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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

..-

Summer list 17, sheet 1
Cert to CADC(Bazelon,Tamm,Robinson)

No. 79-1583

NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA

v.
MARSHALL (Sec'y of Labor)

Timely

Federal/Civil

Please see Preliminary Memorandum in No. 79-1429, American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Marshall.
I would hold this case for Republic Steel Corp. v. ·OSHA,
No. 78-918,

aAd American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,

No. 78-919.
The SG has filed a response in which the AFL-CIO and the
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union concur.
8/6/80

Coleman

Opn 617 F2d 636

c.·.

\\

v.
MARSHALL (Sec'y of Labor)
No. 79-1583
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA

v.
MARSHALL
No. 79-1789
COTTON WAREHOUSE ASS'N, et a1.

- 2 '

'

c

SUMMARY:

The cotton industry attacks OSHA standards for

permissible levels of cotton dust in workplaces on several
grounds,

one of which,

what OSHA must show to establish that

its standards are "feasible",

is an issue pending before this

Court in cases to be argued during the 1980 Term.
FACTS:

Section 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act of 1970 authorizes the Secretary of Labor,
and opportunity to comment·,

after notice

to establish mandatory national

standards governing health arid safety in the workplace.
§

r

~~provides

655 (b).

29 USC

in p.e rt,inent part:

f"' 6(f)~

The Secretary,
in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials ~r harmful physical agents under this
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures,
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the
best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even
if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt
with by such standard for the period of his working life.
[emphasis supplied]

--

Cotton dust is not a carcinogen,

but exposure to the dust

for sustained periods causes respiratory problems and has been

specifically linked to

~:t;i= ~ ,

debilitating disease which

~s

a

to permanent lung damage.

Exposure to cotton dust was one of the expressly-recognized

l ~

health hazards that provoked passage of the Act.
In 1978,

Jollowing publication of a proposed standard,

series of public hearings,

a

and submissions of written data and

comments from interested parties,

the Secretary issued final

standards restricting the amount of cotton dust allowable in
the air of workplaces in the cotton industry.

----

The standards

. include a medical-transfer and income-protection provision [29
-- .. ---......
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'

C.F.R. § 1910.1043(f) (2) (v)] requiring that,

~ ~

where certain

;

levels of exposure are exceeded,

an employee certified by a _ - ~~~~
\\ may transfer wi ~hout~.~. -.... J:;,.y.
physician as 16nable to wear a respirator
1
A.
• 1.~1'1A ~I
~,,~

loss of pay to any other position in the company that is
- - -

~
~

available and that has an exposure level below the designated
level.
Pursuant to 29 USC§ 655(f)

(allowing

w;b · ~tf{

pre-en~orcement

.fl

judicial review),

four

,,

the standards were attacked as infeasible by

---------

representatives of the cotton textile industry and

of

-nontextile industries including the petrs Cotton Warehouse
Ass'n and American Cotton Shippers Ass'n.
the standards were also challenged

Two minor aspects of

b~ployee

unions as too

lax.
HOLDING BELOW:

CADC upheld the standards except for their
~--~-~

(\..._;
\ .

application to the cottonseed oil industry.

The court first

held that the proper standard of review for notice-and-comment ~~v~
rulemaking under the Act is the test of
on the record considered as a whole,"

"sub~ence

29 usc § 655 (f),

rather

Judge Bazelon,

Citing two prior concurring opinions

however,

theCA stressed that it would not

(1) the CA rejected industry challenges to

the feasibility of the exposure level as applied to the latter
stages of textile production and to the~-year deadline for

compliance.

The CA noted evidence that many employers were

already in compliance with the standards and held that while
the quality of the record on this point might have been

~
~

.,.__f /.-A.~ ~ - .. - . - _, ..
---~

O

resolve controversies over technical data.
On the merits,

)urnii/ ~

' 1~

than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard applicable to
informal rulemaking.

,

,....

- 4 -

improved with more extensive studies,

§

6(b) (5) requires the

agency to develop standards based upon "the best available
(

evidence" (emphasis supplied by CA) and that standard had been
satisfied.
(2)T ~ A

also rejected the industry petrs' claims that the

agency's $550 million figure grossly understated the actual
capital costs required in order for the industry· to comply with
the standard and that the true cost was unreasonable because it
would drive many companies out of business.

The CA looked to

the agency's analysis of two cost estimates (one by the
agency's own economic feasibility contractor) and to the
agency's stated reasons for finding both of them excessive,
and found the analysis reasonable.
agency "had evidence in its record
(

The CA then noted that the -

that~h: ind-ustr~~oul~ ?e

able to pass compliance costs on to consumers,"

citing as

"evidence" the fact that one cost consultant had a s sumed that
costs of compliance would be passed on,
a few firms are forced to shut down,
standard economically infeasible;

and added that even if

that would not make the

the agency had expressly

concluded that "the industry as a whole will not be threatened
~

by the capital requirements of the regulation."

The CA found

significant the fact that the employee unions,

by supporting

the agency on the economic feasibility issue,

had rejected the

-

claim that the standards threatened the industry's survival.
(3) The CA also rejected industry's claim that the standard
was invalid because no cost-benefit analysis had been
conducted.

The CA noted that other statutory schemes such as

the Clean Air Act expressly require such analyses,

but the Act

l

_,.

- 5 -
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does not,

and took the view that Congress itself had

undertaken a cost-benefit analysis totally ih favor of
preventing "material impairment of health or functional
I'

capacity" of employees.

The CA reasoned that under Vermont

Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
US 519, 524 (1978),

435

a court may not require an agency to

conduct a cost-benefit analysis unless the agency or Congress
officially requires this procedure.
(4) The CA also rejected a challenge to the permissibleexposure-level for the non-textile industries covered by the
standard. 1 The CA recognized that the types of dust may
differ between textile and nontextile industries and that
"health effects in the nontextile industries appear to be less
prevalent and less severe than in the textile mills",
(

but

noted that the agency had concluded that nontextile workers
still "run the risk" of material health impairment.

The CA

concluded:
OSHA thus explained the evidence it used, the reasons for
its conclusions, and its responses to the industries'
evidence and objections. When agencies are entrusted with
regulating risks on the frontiers of scientific and medical
knowledge, we cannot ask for more.
(5) The CA upheld the medical transfer and wage guarantee
provisions,

reasoning that absent such provisions,

employees

"may refrain from disclosing actual health impairments from the
dust exposure"

and holding that OSHA is authorized to guard

against such problems.
1. The CA made an exception for the cottonseed oil industry,
as to which the court found that the record did not adequately
establish economic feasibility of the standard. The industry
had estimated that the standard would shut down 52% of its
production capacity. The CA remanded that standard.

- 6 -
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The CA denied rehearing en bane,

but Judge MacKinnon would

have held resolution of the cost-benefit question for this
Court's opinion in the benzene case,
AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
CONTENTIONS:

Industrial Union Dep't,

No. 78-911 (decided 7/2/80).

Separate cert petns attacking theCA's

decision have been filed by (1) the American Textile
Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and 13 textile manufacturers,
(2) the National Cotton Council of America (NCCA),

and (3) the

Cotton Warehouse Association (CWA) and the American Cotton
Shippers Association (ACSA).

These petns were all filed before

this Court's decision of the benzene case,

and all petrs

assert a conflict with the decision of the lower court in the
benzene case.

/

(1) ATMI (represented by Robert Bork) asserts a conflict in
the CAs as to what showing OSHA must make in order to establish
that its standards are "feasible" within the meaning of the
statute.

The CA's decision means that the agency need only

have concluded that the entire industry will not be put out of
business.

CAS has read it to require OSHA to demonstrate that

the standard will not cause widespread
consequent unemployment.
of Labor,

busines~

failure and

Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Dep't

489 F2d 120,130 (CAS 1974).

CA6 and CA7 have read

it to require a showing that the benefits of a standard · are
proportionate to its costs.

RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor,

594 F2d 566,573 (CA6 1979);

Turner Co. v. Secreta r y of Labor,

561 F2d 82,85 (CA7 1977).
correct;

The approach of CA6 and CA7 is

otherwise there would be an unconstitutional

delegation of authority.

National Cable Television v. United

- 7 -

..

States,

415 US 336,342 (1974) •

(2) In this case,
"Bazelon heterodoxy",

CADC has finally surrendered to the
repeatedly condemned by Judge Leventhal
I'

and by Professor K.C. Davis for its excessive deference to
administrative agencies.

The court abdicated its judicial

review function by requiring only that the agency have
articulated reasons for its conclusions.

The CA opinion

contains ludicrous examples of deference,

such as the

treatment of a consultant's assumption as "evidence".
(3) The wage-guarantee provisions exceed OSHA's statutory
authority.

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 48 USLW 4189 (US

2/26/80) (upholding regulation allowing an employee to refuse to
work when he has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury,
but noting congressional rejection of a "strike with pay"
provision and stressing that the regulation does not require
pay for work not done).
NCCA,

identifying itself as a "supplemental petitioner

solely on matters of cost and impact",

argues that substantial

evidence on the record as a whole does not support the OSHA
finding that the standard is economically feasible.
CWA and ACSA,

the trade associations respectively for the

cotton warehouse industry and for cotton classing offices,
argue that the CA improperly failed to require an OSHA finding
of "material" health impairment in those industries.
court's standard of "risk" of illness is insufficient.

The
There

is a lack of medical evidence indicating the existence of
material health hazards in warehouses and an absence of any
medical evidence at all with respect to classing offices.

The

- 8 -
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(

.

dust encountered in these places is qualitatively different
from that in textile plants:

it is less respirable.

It was

improper to allow evidence from the "unrelated" textile
industry to override the absence of evidence pertaining
directly

to~

Th~ t

industries.
e Court to

· h~l~

Nos. 79-1429

(ATMI) and

79-1583 (NCCA} for Republic Steel Corp. v. OSHA,
and American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,
(cert. granted, 7/2/80}.

In these cases,

0__)

No. 78-918,
No. 78-919

the Court will

consider the meaning of the word "feasible" in § 6 (b) (5} of
OSHA and the standard of judicial review applicable to OSHA
"feasibility" determinations.

Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
(

v. American Petroleum Institute,

No. 78-911 (7/2/80}.

He

points out that the Secretary has volunteered to reconsider the
standards for cotton warehouses and classing offices.

45 Fed.

Reg. 50328-29 (7/29/80}.
The employee-union resps have concurred by letter in these
~~.........:.---~~

recommendations of the SG.
With respect to the wage-guarantee provision,

the SG

stresses that the Act authorizes the Secretary to require
"practices,

means,

methods,

operations,

or processes [that

are] reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment" [29 USC § 652(8}] and that wage
guarantees are included "practices",
DISCUSSION:
correct.

"means",

or "methods".

The SG's recommended disposition appears

The issue of the construction of the word "feasible"

- 9 -

in§ 6(b) (5) is before this Court in the pending coke-oven

('

emissions cases,

and this Court's resolution of the standard

of review issue in those cases will presumably cast light on
the merits of ATMI's "Bazelon heterodoxy" argument in the OSHA
context.

The ~ge

guarantee issue presents an important question,

going far beyond the W'hirlpool case,

and theCA's resolution

of the issue is dubious.
I would hold Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583 for Nos. 78-918 and
78-919,

with a view toward ultimately granting cert on the

wage-guarantee issue.

I would GVR No. 79-1789 in light of

Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Marshall,

No. 78-911.

The SG has filed a response in which the AFL-CIO and the
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union concur.

( -

8/6/80

Coleman

Opn in Appendix

~r,?7-c-~~

~

s-c-

G~~

~

l·

~ &~JI-/J ~(~~ ~) -{?i-!tl-zcr

;/d£_j;v C-h. ~~-

k

(!1-15''13

~~~~~~
~~~~s-3 .
-

"?

Summer list 17, sheet 1
No. 79-1429

ert to CADC
(Bazelon, Tamm, Robinson)

~

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, et al.

v.
MARSHALL [U.S. Secretary

No. 79-1583

of Labor]

~

NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA

v.
MARSHALL

No. 79-1789

b--1/cl- f< ~ ~ ~

COTTON WAREHOUSE ASS'N, et al.

v.
MARSHALL

_()

Federal/Civil

Timely
(e xt'n in 79-1789)

. ~~~~~ \~se ~~ ~ ~~

~d he ~ ~r \~\~~ a{ ~~
<.; r~b,. Agl't!Mk ~5 ~ro~;de J aX- leasf- b>t tl.o
>

-

2 -

The Preliminary Memorandum for these curve-lined cases sug gest e d
•:

that 79-1429 and 79-1583 be held for the OSHA coke oven cases [No.
78-918, Republic Steel Corp. v. OSHA;
Steel Institute v. OSHA].

and No. 78-919, American Iron &

---------

That option is no longer available because

the writs in coke ovens have just been dismissed under Rule 53.
The SG's response with

respec~ t~a~

cert was granted in coke ovens,

atgued only for a

~d.

-

filed after

Accordingly,

the Court may wish to call for a supplemental response.
Alternatively,
(restated here):

the Court should consider a grant on two questions
(1) whether' the CA correctly interpreted the

statutory requirement that OSHA standards be "feasible";
the CA applied a correct standard of review.
issues 1, 2, and 3 in petition 79-1429 1
79-1583.

They are important,

benzene case,
--.......,.....

(2) whether

These questions encompass

and both questions in

they were left open in last term's

and they are identical to issues that would have been

~-------~--------------------------------~
presented in the coke
oven cases.
Also,

and without any further response from the SG,

the wage

guarantee issue (Issue 4 in No. 79-1429) appears to be independently
certworthy.
The coke ovens development appears not to affect No. 79-1789,

in

which OSHA concedes that a GVR is warranted in light of benzene.
9/18/80

Coleman

Opn in Appendix
of No. 79-1429

1. The "questions presented" in 79-1429 are incredibly biased and it
would be confusing to grant on the issues as stated there. The Court
may want to li~~~~nt to the questions presented in 79-1583,
which are more neutrally-stated.

,,
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79-1419 American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Marshall

1.'

When I got into the briefs on this case, it
occurred to me that possibly the Ethyl Corporation was
interested in the case.
thought.

There were two reasons for this

This is the "cotton dust" case, and one of the

main issues is whether under OSHA the relationship between
benefit and cost of complying with regulations must be
considered
Then, in

a~firmatively

loo~

in the adoption of a regulations.

the amici briefs, one is fil;{ed by an

association that listed its 137 members.

It members are

·.

corporations, one of which is Ethyl.
I called Larry Blanchard, Vice Chairman of the
Board and the officer of the corporation who has followed
the regulatory problems of the company more closely than
anyone else.

Larry is a former partner of mine at Hunton &

Williams, and we talked frankly.

He did not even know the

"cotton dust" case was in our Court, nor did he know that an
association of which Ethyl was a member had a filed a brief.
I advised Larry that at least some of the briefs refer to
the "lead cases" as also presenting the cost/benefit
question.

I stayed out of the lead cases because Ethyl - as

one of the end product users of lead - might have an
interest.

But Larry stated that Ethyl has no interest in

,•'

'•

•·"

..

•

2.
I

,;-

the present cotton dust case, and he sees no reason why I
should disqualify.

1.'

Incidentally, he said that the lead case in which
Ethyl was or may have been interested, has been denied by
this Court.

.,
<'

''·

..

"''

......'

As I have not followed these cases, I do not

know what the status is.

In any event, Larry also said that

'··
l

Ethyl - in his view - has lost all of its battles and is
complying with OSHA's regulations.

He also noted that the

cost/benefit question arguably may arise in almost every
OSHA regulation controversy.

Thus, unless a judge must

.. •

disqualify himself whenever an issue may affect industry in
;

general, he could not own any securities.

l

'

Neither the

statute nor the Code of Ethics requires such a result.
Before calling Larry, I spoke to Justice Stewart,
and discussed this question with him, pointing out that an
amicus brief probably included corporations in which he or
~
his family trusts~ own shares. Potter reminded me that the

,,

Court has consistently followed the policy that Justices do
not disqualify on account of amici briefs.

Any other rule,

would enable interested persons to manipulate the
disqualification of Justices.

Nor did Justice Stewart think

the possible similarity of the wage/benefit question arising
in other industries, justified recusal.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

..

'

.

'

..

...

~

·,

pwc 1/19/81
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

January 19, 1981

RE:

No. 79-1429, ATMI v. Marshall [the "Cotton Dust" case]

Question Presented
The

principal

question

is

whether

OSHA,

before

setting a limit on workers' exposure to a toxic substance, must
establish that the benefits of that limit exceed the costs that
will be incurred to achieve it.
OSHA

has

employers

statutory
in

the

authority
cotton

The second question is whether
to

require

industry

institute

maintenance programs for their workers.

·.

by

rulemak ing
certain

that
wage-

2.

Background
This

is

one

of

several

recent

cases

involving

costs and benefits of environmental and job-safety laws.
case,

like

the Benzene case

from

last Term,

the
Th~s

involves OSHA's

authority under its Act to set standards for worker exposure to
toxic substances.

It

is

instructive

briefly

to describe

the

issues before the Court in Benzene.
The chemical benzene is a carcinogen.

OSHA took the

point of view that any exposure to a carcinogen is harmful, and
such exposure therefore should be made limited.

OSHA claimed

its authority to do so under section 6(b) (5) of the Act, which
provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards
dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical
agents
under
this
subsection,
shall
set
the
standard
which
most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on
the
basis
of
the
best
available
evidence,
that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such
standard for the period of his working
life.
The reference to the term "standard" apparently incorporates by
reference§ 3(8) of the Act, which defines "standard" as
conditions . • • or • . . practices, means,
methods,
operations,
or
processes,
reasonably necessary or
appropriate
to
provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment.
The Secretary took the position that there is no safe
exposure level to a carcinogen such as

benzene.

He

thought,

therefore, the § 6 (b) ( 5) required him to set an exposure limit

3.

at the lowest level that would not impair the viability of the
industry.

That

level,

he

thought,

was

1

part

per

million

(ppm) .

1·

In
fragmented.

reviewing

this

standard,

the

Court

was

badly

Justice Stevens wrote for three justices reversing

and remanding.
separately.

You joined parts of his opinion and also wrote

Justice Rehnquist concurred in the

result.

Four

justices joined a dissenting opinion.
The plurality held that § 3 (8)
be read

in tandem.

"reasonably
healthful

Section 3 (8)

necessary

or

employment."

and §

6 (b) (5)

should

requires standards that are

appropriate

According

to

to
the

provide
plurality,

safe

or

however,

"'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.'"

Slip op. at 31.

There

every day

are

many

activities

that

we

engage

in

that

entail some risk, but that nevertheless are considered "safe."
Id.

According

to

the

requirement of § 3 (8)
levels,

the

presenting
41.
the

plurality,

"significant"

not done

is

unsafe,"

risk of health

On the record in this case,
Secretary had

the

threshold

is to show that, at prevailing exposure

"place of employment
a

therefore,

so.

id.

at 3 2,

impairment,

id.

by
at

the plurality concluded that
His

assumption was

that any

exposure to a carcinogen was harmful and subject to regulation.
The plurality, by imposing a threshold test of the significance
of

risk,

required

the

Secretary

to document

his

assumption.

Because the Secretary had failed to adduce evidence meeting the
threshold test,

the plurality did not need

to reach the more

4.

difficult question of whether

the Secretary had to undertake

"cost-benefit analysis."
You joined parts of the plurality opinion and wrote a
short

opinion

of

your

own.

In

it,

you

noted

that

OSHA's

"fallback" position was that substantial evidence supported the
1 ppm standard even under the plurality's test.
to respond to OSHA's alternative position.

You undertook

"[A]ssum[ing] that

OSHA properly met this burden," you concluded that "the statute
also requires the agency to determine that the economic effects

'-"--.............

-.._.~

.-,.._...-

~

of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the expec
benefits.

An

-----,-.

occupational

'reasonably necessary' nor
if

it

calls

for

health

expenditures

You noted that

standard may be

neither

is

'feasible,' as required by statute .,
wholly disproportionate

expected health and safety benefits."
concurring).

standard

Id. at 4-5

to

the

(Powell, J.,

"[t]he cost of complying with a

'bearable' and still not reasonably related to

the benefits expected.
may have financial
ordered costs.

A manufacturing company,

resources that enable

for

example,

it to pay the OSHA-

But expenditures for unproductive purposes may

limit seriously its financial ability to remain competitive and
provide

jobs."

Moreoever,
reading

Id.

if

of

at 5 n. 4;

economic

the

considerations

statute

resources because the

see also

would

result

id.
are
in

at 6

&

ignored,

n.6,

7.

OSHA's

misallocation

of

industry would spend too much money to

eliminate

one

risk,

and

eliminate

some

other

one.

not
In

have
sum,

enough
the

left

to

try

implication of

to
your

opinion is that Congress could not possibly have wanted OSHA to

....

50

consider costs to ensure
ruined,

but to

that entire

ignore costs when

slightly less stringent.
doubt

that

societal

Congress

conflicting

goal

in
or

the

level of

See id. at 4-7.

intended

interest

industries would not be

OSHA to

health

and

maintaining

"There can be

balance

safety

a

regulation

strong

litt~e

reasonably

with

the

national

is

the

often

economy."

Id. at 6 n.6.

Discussion
In

this

case,

as

you

know,

OSHA

set

an

exposure

standard of 200 micrograms of cotton dust per cubic meter.

For

...

"slashing
set

the

standard

believed
not

be

and weaving"

that

a

at 750 mcgs/cu m.
stricter

technologically

industry.

aspects of the textile
OSHA did

standard,

"fea-sible"

industry,
so

because

although desirable,
because

it

OSHA

would

it

would

ruin

the

The question is whether OSHA should have set even a

higher standard in light of the substantial costs of reaching
the

200/750

standard.

Your

opinion

in

Benzene

in

dictum

anticipated this crucial issue in the Cotton Dust case.
A.

Petrs' Arguments

1.

Cost

Benefit Analysis.

OSHA's

construction of

the statute treats costs as totally irrelevant until they reach
the point at which the standard, if implemented, would destroy
an entire industry.
to

make

evidence,

a

This cannot be the law.

responsible
of

the

prediction,

economic

impact

OSHA should have

supported
of

its

by

substantial

standard,

and

to

6.
explain why it believes that a standard having such a burden is
worthwhile.
OSHA seems to believe that Congress left it free to
impose

enormously

costly

single health hazard,

requirements

as

in

the

context

of

a

long as compliance with that single

standard does not ruin the industry.

In Benzene, the plurality

sought not to "give the Secretary the unprecedented power over
American industry that would result" if he could try to require
a

risk-free

workplace.

requirement
risk[s)"
health
way,

that

OSHA

only does

risks

there

only

half

that

may

But

the

cannot

be

the

eliminate
job.

of

be

achieving

threshold

"significant

There

prudently

ways

plurality's

may

be

significant

avoided.
almost

Put

as

health

another

much

health
l

ti/'ft4u./
a~

OSHA violated

benefit at a drastically reduced cost.

to make
the statute in two ways.
it failed
----------------------~~
responsible cost estimate.
The costs of OSHA's regulation are
in dispute.
would

cost

opted for
estimate

One [the RTI estimate] concluded that the standard
$1.1

billion.

OSHA

rejected

a $550 million estimate
was

not

based

on

the

this

estimate,

[Hocutt-Thomas].

exposure

-

standard

But

and
this

eventually

-

adopted, but rather on a less stringent one.
Thus, OSHA
~
......__._
inexplicably based its cost estimate on a study that did not
even

purport

eventually

to

measure

adopted.

Hocutt-Thomas
for

new

the

estimate

To

estimate

technology and
too

the
be

cost

sure,

contained

of

OSHA

biases

the

speculated
(failure

retrofitting costs)

large.

But

only

by

standards

the

that

to

OSHA
the

subtract

that perhaps made
most

remarkable

7.

coincidence would the amount of the overstatement be equal to
the

additional

costs

required

to

attain

standards that OSHA actually adopted.
to produce

a cost estimate

the

more

stringent

Thus, OSHA failed

that could

survive

the

ev~n

threshold

duty, established by the plurality in Benzene, to show that the
total cost would not bankrupt the entire industry.
its

cost

date

was

flawed.

Moreoever,

its

As noted,

assumption

that

increased costs could be "passed through" to consumers ignored
the fact that constraints imposed by foreign competition made
any passing-through difficult.

~ even
the

agency failed

if

~SHA

did meet its threshold burden,

to explain why

the

costs of

were justified in light of their benefits.

its

standards

The mere fact that

----------~--

compliance
industry

costs
does

are

not

not

mean

requirements of the Act.

great
that

enough
a

to

destroy

standard

an

comports

On the contrary,

entire

with

the

"Congress did not

intend OSHA to reduce each signficant hazard without regard to
economic consequences

.

short of serious dislocation."

Benzene, slip op. at 5-6 n.5

(Powell, J., concurring).

standards

such

operations

may
as

require
are

only

"reasonably

conditions,

necessary

or

OSHA's

practices,
appropriate

and
to

provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."
§

3(8) of the Act.

§§

In sum, the standard setting provisions of

3 (8) and 6 (b) (5) are qualified and relative in nature.
The legislative history confirms this view.

Senator

Javits, the author of the Administration's original bill, took
the

position

that

OSHA standards

should

be

"reasonable"

and

8.
"practical" as well as technologically achievable.
Committee,

although

rejecting

Javits'

plan

to

The Senate
1'

establish

an

independent review board, agreed that the standards under § 6
should be "feasible requirements."
into

I

6(b) (5)

§

satisfied

The addition of that term

Senator

Javits.

Furthermore,

the

Senate Committee also substituted the word "material" for "any"
impairment

of

health.

"balanced"

bill,

so

This,

that

too,

was

OSHA could

designed

not

try

to produce a

to

establish

a

risk-free utopia regardless of costs.
This concern also was demonstrated in the compromises
in the drafting of

the

Congress

hybrid

adopted

rulemaking

but

a

judicial review sections of the bill.

required

procedure
that

a

that

permitted

reviewing

court

informal
look

for

"substantial evidence on the record as a whole" rather than the
more

review

deferential

behavior.

In sum,

for

"arbitrary

it is clear

and

capricious"

that Congress believed

it was

enacting a "fair and reasonable bill that balanced the needs of

.....__

~

--

workers and industry."
P etrs

thus

~._....

~

94 Harv. L. Rev. at 248.
believe

that

OSHA

must

show

that

its

standards address significant health risks or material health
impairments,

and

that

significant

reduction

the

standard

of

that

is

expected

risk.

to

According

achieve a
to

petrs,

whether a reduction in risk is significant depends on the costs
necessary

to achieve

that

do

they

not

it.

expect

Petrs

try

to make

OSHA to engage

in a

clear,

however,

rigidly

formal

cost-benefit calculation that places a dollar value on employee
lives or health.

Rather, OSHA simply must analyze and evaluate

r

..

,

l

9.
alternative courses of action to see whether society's limited
industrial-hygiene
It

misallocated.
assessment
(Powell,

resources
is,

of

in the first

course,

not

being

up

to

subject

to

squandered

OSHA

instance, Benzene,

concurring),

J.,

are

to

supra,

judicial

make

'

or
this

at 7-8 n. 8

review.

Even

though a court might well be reluctant to disturb the agency's
judgment,

forcing

it

to

identify and weigh

the

factors

will

have a salutary effect on the agency's decisionmaking process.
Petrs note

that most courts

facing

required some analysis along these lines.
briefs.

-

~~..

OSHA's effort in this case fails because
the

benefits

of

its

required to achieve them.
impact

See cases cited in

Petrs also point out that other statutes with similar

language have been construed similarly.

assess

OSHA cases have

that

the

standards

in

light of

industry's

between

would have.

byssinosis

treated

grade

varying

costs

proposed

program

(which

involved

use and employee

Moreoever, OSHA did not differentiate

symptoms of byssinosjs in
....
evaluating the benefits of its standards.
Most of the grades
of

the

the

OSHA did not seriously analyze the

medical surveillance coupled with respirator
transfers)

it did not

grades

and

_____

are

__...
reversible

1/2

byssinosis

if

which

chest tightness -- as a grave harm.

OSHA,

monitored.
is

simply

It is not.

however,
infrequent

Cotton dust is

not a carcinogen like benzene.
2.

Wage-Maintenance

Programs.

A

separate

issue

involves OSHA imposition of a wage-maintenance program.

Under

OSHA's rules, respirators must be provided and used during the

\~

10.

transition period before the new rule is fully in effect.
this

requirement petrs have no quarrel.

(f) (2) (v)

of

the

rule,

however,

Pursuant

employees

to

With

section

unable

to

u~e

respirators (because of facial configuration, for example) must
be

given

an opportunity

to

transfer

to another,

safer,

job.

Such transfers may be made even though the employee shows no
symptom of byssinosis.

Moreoever, employers must ensure that

such employees suffer no loss of earnings.
Petrs contends that OSHA doesn't have the authority
to do this.
this

The Act contains no express grant of authority for

requirement.

The

CA

concluded

impliedly authorized by section 3 (8)
"reasonably

necessary

or

that

the

provision

of the Act as a measure

appropriate

to

provide

healthful employment and places of employment."
this

is

not

correct.

The CA' s

was

or

Petrs contend

invest

OSHA with

virtually limitless authority to impose almost any

imaginable

requirement

as

arguably

related

view would

safe

to

health,

such

insurance, food stamps, or health spa retreats.

health

In the course

of debate on the Act, Congress rejected a provision that would
have

permitted

an employee

to

"strike with

initiative to avoid a hazardous workplace.
in

Whirlpool

Congress

did

Corp.
not

v.

want

Marshall,
to

salary for

doing no work.

that

not

OSHA

unwilling

to do

accomplish
by

445

pay"

by

u.s.

1,

statute.

what

Finally,

own

17-80

(1980),

their

regular

Congress must have

rule

his

As the Court noted

let employees obtain
Thus,

at

Congress
petrs

intended

itself

point

out

was
that

Congress in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969

11.

protection

wage

promulgate

to

Congress thus knew how to write such matters in~o

regulations.
the law.

agency

the

authorized

That Congress chose one year later not to do so in

this context suggests that OSHA cannot do it by regulation.
B.

Resps' Arguments
1.

Cost-Benefit Analysis.

The Cotton Dust standard

plainly meets the threshold inquiry, established by the Benzene
plurality, that the prior standard represent a significant risk
of

material

health

approximately

The

impairment.

roughly 500

previous

to 1000 mcg/cu m.

standard

Under

this

was
old

standard, as the agency found, one worker in four will contract
some grade of byssinos i~.
.......

~

byssinosis.

One in 1000 risks a grade 3 case of the disease.

Under
byssinosis

One in 15 risks a case of grade 2

the

would

unacceptable.

remain.

The

Secretary

forms of the disease.
------...-- -----that persons can be identified
disease

a

ris ~ of ~

26%
.:.-

found

this

Thus,

becomes

and

irreversible.

it

simply

is

be

incorrect

taken off

the

job before

Second,

even

those with

mild forms of the disease suffer material impairment.
medical

to

There is n9 bright line separating the mjJd and

chronic

their

(flA-L~

propo~al,

industry's

surveillance

(which

the

industry

ineffective as a primary control method.

plan

Third,

requires)

is

Testing is not always

accurate and workers sometimes are afraid to report symptoms.
Fourth,

there are

insufficient openings for

transfers for

the

number of workers that would need them under the industry plan.
Finally,

respirators

simply

do

workers do not like to use them.

not

always

work,

and

many

I

12.

??

$1d<_/3%
wU..L

.

declined to

incur ~

Under the plan as adopted, 13% of workers would
the disease.

The Secretary

impose a more strict

standard because he found that doing so would severely injufi:e
the financial health of the industry.
If
by

the

the Secretary met the threshold test established

Benzene

plurality , ---·rne quest ion

in

this

case

becomes

whether the Secretary had to go farther and show somehow that
the

costs

of

benefits.
such

a

implementing

As

be

standard

are

less

than

its

the CA held, Congress did not intend to impose

requirement.

standard

the

the

The

one

that

statute
"most

provides

adequately

only

that

ensures,

the

to

the

extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health."

§

6(b) (5) of the Act (emphasis added).

Thus, Congress itself has

done

Secretary

the

balancing.

It wanted

-------

highest

level of protect ion consistent with

The definition of "feasible"
word

the

does

not

refer

to

simple.

It

first

achieve

the

industry health.

is "capable of being done."

the desirability or

something, but only the capacity to do so.
is

to

determines

the

The

benefit of doing
OSHA's task, then,

level or

protection

at

which no worker will face a significant risk of material harm.
Then,

OSHA looks

to see whether

technologically and

that

level of protect ion is

economically achieveable.

If

it

is

not,

OSHA sets its standard at the level that provides the maximum
protection consistent with industry long-term health.

-

Cost-benefit
.....___
inquiry.
~

..

'""I

Congress

analysis

--------

envisioned

is
no

simply
such

not

--

gloss

part
on

the

-

of

the

plain

13.

language
benefits

of

the

of

statute.

Congress

eradicating

toxic

the

"best

that

the

categorically

provided that the

indust:ay

Senator Dominick noted that the bill required

available

requirements

determined

substances

outweighed the costs of doing so,
could survive.

was

standards,"

would

impose

and Congress knew that these

substantial

costs.

Congress

envisioned that these costs would not be avoided by variances
or cost-benefit analysis, but rather through government loans.
15

u.s.c.

Congress

§

636(b) (5).

demanded

the

It

level

adequately" protects workers.
of

Congress

statute,

or

so

much

any

as

cannot

§

of

protection

that

language,

inadvertent."

this

that

the

that
"most

No member

language

requires

undertake cost-benefit considerations.
be deemed

overemphasized

6(b) (5) of the Act.

suggested

other

be

in

the

Secretary

This omission "cannot

Benzene, supra, at 32

(Marshall, J.,

dissenting).
Nothing
modification
impairment"

of
has

cited
the

by

petrs

term

"any

nothing

to

do

is

to

the

impairment"

with

cost

contrary.
to

benefit

The

"rna ter ial
analysis.

Rather, as the plurality in Benzene recognized, this change was
directed at the threshold matter of establishing a significant
risk of injury.

Congress clearly did not want OSHA to regulate

trifling or remote injuries such as mosquito bites.
Petrs also exaggerate to the extent that they argue
that OSHA intends to push industry to the brink of ruin.
true

that OSHA wants

to

set

the

highest

possible

It is

standards.

But these always must be consistent with the long run health of

14.

the

This

industry.

requirement.
construed

is

the

purpose

of · the

In light of that requirement,

the Act always

to maintain the

profitability and competitiveness.

"feasibility"

the Secretary has

industry's long-rl!m

In this case,

for example,

the agency modified the proposed "weaving" standard from 500 to
750 mcgs/cu m because it was clear that the lower limit was not
reasonable.
Secretary

There
pays

misallocation.

are

at

least

attention

to

four
the

danger

material

in

which

of

the

resource

First, he sets his own priorities based on the

urgency of potential danger to workers.
plurarity

ways

held,

he

harm."

regulates

Third,

he

only

looks

Second, as the Benzene
"significant

to

see

whether

risks

of

proposed

alternative methods would accomplish the same result at lesser
cost.

Fourth, he gives consideration to costs in deciding how

long the compliance period should be.
the

greater

innovations

the
and

possibility
the

greater

The longer the period,

of

inexpensive

the

likelihood

technological
of

improving

equipment by attrition rather than by retrofit.
In any event, it is not clear what is meant by "costbenefit analysis."

Any such analysis necessarily must attempt

to quantify human life.
is

arbitrary.

Even

if

How can this be done?
cost-benefit

It essentially

analysis means comparing

costs against the dollar amount of preserved working capacity
and medical bills,

still

the Secretary would have

to make a

prodigious undertaking.
2.
exceed

his

Wage-Maintenance Programs.
authority

in

including

the

The Secretary did not
medical

transfer

and

15.
income

protection

provisions

in

the

These also are "practices, methods,

cotton

dust

standard.

operations, or processes"

that are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide

sa~. e

or healthful employment."

take ·

several years
standard.

for

These

workers.

the

§

3 (8)

of

the Act.

It will

industry to comply fully with the new

interim procedures

are necessary

to

protect

Some employees are unable to wear respirators.

are entitled to preserve their wages
the burden of compliance

They

in the meantime because

is on the industry, not the worker.

Employees will be reluctant to report symptoms unless they are
protected by a job-transfer or wage-maintenance option.
Nothing
That

case

in

involved

the Whirlpool
a

transfer provisions

case

is

to

the

"strike with pay" provision.

contrary.
The

job-

in this case only are applicable where a

doctor has certified that an employee cannot wear a respirator
and where there

is an alternative

job that

the employee can

perform.

Summary

issue

in

money.

Your

opinion

this

case.

It always

incremental
returns

in

Benzene

Common sense

is pass ible

seems

teaches

to make

safety gains cost money.

suggests

that

incremental

to

control

the

key

that safety costs

things more

safe,

but

The law of diminishing

safety

gains

are

achieved

relatively inexpensively at first, and eventually only at great
marginal cost.
health

">'

....

OSHA construes its statute to require it to set

standards at

the most stringent level consistent with

16.

industry survival.
cost

is

great

In other words,

essentially

that

the

irrelevant

entire

under

until

industry's

Benzene, you rejected this view:

the OSHA approach,

the

expense

survival

is

becomes

impaired.

1'
so

In

Congress cannot be deemed to

have intended OSHA to ignore the fact that, at some point, the
marginal

cost

of

increased

safety

exceeds

the

incremental

increase in safety.
The

other

issue

in

the

case,

pertaining

to

the

income-maintenance component of the rule,

is not controlled by

your

I

opinion

agency

has

in Benzene.
the

better

It
of

is close.

that

part

of

tend to think the
the

argument.

The

income-maintenance provision is reasonably consistent with the
authorization that Congress conferred,
upheld.

P.w.c.

...(

1/19/81

and probably should be

pwc 1/20/81

SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

January 20, 1981

RE:

No. 79-1429, The Cotton Dust Cases

In

this

memo,

I'll

try

to

answer

some

of

the

questions you raised, and also clarify some of the points that
may have been unclear in my first memo.

'

.

A.

The Relationship Between "Feasibility" and "Cost-Benefit"
It

is

examination

of

vi tal

to

appreciate

the

technological/economic

betwee~

distinction

feasibility

and

cost-

benefit

analysis.

former;

petrs would like OSHA also to perform the latter.
1.

the

concedes

that

it

must

examine

the

Cost-Benefit Analysis Under § 6(b) (5) of the Act.

Section 6(b) (5)
at

OSHA

level

of the Act instructs OSHA to set the standard
that

"most

adequately

ensures,

to

the

extent

feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment
l(

/

of health."
onl~

------------

••

--

In OSHA's view, the feasibility provision requires
.. -·-------..
the standard be (1) technologically capable of

that

-··---- -

achievement,

,,employers

and

out

of

(2)

not so high that it would "put[]

business."
467,

478

Industrial
(CADC 1974)

Union

Department

(McGowan,

v.

Thus,

J.).

under OSHA view of the statute to the extent
will
industry.
is

promulgated

if

it

would

ruin

an

That is why the controversy over the cost estimates

relevant.

estimate.
perhaps

be

OSHA accepted

In OSHA's view,

not

some

weak

the
the

"Hocutt-Thomas"

$550 million

-----------

industry as a whole

-

individual

companies)

could

(although
pay

that

price, particularly in light of the industry's ability to "pass
through" cost increases to consumers.
with the Hocutt-Thomas estimate.
In
"feasibility"

sum,

under

requirement

industry's financial

'<

'·

OSHA's
of

§

[There may be problems

See Bench Memo at 6-7.]
view
6(b) (5)

of

the
refers

statute,

the

only

the

to

and technological capability to meet the

3.

health standard.

"Feasib!.lity" does not require cost-benefit

analysis.
~--

Cost-Benefit Analysis Under

2.

Petrs,

however,

derived
standard

from
be

suggest
3 (8)

§

that

of

the

"reasonably

cost-benefit

statute,

necessary

safe or healthful employment."
it

did

in

Benzene,

tandem with §

6 (b) (5).

language in § 3 (8)
identified

by

regulation

was

OSHA,

or

analysis

may

requires

that

appropriate

should

not

OSHA does contend,

Benzene

aimed

at

plurality:
reducing

be

to

be
a

promote

construed

however,

threshold

problem

is

namely,

a

in

that the

whether

"significant

Plurality op. at 35.

that

the Act.

OSHA does not now contend, as

3(8)

§

which

of

is directed only at the threshold problem

the

material harm."
to

that

3 (8)

§

the

risk

of

In this case, according
long

past,

because

the

agency found that its standard would demonstrably diminish the
incidence of byssinosis.

In sum, the "reasonably necessary or

appropriate" language is relevant only to the threshold test of
the Benzene plurality:

the need to show a demonstrable risk of

material harm.
Relevance

3.

of

Costs

In

OSHA's

View.

OSHA

strenuously insists that it does not intend to drive "industry
to

the

brink

of

ruin."

There

are

several

ways

that

OSHA

considers cost without employing formal cost benefit analysis.
Bench Memo 13-14.
is

relevant

maintain

to
the

competitiveness.

There are five principal ways in which cost

the

calculus.

industry's

First,
long-run

OSHA always desires
profitability

to
and

In this case, for example, OSHA modified its

4.

original weaving standard of 500 mcgs/cu m because it was clear
that the lower standard was not reasonable.

Second, OSHA setst

its own timetable of regulatory policies based on the urgency
of potential danger to workers.

Third, in accordance with the

holding of the Benzene plurality, OSHA only seeks to regulate
"significant

risks

of material

harm."

Fourth, OSHA looks

to

see whether proposed alternative methods could achieve the same
results at less cost.
to

be

relevant

should be.
of

in

Fifth, OSHA considers compliance costs

deciding

how

long

the

compliance

period

The longer the period, the greater the possibility

inexpensive technological

innovations

and

the greater

the

likelihood of improving equipment by replacement rather than by
retrofit.
Summary

4.

inquired

of

the

whether

OSHA's

Position

Secretary

claims

on

Costs.

authority

You

to

set

standards "in disregard of their economic impact, with the sole
limit being that the cost of a single standard must not be so
great as to threaten the destruction of an entire industry."
think the answer to your question is a "qualified yes."
have

shown,

OSHA does

requirement

of

requirement

of

6(b) (5)

§

3(8)

§

---------------------

discussion
because

supra

insist

and

Congress

sensible regulator.

nor

-

requires
Bench

wanted

ensure worker health.

that

neither

the

the

Memo.

regulations

It

claims
that

.i

necessary"

analysis.
this

"most

See

authority

adequately"

OSHA does, however, insist that it is a
The agency considers costs in various ways

without engaging in formal cost benefit analysis.

.It,

As I

"feasibility"

"reasonably

cost-benefit

I

Indeed, OSHA

5. '

claims that

it does not understand the nature of formal cost

benefit analysis, because that process would require setting a t
dollar value on human life and health.
B.

See Bench Memo at 14.

Findings of Fact
Like you,

conclusions

in

the

I cannot find the Secretary's findings and
materials

that

we

were

given.

however, studied theCA opinion in some detail.

I

have,

It referred to

the record quite frequently and did not reject any conclusion
reached by the agency.
1.
noted

that

Evidence
the

agency

evidence did adopt,
requires
The

proposed

OSHA's

to

adopt,

by contrast,

surveillance,

to

and

after

use

CA

hearing

This approach

keep the dust level low.

proposed an alternative

the

The

Standards.

a "dust control strategy."

equipment modifications

industry,

medical

Supporting

of

respirators,

involving
and

job

transfers.
The CA found

that,

at least

in its chronic stages,

byssinosis is a material health hazard.

Pet. App. 50-51 n.83.

The causal nature of the disease is not clear,

id. at 51, but

it is clear that something in cotton dust induces the disease
in

some

persons.

OSHA

relied

on

several

witnesses

who

testified that the control of dust is the only effective way to
control the disease.
ineffective
itself
Indeed,

until

because
it

Id.
the

already

industry • s

Medical surveillance generally was
disease
has

sometimes

reached

witnesses

the

does

not

manifest

irreversible

testified

that

surveillance without dust control was ineffective.

stage.
medical

!d. at 51 &

6. :

Approximately

n.87.

byssinosis under
at 49 n. 79.

the

25%

of

the

workers

would

contract
Id. 1:

industry's proposed exposure level.

According to one

key study that OSHA apparently

credited, only about 12% of the workers would get the disease
under OSHA's exposure levels.
The

industry

Brief for Secretary at 8.

apparently

introduced

evidence

suggesting less pessimistic conclusions, but the agency thought
the

industry

n.76.

studies

had been "discredited,"

Pet.

App.

48

&

The CA refused to disturb OSHA's evidentiary weighing.

Id. at 49 n.77.
2.
not

repeat

Evidence Supporting OSHA's Cost Estimates.
the

relevance

of

described above in this memo.

this

information,

which

I'll
is

Nor will I reiterate at length

the dispute over the accuracy of this information.

I discussed

the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas estimates in my prior memo at pp. 67.

The only tenable basis for rejecting OSHA's reliance on the

latter

estimate

is

that

the

estimate

was

based

on

expectation of complying with a less stringent standard.
found,

however,

that

any

resulting

downward

bias

here

the
OSHA
was

offset by certain upward biases elsewhere in the Hocutt-Thomas
figures.

The CA refused

to disturb OSHA's conclusion.

Pet.

App. at 62-66.
C.

Conclusions and Recommendation
Your memo was very perceptive.

the cost/benefit question .
what

[you]

.

'

wrote

in Benzene."

.

I did merely "resolve

in a brief summary, accepting
I

did

so because--much to my

7•

dismay--!

found myself

believing

that the government had the

better of the argument on that key issue.
I

found your "broad brush"

persuasive as a policy matter.

remarks in Benzene to be

Though it is uncomfortable to

think that it costs too much to save a human life, a rational
policy should recognize that society has a great interest in
maintaining a strong national economy, and that it sometimes is
necessary

to

interest.

take

See

risks--even

Benzene,

health

slip

op.

risks--to

at

6

n.6

further

that

(Powell,

J.,

concurring).
Yet,

on reviewing

the

authorities cited,

I

tend to

think that the government may be right that Congress, however
foolishly, did not put this policy into the OSHA Act.
the legislative history that petrs advanced.
7-8.

Consider

See Bench Memo at

Petrs point to nothing really persuasive that shows that

Congress

intended

cost-benefit

analysis.

legislative history are very vague.

Their

citations

to

They refer to the desire

to have a "reasonable" or a "balanced" bill.

They also rely on

the fact that Congress made the standard of review "substantial
evidence" rather than "arbitrary and capricious."

If Congress

had wanted OSHA to balance costs against benefits, I would have
thought that legislators would have made this clear.
not.

Can this omission "be deemed inadvertent?"

They did

Benzene, slip

op. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The government's construction of
perhaps

unwise

as

a

policy

matter--seems

closely with the legislative history.

the statute--while
to

conform

more

See Bench Memo at 12-13.

''

8.

Congress may

well

setting

a

standard

"put[]

employers

have envisioned
only

to

out

of

the

that costs

extent

that

business."

be

relevant

they

would

Industrial

to
not

Union

Department, supra.
Even if you now agree with my tentative inclination,
however,
opinion.

I

should

think

that

you

are

bound

If you want to pursue that course,

by your
I

Benzene

tend to think

that the best language to rely on is the "reasonably necessary"
reference in §

3 (8) •

I

thought the government's rebuttal on

this point, see discussion supra, was probably persuasive, but
somewhat

less

persuasive

than

its

strong

rebuttal

on

the

§

6 (b) (5) argument.

P.W.C. 1/20/81

P.S.

I'll xerox one or two of the better CA opinions on this

issue •

.

'

·;.

lfp/ss

1/20/81
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Paul Cane

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Jan. 20, 1981

Cotton Dust
I

evening.

dictated the attached memorandum at home Monday

It is an unstructed identification of points and

questions that we may have to address if asked to write the
opinion.

-

Also, your thinking about these will assist me in

deciding how to vote at Friday's Conference.
discuss this case on Thursday,

I

Before we

hope you will have an

opportunity to consider these points and questions.
I am asking Sally to give you the memorandum,
unedited and before

I

have an opportunity to read it.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

<.

lfp/ss

1/20/81
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Paul Cane

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Jan. 20, 1981

79-1429, 79-1583 Cotton Dust Cases
Your bench memo, written under considerable
pressure, is quite helpful in setting forth the arguments
presented by petitioners and respondents.

You resolve the

cost/benefit question - the critical one - in a brief
summary accepting what I wrote in Benzene.
that case to paint with a "broad brush".

I was able in
In the present

case, however, I am not sure that we could write a
persuasive opinion without being more specific.

"'.

A puzzling feature of this case, at least for me,
is that the briefs on both sides present reasonable
arguments - assuming that the facts and findings stated in
each case are correct.

I still have not been able to locate

in the briefs or printed appendix, a copy of the Secretary's
findings and opinion.

The briefs do not seem to make any

specific references to such findings.

I have not read

CADC's opinion carefully, but it seems to make general
findings that - if accepted - might make it difficult for

..

petitioners to win on their cost/basis argument.

l,

...

2.

In sum, what are the established facts in this
case?

To what extent does the record justify the factual

assertions in petitioners' brief.

Or, vice versa, to what

extent does the record justify the rather sweeping factual
assertions in the government's brief.
at this time that we review the record.

I am not suggesting
Rather, I am

wondering whether the Secretary (or OSHA) made findings that
were accepted by the Court of Appeals and - if so - what
were they.
And apart from findings, does the Secretary, in
any opinion, or its brief, concede that it asserts authority
to set standards "in disregard of their economic impact,
with the sole limit being that the cost of a single standard
must not be so great as to threaten the destruction of an
entire industry?"

See question No. 1 presented in

petitioners' brief.
In petitioners' brief, summary of argument, p. 19,
it is stated:
"OSHA's approach treats the cost of its
standards as being totally irrelevant until
they reach some undefined point at which the
standard, if implemented, would cause the
destruction of an entire industry."
If indeed this is OSHA's "approach", we have a
rather easy target.

But where is OSHA's "approach" or

position on this question, stated, and exactly what does it

·.

3.

claim as being its authority with respect to the cost of
standards?
My recollection from the Benzene case is that OSHA
took the position that only §6(b) (5) applies, and therefore
that it is authorized to "set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, • • • that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health • •

"

OSHA denies that §3(8) (a), defining the term "standard"
limits §6(b) (5) in any way.

My recollection, however, is

that in the Benzene case the plurality opinion - in which I
joined to this extent - held that the two sections must be
read together so that the test is not merely one of
feasibility (construed by OSHA to mean "technological
feasibility" (seep. 13 SG's brief), but in addition that
the standard must be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide" a safe environment.
Does OSHA accept in this case - or did it accept
when the cotton dust standard was adopted- that S3(8) and
6(b) (5) must be read together?

Putting it differently in

this case that its standard is "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" as well as being technologically feasible?
In my brief concurring opinion, I did not
undertake to go beyond general language.

Assuming the

applicability of the necessity to show a standard to be

.,

4.

"reasonably necessary or appropriate", and that this means

.'

there must be a demonstration of a reasonable relationship
between cost and benefits, what sort of evidence must be
considered and what kind of findings would be require?
I notice, for example, in the brief of the
American Industrial Health Council (amicus), it is said:
"We do not suggest that OSHA must engage in a
strictly quantative cost/benefit assessment.
But as several courts have held, OSHA may not
issue a standard until it has evaluated the
benefits that will be gained and the
resulting costs and has found a reasonable
relationship between the two."
Has this been done in this case, or does OSHA
claim this is unnecessary?
Briefs supporting reversal of the decision below
refer to other decisions of courts of appeals that do
require cost/benefit analysis.

I would like to have xerox

copies of any CA opinions that in fact do this, with your
view as to which is the best case.
In sum, Paul, while I have no doubt whatever that
OSHA is assuming a virtually unrestricted power to establish
standards almost solely in light of perceived health and
safety benefit (e.g., the absolutely risk free workplace),
the SG's brief seems to argue that OSHA did in fact consider
carefully "economic feasibility" (p. 14, et seq.), and
relied on the Hocutt-Thomas cost estimates of about

...
'

~

·~·

5.

$543,000,000 for the industry that OSHA considered to be
economically feasible.

To be sure, the SG speaks in terms

of "feasibility" rather than "reasonably necessary or
appropriate".
difference.

Specifically, what do you perceive to be the
If OSHA and the SG were arguing that

technological feasibility is all that need be considered,
why would there be any discussion of the Hocutt-Thomas and
other cost estimates?

Petitioners say that the answer is

that these estimates relate only to the survivability of the
industry in its entirety, without considering any of the
factors that I mentioned in my concurring opinion.

* * *
No doubt, Paul, you will consider this memorandum
to be rather negative and pessimistic from the viewpoint of
one who holds my view that Congress must have intended a
weighing of costs against benefits.

I am not implying any

change in the views I expressed in Benzene.

Rather, I find

few specific answers to the questions in this case, and am
hopeful that - with your greater familiarity with the case you will be able to shed additional light.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

pwc 1/21/81

ANOTHER SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

January 21, 1981

RE:

No. 79-1429, ATMI v. Marshall [the "Cotton Dust" cases]

The more I think about this case, the more attractive
seems

your

suggestion

that

we

seriously

Rehnquist's nondelegation argument.

I

had no time

to make

..

!;!.-, ,

'

.

Please forgive its

it ornate,

little or no authority for some propositions .

·~· •,..;

Justice

Let me try to sketch out a

theory of decision based on this argument.
rough form.

consider

and

I

provide

I.

Purpose of Administrative Agencies
Delegation

inevitable

byproduct

of

agencies

administrative

to

complex

government.

Where

is

an

Congress

undertakes to regulate in a field demanding special expertise,
particularly

in

areas

of

science,

it

frequently

may

be

advantageous to delegate much of the detail work to the agency.
In sum,
Congress may wish to exercise its authority
in a particular field, but because the
field is sufficiently technical, the ground
to be covered sufficiently large, and the
Members
of
Congress
themselves
not
necessarily expert in the area in which
they choose to legislate, the most that may
be asked under the separation-of-powers
doctrine is that Congress lay down the
general policy and standards that animate
the law, leaving the agency to refine those
standards, "f i 11 in the blanks," or apply
the standards to particular cases.
Benzene,

slip op.

at

5

(Rehnquist,

J.,

concurring)

(emphasis

added) •

II.

Origins of the Nondelegation Doctrine
At all times,

however,

the administrative lawmaking

power must be derived from Congress' article I lawmaking power.
The delegation question concerns the extent to which this
constitutionally
293

u.s.

388

tolerable.
(1935),

the

In Panama Refining Co.
Court

considered

v.

is

Ryan,

delegation

of

authority to the President to regulate the flow of "hot oil."
In the statute in that case, Congress had made a

"declaration

of policy,"

in which it directed the President to act, or not

to

accordance

act,

in

with

various

criteria.

The

criteria

conflicted somewhat.
"to

provide

for

For example, Congress told the President
the

general

welfare

by

promoting

the

organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action
among

trade groups."

In the

same

sect ion,

however,

Congress

told the President "to eliminate unfair competitive practices."
Similarly,
increase

at

one

the

point

the

consumption

President

of

was

industrial

instructed

and

"to

agr icul tur al

products" but simultaneously "to conserve natural resources."
Id.

at

417.

things.

In

sum,

However,

the statute

as

Chief

favored

Justice

any number of good

Hughes

remarked,

the

constitutionality of "such a delegation of legislative power
.

.

is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed

that

the

believes

President
to

be

has

the

acted,

public

and

good.

will
The

act,

point

is

motives but of constitutional authority
The

Court

then

quoted

Congress'

for

he

one

of

not

Id. at 420.

II

legislative

what

power,

found

in

Article I, and said, "The Congress manifestly is not permitted
to

abdicate,

or

to

transfer

to

legislative functions with which

it

others,

the

essential

is thus vested."

Id.

at

421.
Notwithstanding Panama Refining and cases like it, it
is
The

plain

that

question

Congress does
in

within

proper

three

factors

each

case

is

limitations.
in

evaluating

delegation.

First, Congress

policy

respect

with

have

to

that

broad

whether

Chief
the

license
the

Justice

to delegate.

delegation
Hughes

occurs

identified

constitutionality

of

the

in the statute must "declare[]
subject."

Panama

Refining,

a

293

•'

r •

..
.

.
..
•.

'

u.s.

at 415.

Second, Congress must "set up a standard for the

[delegatee's]
a[]

finding

authority.
is

action."
by

the

Id.

phrased

Id.

[delegatee]

Congress

in

In another case,

somewhat

limitations

Third,

"require[]

exercise

of"

its

the constitutional question

differently:

constitutionally

the

must

the

required

stringency

in

each

case

of

the

must

be

judged "according to common sense and the inherent necessities
of the governmental co-ordination."

u.s.

States, 276

III.

Co.

&

v.

United

394, 406 (1928).

OSHA's Construction and Application of Its Mandate
It

OSH

Hampton

Act

is hard

to

be

to know exactly how Congress wanted the

applied.

There

are

at

least

four

possible

interpretations.
The
articulated
sense

to

first

is

something

in Benzene.
have

a

along

We agree,

policy

that

I

the

lines

think,

treats

that

you

that it makes no

costs

as

essentially

irrelevant until they loom large enough to threaten "industry
survivability."
concurring).

See

Benze_!le,

slip

op.

at

4-7

(Powell,

J.,

Principles of diminishing returns make it clear

that incremental gains in health and safety are accomplished at
ever-increasing costs.
The second is the position that the union respondents
took at oral argument.
question

is

According to the union,

establishing

a

significant

the threshold

risk

of

health

impairment, and the ability to reduce that risk significantly.
This much is clear from Benzene.

Then, according to the union,

5.

If that

OSHA is to set the most effective standard possible.

standard is not "feasible," it should be relaxed to the point
where

it

worker

provides

consistent

the

greatest

with

the

possible

survival

protect ion

of

the

for

"industry

the
as

a

whole."
The

third

is

OSHA's

agrees mostly with the union
gloss.

In

claimed

that

~'

its

brief

it

and

was

articulated

respondents,

approach.

but adds

at oral argument,

not

an

"unreasonable

kind of a

OSHA essentially
regulator."

OSHA pointed out that it is always

Bench Memo at 13-14.

cognizant of the long-run health of the industry.
standards,

the

into account
own

of

Labor

takes

based

on

the

urgency

In setting

practical

in at least four specific ways.

priorities

workers.

Secretary

OSHA

of

(A)

realities

He sets his

potential

harm

to

(B) As the Benzene plurality held, he regulates only

"significant

risks

of

material

harm."

(C)

He

looks

to

see

whether proposed alternative methods would accomplish the same
result at

lesser cost.

(D)

He has discretion

in determining

the length of the compliance period.
In

this

case,

OSHA

seemed

to

take

an

different from any of the three articulated above.

approach

It is kind

of a mishmash involving some of the elements described above.
I have read the Final Standard, reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 27350
(1978).

OSHA

seemed

to

start

with

a

goal

of

imposing

a

standard of 200 micrograms per cubic meter on all aspects of
the

industry.

standard

It

that would

is

plain,

however,

protect workers

that

this

the most.

is

not

the

Approximately

1.

13%

of

the

byssinosis

work

even

force

at

the

will
200

suffer

from

mcgs/cu-m

some

level.

degree

Thus,

even

of
in

commencing deliberations at that level, OSHA already seems to
have considered cost to some extent.
and weaving" aspects of the
750 mcgs/cu-m,
suitable

for

the "slashing

job, OSHA raised the standard to

apparently because this standard would provide

protection

burdensome.

Then,

and

any

Id. at 27360.

lower

standard

would

standard

did
was

reach

that

too

At this point, however, OSHA still

has not reached its official "feasibility" analysis.
finally

be

point,

appropriate,

it

because

found

that

"although

employers may shut down rather than comply,

When it

the
some

the

200/750
marginal

industry as a

whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements of the
regulation."
set

a

Id. at 27378.

standard

that

In sum, OSHA concluded that it had

"assure [d]

maximum

benefit

constrained only by the limits of feasibility."

IV.

Id.

Nondelegation Problems in this Case
We agree,

I

am sure,

that Congress constitutionally

could impose a standard that would put much of an industry out
of business.

Although an

ill-advised policy,

this

is one on

which the Court must rely on Congress' judgment, tempered as it
is by public accountability.

The problem here is that Congress

has not taken a clear position.

Instead, it has demanded that

OSHA set standards to the extent "feasible."
problem thus is easy to identify:
struggle briefly with the term.

The core of the

what is "feasible?"

Let me

7.
Two groups must bear the cost that OSHA characterizes
in

this

case

everyone's

as

The

"feasible."

attention
be

focuses,

entities

will

unable

however,

OSHA ignored

is

to

the

first

the

absorb

group,

industry
the

on

which

itself.

Some

cost.

burden on another,

Remarkably,

perhaps equally

important group, that also must pay the cost of worker safety:
the

consumers of products.

OSHA reasoned that only marginal

firms would be put out of business because
for

cotton products was "inelastic."

means

that

companies

mechanisms

onto

the

decrease in sales.]
that even a 500%

largely
price

can

of

it believed demand

[Roughly speaking,

tack

goods

the

cost

without

a

of

that

safety

substantial

At oral argument, one attorney pointed out

increase

in the price of goods would be no

burden on companies if demand were inelastic.

Justice Stewart

correctly observed, however, that consumers then would pay the
bill.
As
cannot decree

I

noted

the

that consumers

for worker safety.
so.

above,

point

is

not

that

Congress

and corporations pay this price

The question is whether Congress has done

But Congress indicated only that health improvements were

to be made if "feasible."

Who is to decide what is feasible?

Herein lies the delegation problem.

Congress has not defined

the term.

It is tenable to conclude that, consistent with the

principles

of

constitutional

delegation,

Congress

must

do

a

more precise job.
In
Refining.

many

Here,

as

respects,
there,

this

case

resembles

Panama

Congress did not set a policy and

provide standards with which to
Congress
protect

told

the

workers,

Congress

did

agency

but

not

implement

to

do

so

describe

it.

accomplish
in

how

a

way

to

two

that

strike

the

In this case,
good
is

things:

"feasible."

balance.

OSHA
1,

appears

to

take

the

point

of

view

that

costs

passed

consumers are irrelevant in assessing feasibility.
the

agency

is

"industry as

comfortable

a

whole"

is

as

long

not

as

impaired.

the
I

on

to

Moreoever,

health

recall

of

from

the
oral

argument that the government lawyer was very reluctant to put
much of a boundary on the precise number of firms that could be
destroyed consistent with "industry survivability."
standards were given to the agency,
know whether

the

a

Because no

reviewing court cannot

agency complied with

its mandate.

Finally,

and perhaps most important, to permit Congress to abdicate its
constitutional responsibility on an important policy choice is
to

permit

decision

it
on

yesterday

I

to
an

escape
issue

found

a

the

of

public

broad

newspaper

accountability

social
article

for

significance.
that

its
Just

identified

the

problem of "cost benefit analysis" as one of the most important
environmental
"direct

But,

issues of the age.

comparisons

[of

costs

and

the

article

benefits]

are

because it is hard to put a measure on human life.
Post, Jan.

21, 1981, at A2, col.

3:

reported,
difficult"
Washington

see Benze1_1e, slip op. at

29-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This is precisely the reason that Congress should be
required

to

undertake

agencies evolved because

the

task.

Legitimate

delegation

to

it was useful to have someone other

..

9•

than

legislators

"fill

in

the gaps."

Where

the

"gap"

is an

issue of such profound economic and social significance as the
tradeoff

between

health

and

productivity,

it

should

be

Congress, not the agency, that strikes the balance.

V.

The Wisdom and Difficulties Associated
With a Return to Nondelegation
Some will argue that the nondelegation doctrine is a

discarded relic of the Lochner era of judicial intermeddling.
I do not think so.

The overzealous judicial review tendencies

represented by Lochner denigrated Congress' role because judges
substituted

their

nondelegation
contrary,

judgment

doctrine

does

for

that

not

share

legislators.

this

flaw.

On

The
the

the nondelegation doctrine reasserts the primacy of

Congress as the maker of policy.
always

of

relish

questions

that

such

as

To be sure, Congress does not

responsibility.
cost-benefit

Legislators

analysis

by

duck

turning

hard
their

resolution over to administrative agencies, just as legislators
can duck

"private right of act ion" quest ions by turning

them

over to the courts.
The "cost benefit" question is precisely the kind of
hard question that courts ought to demand that Congress answer.
As

you

suggested

particular,
employment,
policy.

the

in
cost

inflation,

Benzene,
of
and

It plainly is an

the

cost

safety--has
even

of

regulation--in

ramifications

national defense

and

for

foreign

issue on the minds of legislators.

During the OSH Act debate, Senator Saxbe said, "When we come to

-~ ..•

..

1.

saying that an employer must guarantee that such an employee is
protected from any possible harm, I think it will be one of the
most

difficult

Benzene,

areas

slip op.

we

at

are

15

going

to

(Rehnquist,

J.,

have

to

ascertain."

concurring).

Later,
1,

Senator

Saxbe

complained,

passing back and
Id. at 8.

forth

"I

are

believe

going

the

to have

terms

that we

to

identified."

be

are

The problem in this case is that Congress never did

adequately

describe

the

health and cost that
three difficulties
have occurred.

nature

of

it envisioned.

the

relationship

Because

it did

between
not,

the

identified by Justice Rehnquist in Benzene

First, OSHA has no "intelligible principle" to

guide it in its work.

Second, reviewing courts are left with

no

to

standards

discretion.
to

evade

to

apply

Third,

test

the

exercise

of

the

agency's

and most important, Congress is permitted

accountability

for

decisions

that

are

of

great

significance to all.
A nondelegation opinion in this case will not be easy
to write.
the

recent

I am not unmindful that this Court, and others,
past

has

permitted

Congress

to

delegate

The WNCN case brings to mind the FCC's statute.

in

broadly.

That agency is

permitted to regulate the airwaves with nothing more to guide
it than "the public interest."

Yet,

it may be that

the issue in Cotton Dust is of such profound significance that
it differs qualitatively from other cases in which delegation
has not been perceived as a problem.

P.W.C.

1/21/81
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CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

1,

January 21, 1981

Re:

(79-1429 - American Textile Manufacturers Institute,
Inc. v. Marshall

(

(

(79-1583 - National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am inclined to think we should invite the parties
to comment on the effect,
Regulations

~f

any, of the change in

disclosed by Bork in the oral argument .
Regards,

•:

79-1429 AMERICAN TEXTILE v. MARSHALL

Argued 1/21/81
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Dear Chief:
as to the change in
Sincerely,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

1,

January 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

79-1429) American Textile Mnfg. Institute v. Marshall
79-1583) National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall

I agree with the Chief's suggestion that the parties
should be called upon to comment on the effect of the
change in Regulations disclosed by Bork in the oral
argument.
Sincerely,

..

' .

(

____

Conf. 1/23/81
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 26, 1981
RE:

79-1429 - American Textile Institute v. Marshall
79-1583 - National Cotton Council v. Marshall

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I will defer voting in this case until some light is
shed on the "11th hour" change in the Regulations.
Regards,

/
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20,?~~

CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

1,

January 30, 1981

Re:

(79-1429 -American Textile Manufacturers, Inc. v.
Marshall
(79-1583 - National Cotton Council of America v.
Marshall

(

Dear Bill:
I have now reviewed the various exchanges in this
case,and I would prefer that you proceed to assign
it since my views on the excessive delegation remain
just about where they were at the time of the Conference.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

··'

mniteb ~tatrs Jlepartmrnt of Justice
®ffict of tbt ~olidtor ~tntral
Masbington. Ja.~. 20530
January 30, 1981

Honorable Alexander Stevas
Cl erk
up r eme Court of the United States
Was h ington, D.C. 20543
Re:

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc.,
et al. v. Ray Marshall, et al., No. 79-1429,
and National Cotton Council of America v. Ray
Marshall, et al., No. 79-1583

De a r Mr. Stevas:
We have received petitioners' response to the Court's
re quest concerning the effect on these cases of the recent
am endments to the Cancer Policy standard. We will refrain from
responding in kind to petitioners' intemperate remarks, but we do
believe that petitioners' one substantive point merits a short
reply.
Petitioners contend that the Cancer Policy amendments are
r elevant to these cases because they represent abandonment by the
Secretary of the policy that governed the setting of the cotton
dust standard. This contention is incorrect because the stated
purpose of the amendment was to conform the Cancer Policy to the
s ignificant risk limitation imposed by this Court's decision in
I nd ustrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, No.
78-911 (July 2, 1980). The error in the benzene standard
identified by the Court in Industrial Union Department, and the
def ect in the Cancer Policy standard, was that the Secretary,
when dealing with· a carcinogen, believed that the Act required
hi m to set the standard at the lowest feasible level, even in the
ab sence of evidence that such lowerin g of the level was necessary
to eliminate or reduce a significant risk of material health
imp airment.

What petitioners have persistently ignored .is that the
cot ton dust record contains substantial empirical evidence
(l ) that both the previous standard (1000 ug/m3) and the socal led industry alternative (500 ug/m3) would continue to create
a s i gnificant risk of material health impairment to employees;
(2 ) that the new standard (200 ug/m3) would substantially reduce 1
that risk; and (3) that even under the new standard, there would
remain a significant risk of contracting byssinosis (13%
a cc ording to the Merchant Study) that the Secretary could not
eliminate because of feasibility limitations. These findings
(wh ich were upheld by the court of appeals as supported by
substantial evidence) are se~ out in the Secretary's statement of
re asons accompanying the final standard, and the Secretary relied
on t hese findings in making his decision. 43 Fed. Reg. 27358273 59 (1978).
While the Secretary did set the standard at the "lowest
fe asible level," that decision was made because the Secretary
affirmatively demonstrated on the basis of overwhelming evidence
that there is no safe level that could be feasibly achieved. He
did not rely on an "assumption" of no safe level for a toxic
sub stance, as was th~ case for benzene. The recent proposed
revisions to the Cancer Policy standard, 46 Fed. Reg. 7402-7408
(1 981), simply incorporate the requirement that the Secretary
make precisely the same findings of significant risk made in
c ot ton dust before regulating carcinogenic substances. Indeed,
it is rather odd for petitioners to suggest that the Secretary
would have promulgated a regulation undermining the basis for the
cotton dust standard while that standard was undergoing judicial
review!
In sum, we reiterate that the Secretary's cancer policy
modifications have absolutely no bearing on the disposition of
the issues in this case. It is most unfortunate that the textile
industry has determined to rely on this irrelevancy in an effort
t o convince the Court to avoid resolution of the important legal
is sues raised in these cases.
Sincerely,

~ 7¥711 F. ~. n .
Wade H. McCree, J~
Solicitor General

cc:

Neil King

- 2 -

®fficc of t fC Qllcrh

~prtmc @oud of tire ~lnitcb Ji9tztfers
Memorandum

January 30, 1981
Memo to the Conference
Re:

American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Ray Marshall,
No. 79-1429; and National Cotton
Council of America v. Ray
Marshall, No. 79-1583

Subsequent to my memorandum of
January 29, 1981, regarding the aboveentitled cases, I have received the
attached reply by government council.

~t.(UV
Al Stevas
Clerk

...
/

MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

January 30, 1981

RE:

1.

Nos. 79-1429, The Cotton Dust Cases
I have read the memos by industry and the SG

on the repeal of the "carcinogen policy."

The SG says the

repeal is irrelevant to this case.
Industry says it is
-=
~--------------"highly relevant" but does not explain how.
I think the SG is right.

In repealing the

___

carcinogen policy, OSHA simply
was codifying
the plurality's
- --_;;;;..,.
-~--

holding in Benzene.

Thus, the repeal does nothing more than

bring the Code of Federal Regulations in line with the case
law.
I don't understand what WJB is referring to
in this memo, but I don't suppose it could hurt to have the
SG file a response.

P.w.c.

I

'

1/30/81

.§u:pumt <!Jcurl cf flrt ~~ .itatt_s'Jlfru¥!rtt41fcn.ltl. <!J. 20gtJ!~

·1

CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

January 30, 1981

1,

Nos. 79-1429 & 1583 American Textile Manufacturers
v. Marshall

Dear Chief:
I had supposed the order of filings in the above was
going to be Bark first and then response from the - Solicitor
General. In any event, it is very clear to me that Bork•s
position in the Wilmer, Pickering letter is very different
from that which he made at oral argument. See Transcript of
oral argument at pages 6 and 7.
In the circumstances I wish the Clerk would be requested to telephone the Solicitor General and ask him to .file an
additional response to the Bark letter.
S5ncerely,
/)

' -' 1
I

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

·,y"C{_

'

l

~

.:§u.punu Qfl!urll!f flrt ~~ .:§fldtg
~a,glpngtcn. :!9.

QJ.

z.o~'!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

February 2, 1981

1,

No. 79-1429 American Textile Mfrs. Ind. v. Marshall
No. 79-1583 National Cotton Council of America v.
Marshall

Dear Chief:
I'll undertake the opinion for the Court in the above.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

,,.

, sending a
",;,Justice
•
....
~·

;§u.ptttttt Qfourl ttf tqt ~b .:%btits
~as-ftingtcn. ~. <!J. 20p>!~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 3, 1981

Re:

79-1429 - American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Marshall

Dear Bill:
Are you willing to undertake a dissent 1n
this case?

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to:

Justice Stewart
Justice Powell

;§u:prtmt <Q:cnrl of tqt %titt?t .§fitts

'J!lrasfringLm, lB. C!f. 20,?)!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

1.

February 4, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1429 American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Marshall

Dear Chief:
I will be happy to undertake a dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,
(A"'~-

The Chief Justice
Justice Stewart
Justice Powell

,.'

,,

..

.

MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

March 31, 1981

RE:

79-1429, Cotton Dust Cases
As I told you last week, a notice in the

federal register announced that OSHA is conducting a
rulemaking on the feasibility of employing cost-benefit
analysis.

The SG now has filed a memorandum explaining the

action OSHA proposes to take.

------

-----

Although the SG acknowledges

that our case is not technically moot, it suggests that the
Court vacate and remand to the agency for further
development of the record.

P.W.C.

03/31/81
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March 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
· Mr.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquis-t
Stevens

•.·'From: Mr. Justice Brennan
Circulated:

APR 1 1981
1

RE: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v, DonQvan, et ·

~ CClT Ctt±~eu~.~~----------

al.
Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583

As you know, the Gov e rnment has filed a supplemental
me morandum in the above case.

The memorandum describes President

Reagan's issuance of Executive Order No. 12291, directing all
federal agencies to assess potential costs and benefits of major
regulatory proposals.

In response, the Secretary of Labor filed

an "Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" on March 27, 1981.
This is the Secretary's first step "to evaluate the feasibility
and utility of cost-benefit analysis in the standard setting
process, to compare the costs and benefits of the current
standard and various alternatives, and to reassess the current
standard in light of the findings." Memorandum, at 2.

While the

Government readily admits that this action does not moot the
case, id., at 4, it nevertheless recommends for prudential
reasons that we vacate the Court of Appeals decision and remand
the case to the agency.

I assume that we will not act on the

memorandum until all parties have an opportunity to file a
response.
In any event, I disagree with the Government's position.

My

primary reason is that the majority conference vote in this case,

to be reflected in the opinion for the Court now being prepared,
is based on the proposition that cost-benefit analysis is
prohibited by the statute.

This is consistent with the

Government's previous argument that "it would be inconsistent
with the Act for OSHA to engage in cost-benefit analysis."
Memorandum, at 3a.

It would surely be best for all concerned to

decide that issue and save the Secretary the necessity of
engaging in a futile proceeding involving thousands of pages of
study; he might better use the time to persuade the Congress to
change the statute.
Moreover, there clearly remains an active case or
controversy here.

The Secretary has taken no action to

"promulgate, modify, or revoke any occupational safety or health
standard" pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §655.

We have no way of knowing

whether this ''Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" will lead to
a recommendation that formal rulemaking modifying or revoking the
existing standard be pursued.

Certainly the union will fight the

Secretary tooth and nail to prevent it.

The case eventually

would be back here again, brought by the union or the industry
depending on future actions of the Secretary.

Therefore, the

final result of the Secretary's action is highly speculative, and
in all events probably would not occur for a substantial period
of time.

Although the Government intimates that it is

maintaining the current cotton dust standard during this reevaluation for policy reasons, this explanation is misleading,
for the Secretary would in no case be entitled to modify or

·r

revoke the standard without conducting a formal rulemaking
procedure pursuant to §655.
In sum, I think we should deny the

S~cretary's

application

and proceed with decision of the case.
1.

Sincerely,

W.J.B. · Jr .

-

.....

·'
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CH AM BER S 0 F

J U ST I C E J OHN P AUL STEVE N S

April 1, 1981

Re:

79-1429 & 79-1583 - American Textile
v. Mar s hall

Dear Bill:
Although I have not yet had an opportunity to reexamine the papers in this case, it is my recollection
that my vote in favor of the Government was predicated
on the proposition that cost benefit analysis was not
It
,
d " b y t h e statute.
'
~
require
I d o not recall coming
to
any
conclusion one way or the~ot~er on ~~ he question whether
cost benefit analysis is ' prohibite by the statute.
I
did not think it would be necessary to reach that
question in order to uphold the standards that are
challenged in this case.
I also have not come to rest
on the question raised by the Secretary's application,
but I did think I s hould clarify my understanding of
-~the rea s on for my vote.
Re s p e ctfully,

j~
Justice Br e nnan
Copies to the Confer e nce

~

,;;.

•
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CHAM BE RS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-1429 & 79-1583
v. Marshall

American Textile

Although my views as to the constitutionality of the
statute at issue here will not in all likelihood be affected
by a change in the government's position concerning "the
feasibility and utility" of a cost-benefit analysis for the
cotton dust standard, I believe that the Solicitor General
is correct that the decision by the Court at this time would
be tantamount to an advisory opinion. Memorandum, at 4.
I,
of course, am in the dissent in this case and am in no
position to speculate as to the intent of those in the
majority.
But from my recollection of our conference vote
I, like my brother John, am not sure that the majority voted
that a cost-benefit analysis is prohibited by the statute.
'-..__/
I

Sincerely,~

t

I
I

. '

.

__

:..-------··-

.,

~~
MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

April 2, 1981

RE:

/7 .., - -

Mr. Justice Powell

lJ_ LA - '

~~

/~

79-1429, Cotton Dust Cases
Petitioners, the cotton companies, have

filed a motion to defer consideration of the government's
suggestion of a remand.

They would like to file something

by April 9, and ask that the Court not take action until
that time.
I think a delay would be helpful.
understand that WJB's opinion is soon to circulate.

I
Perhaps

the Court should defer consideration of the suggestion of

'-"

remand until it sees WJB's opinion.

That would focus the

issue.
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Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,

v.
RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.,
Respondents.
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.,

--

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
MOTION TO DEFER CONSIDERATION AND EXTEND
THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PETITIONERS MAY
RESPOND TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

Petitioners in these consolidated cases hereby
request that this Court defer consideration of the Supplemental
Memorandum for the Federal Respondent ("Supplemental
Memorandum") filed on March 27, 1981, and extend until April 9,
1981, the time within which petitioners may file a response to
the Supplemental Memorandum.
as follows.

The grounds for this Motion are

The Supplemental Memorandum introduces a radically
~ew

development into these cases.

It discloses the Secretary

of Labor's intention to institute a further rulemaking
proceeding to reevaluate and reconsider the Cotton Dust
Standard that is at issue in the cases before this Court.

This

proceeding will include a reexamination of the agency's
position on the two most critical issues presented in these
cases -- the nature of the cost-related limitations applicable
to occupational health standards and the role that cost-benefit
assessments should play in the setting of such standards.
Most of the more than one dozen petitioners in these
cases received copies of the Supplemental Memorandum only
within the last two or three days.

The developments described

in the Supplemental Memorandum are highly unusual in nature,
making it difficult for petitioners to analyze the situation
and formulate a joint response to the Secretary of Labor's
recommendations.

The difficulty of analyzing the Secretary's

proposal is complicated by the fact that the challenged
Standard apparently is to remain in effect and to be enforced
while the further rulemaking proceeding is conducted.
Petitioners believe that their views on the issues
raised by the Supplemental Memorandum will be of significant
value to the Court.

However, a short additional period of time

will be required for petit ion e rs to a ssess the impact of these
new developments and to consult with each other regarding an
appropriate response.
Accordingly, petitioners request that the Court defer
consideration of the developments addressed in the Supplemental
Memorandum and extend until April 9, 1981, the time within

- 2 -

which petitioners may file a response setting forth their views
on those developments.
Petitioners are authorized to make the following
representations:
present Motion.

The Federal Respondent does not oppose the
The Union Respondents were advised by the

Clerk's Office that the Court would consider the Secretary's
Supplemental Memorandum at its conference on Friday, April 3,
1981, and accordingly are filing their response today.

In

these circumstances, the Union Respondents take no position on
the present Motion.
Respectfully submitted,
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No. 79-1583

NATL. COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA
vs.

DONOVAN, SEC. OF LABOR

Motion of federal respondents for leave to file supplemental
memorandum, after argument.
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AMERICAN TEXTILE MFGS. INST.

· Motion of Federal Respondents
for Leave to File Supplemental
Memorandum after Argument

v.
DONOVAN, Sec. of Labor

CADC

No. 79-1583

(Same)

NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF
AMERICA

v.
DONOVAN, Sec. of Labor
SUMMARY:

-

The Secretary of Labor (resp) requests leave to file

a supplemental memorandum after argument informing the Court of his
\

decision to reconsider the health standards regulating occupational
exposure to airborne concentrations of cotton dust and suggesting

(

- 2 BACKGROUND:

In June 1978, resp issued final mandatory occupa-

tional health standards regulating occupational .exposure to airborne
concentrations of cotton dust.

On pre-enforcement review, the CADC

upheld all major provisions of the standards against petrs.

Pet :r;s

sought review from this Court, certs were granted and the two cases
were argued on Jan. 21, 1981.
On Feb. 17, President Reagan issued an Executive Order directing
all federal agencies to assess costs and benefits of' major regulatory
proposals.

In light of this directive, resp has determined to under-

take a re-examination of the cotton dust standard and has issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which was filed with the
Federal Register for publication on Mar. 27.
CONTENTIONS:

( '---'

Resp believes that the 'additional information,

data and comments likely to be received through the public proceeding will permit him to make an informed judgment as to the feasibility ·
and utility of the cotton dust standard and may well lead to modifications.

Resp suggests that pending his reconsideration, the Court

may wish to refrain from further consideration of the issues now
before it.

While the actions of the resp do not moot the present

controversy, resp suggests that a decision by the Court at this time
would, to a substantial degree, be tantamount to an advisory opinion.
Resp also suggests that in light of the recent developments,
set forth in his supplemental memorandum, "it would be appropriate
for the Court to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals

and

remand the case so that the record may be returned to the Secretary
for further consideration and development."

.. ~.
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DISCUSSION:

Although there may be substantial grounds for

disagreeing with resp's opinions as to the effect of his reconsideration, the fact that he is reconsidering the cotton dust standard
should be formally brought to the Court's attention.

Because

th~

effect of the reconsideration involves some argument, a supplemental
memorandum filed with leave of the Court pursuant to Rules 35.5 and
35.6 is the appropriate method for alerting the Court to the recent
developments.
The motion and supplemental memorandum were tendered on Mar. 30.
Thus, petrs have not had an opportunity to respond either to the
motion or the memorandum.

Should the Court grant the motion, it is

recommended that the Court also allow petrs to file reply memoranda
by a date certain.

( '--'

A reply date of Monday, April 13, might allow

the Court to consi·der the cases at the Apr. 17 Conference.

An

earlier deadline is not recommended because it might not allow
counsel sufficient time to prepare considered memoranda.
There is no response.
4/1/81
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AMERICAN TEXTILE MFGS. INST.

v.

c__

DONOVAN, Sec. of Labor

CADC

No. 79-1583

(Same)

NATL. COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA

v.
DONOVAN, Sec. of Labor
On Apr. 2, the Court received:

(1) a motion by the labor union

petrs for leave to file a response to resp's supplemental memorandum;

-----

and (2) a motion by the manufacturer petrs to defer consideration of
resps supplemental memorandum until after Apr. 9 in order that these
petrs may file a response.
\

I suggest that the Court relist all the motions for its Apr. 17
-----.....__
Conference, by which time all the parties will have had an opportunity
to present their views.
4/2/81
PJC
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American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc,, et al.,
Petitioners,
79-1429
v.
Jiaymond J, Donovan, Secretary
On Writs of
./
of Labor, United Stl:ttes Dethe
United
States
C~
V""
V
pattment of Labor, et al.
of Appeals for the Dis•
National Cotton Council of
trict of Colum~it.~
America, Petitioner,
79-1583
v.
Jtaymond J , Donovan, Secretary
of Labor, United States Department of Labor, et al.
u,..J~u~

Certio~ ~~

~.-o''t~'' ~

•'

[May-, 1981]

'

-r:-. ,,

~ ~ ~

delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress enacted the Qccupational Safety ~nd Health Act ~I
of 1970 (the. Act) "to assure so far as possible every wo}:fing
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful w~in ~
conditions... ." 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes
•
the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and <X1!ifei~~M.Ifl,4-olr.-C-...U~"
nity to comment, mandatory nat.-ionwide standards go'!.~
. rn~.i_.n~5g~ d
.JI). . ..
health and safety in the workplace. 29 U.S. C. §§ ~ '~
1/J _
(b) . In 1978, t.he Secretary, acting through the Occvp""a..t""lO~'~'~II""I11
1-Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/ promW~ ~
JusTJCE BRENNAN

int~ A.-J..J~ ~~ .. -J----

1 This opinion will use the terms OSHA and the Secretary
ably when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, or th(j._s~~s~nt {-r~
S~cretary for Occupational Safety and Health. The Secretary of Labor

.
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a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an
airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manu~
facture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "conatellation of respiratory effects" known a& "byssinosis." 43
Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 ( 1978). This disease was one of the
expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of
the Occupational Safety and Health A.ct of 1970. S. Rep. No.
fH- 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legislative History of
the Occupatio'nal Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 143 (1971)
(Legis. Hist.).
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry ,2, challenged the validity of the
HCotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29
U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did
below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its
Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs
and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the
~ecretary 'Of Labor and two labor organizations,3 counter that
Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself,
and that the Act should therefore be construed to preclude
OSHA from doing so. They interpret the Act as mandating
has delegated the authority to promulgnte occupational safpty and health
itandards to the Assistant Secretary. See 29 CFR § 1910.4 (1980) .
1 Petitioners in No. 79-1429 include 12 individual cotton textile manufacturers, and the American' Textile Manufacturers In~titute, Inc . (ATMI) ,
a. trade association representing approximately 175 companies. Brief for
Petitioner~ American Textile Manufacturers Institute et al., at i, 2. In
No . 79-1583, petitioner is the National Cotton Council of America, a nonprofit corporatibn chartered for the purpo~e of irrcreasing the consumption
@Jf cotton and cotton product~ . Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Couneil of America, at 3-4.
8 The two labor organizations are the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Industrial Union Department, AFLCIO, and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
In the Court of Appeal::;, the labor organizations challenged the Cotton
Du~t Standurd a~ not sufficiently stringent.

.;.

.,

.•

79-1429 & 19-1583-0PINION
AMEIUCAN Till\TILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

3

tha~

OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to
eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment,
~ubject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. 617 F. 2d 636
(1979). We granted certiorari, U. S. (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but not
decided in last Term's Industrial Union Department v. Amer(1980) ,4 and to decide
ican Petroleum Institute, - U. S. other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard,ft

I
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as
"brown lung" disease, is a serious and 'potentially disabling
respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust. 6 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit
4 Jus•rteE PowELL, concurring in part and in the judgment, was the only
member of the Court to reach expressly the cost-benefit issue. .Tus1'ICE
PowELL concluded that the statute "requires the agency to determine that
the economic effects of it;; standard bear a reasonable relationship to the
expected benefits." Industtial Union Department v. American Petrole·um
In~titute, slip op., at 4 (PowELL, .T., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
ft In addition to the cost-benefit issue, the other questions presented and
addressed are (1) whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole
supports OSHA's determination that the Cotton Dust 'Standard is economically feasible; and (2) whether OSHA has the authority under the Act
to require that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees
who are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear
respirators.
6 Cotton dtt:>l is defined as
"dust pr~ent in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which
may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant
matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pe:;ticides, non-cotton plant matter ami
otlwr contaminanto which may have accumulated with the cotton during
the growing, hurve:sting and subsequent proces:;ing or storage period~ .
Any dust pre;,ent during the handling and proce:ssing of cotton through the
weaving or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations or
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6--16, Joint App. 15-22.7

Byssinosis is a ucontinuum
.tisease," 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2, that has been categorized
into four grades.8 In its least serious form, byssinosis produces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness,
shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective
indications of loss of pulmonary functions. Id., at 27352,
tol. 2. In its most serious form, byssinosis is a chrouic and
irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar
to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely disabling. Ibid. At worst, as is true of other respiratory diseases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssinosis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions
and contributes to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 673, Joint App. 72 ("there is an association between mortality
and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has described the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows:
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust],
symptoms occur on Monday, or other days after absence
from the work environment; later, symptoms occur on
other days of the week; and. eventually, symptoms are
continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure." A.
inanufacturing proresses using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton fiber
by-products from textile mills are considered cotton dust." 29 CFR
§ 1910.1043 (b) (1980) (Cotton Dust Standard).
7 References are made throughout this opinion to the Joint Appendix
filed in this Court (Joint App.), and to the Joint Appendix lodged in
the Court of Appeals below (Ct. of App. J. A.).
8 Known generally as the Schilling clas~;ification grades, they include:
1
' [Grade] %: slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity ; no
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment.
"[Gntde] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity ; no
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment.
" [Grade] 2 : evidence of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of
ventilatory capacity.
"rGradej ·a: evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of
ventilatory capacity." Exhibit 6-27 ; Joint App. 25 ; ~ee 41 :Fed. Reg•.
56500-56501 (1976) .
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Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-H:l,
Joint App. 15.3
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which
the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling
grades, it is likely that prolonged e:li!posure contributes to the
progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354:, col. 1 and 2; Exhibit 6-27,
Joint App. 25; Emibit 11, Joint App. 152. It also appears
9 Descriptions of the disease by individual mill workers, presented in
hearings on the Cotton Dust Standard before an administrative law judge,
are more vivid:
" When they started speeding the looms up the dust got finer and more
and more people started leaving the mill with breathing problems. My
mother h;1d to leave the mill in the early fifties. Before she left, her
breathing got so short she just couldn't hold out to work. l\!Jy stepfather 'left the mill on account of breaching [sic] problems. He had
coughing spells til he couldn't. breath, like a child's whooping cough. Both
my sisters who work in the mill have breathing problems. My husband
bad to give up his job when he was only fifty-four years old because of
the breathing problem." Ct. of App. J. A. 3791.

"I suppose I had a breathing problem shlCe 1973. I just kept on getting
sick and began losing time at the mill . Every time that I go into the
mill I get deathly sick, choking a~d vomiting losing my breath. It would
blow down all that lint and cotton and I have clothes right here where
I ha,ve wore and they have been washed several times and I would like for
you all to ~ee them. That will not come out in washing.
I am only fifty-~ven years old and I am retired and I can't even get to
go to church because of my breathing. I get ~hort of breath just walking
around the house or dressing [or] ~ometimes j4st watching T, V, I cough
all the time." lrl., at 3793.
u • • • I had to quit because I couldn't lay down and rest without oxygen in
the night and my doctor told me I would ha.ve to get. out of there. . . . I
couln't. rsic] even breathe, I had to get out of the door sol could breathe
and he told me not to go back in [the mill] under any circumstances."

!d., at 3804.
Byssinosis is not a newly discovered disease, having been described as early
as in the 1820s in England, Joint App. 404-405, and observed in Belgium
in a l:i'iudy of 2,000' cotto.u workers in 1845, Exhibit 6-16, Joint App. 15~

-.
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tl1at a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without
experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, Joint
App. 192.10
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such workers, suffers
from the most disabling form of byssinosis. 11 43 Fed. Reg.
27353, col. 3; Exhibit 124, Joint App. 347. The Senate Report accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 active and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease.
S. Rep . No. 91- 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970). Legis.
Rist. 143. One study found thf).t over 25% of a sample of
active cotton preparation and yarn manufacturing workers
suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure
level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43
Fed. Reg. 27355, col. 3; Exhibit 6--51, Joint App. 44. 12 Other
studies coufirm these general findings on the prevalence of
byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6--56, id. at
376--385.
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the
United States as a distinct occupational ha.zard associated
with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Legis.
to Ar:, an expert representing the industry noted:
"[T] he assumption is often made that the disorder progresses from 1f2 to
1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all grades reflect the progress of the individual's disability . In many instances, however, there is no progression at all. Sometimes Grade 3 seems to appear de novo, or there is a jump from 1 to 3.
Among those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2 very often never
occurs." Exhibit 41, Joint App. 192.
11 The criterion of disability u:,;ed for the 35,000 worker estimate was a
Forced Expiratory Volume (FEV 1 ) measurement of pulmonary function
of 1.2 liters or le:,;s. 43 Feu . RPg. 27353, col. 3. An FEV 1 of 1.2 liters
" 1::, a small fra ction of the pulmonary performance of a normal lung."'
Ibid.; Ct. of App. J . A. 1231.
1 ~ There are betwPen 126,000 and 200,000 active workPrs in the yarn
preparation and manufacturing segment::, of the cotton industry. 43 Fed.
ll,eg 27379, col. 2,
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Hist. 143.13 In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust 14 be
limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per
cubic meter of air (1000 ug/m3) averaged over an 8-hour
workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1. The United States
Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968,
when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey
Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant
threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that
included the 1000 ug/m3 limit for total cotton dust. 34
Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969),1~ Following passage of the Act in
1970, the 1000 ug/m3 standard was adopt-ed as an "established Federal standard" under § 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C.
I 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate protection of workers for the period between enactment of the
statute and promulgation of permanent standards. 16
In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of
1~

Indeed the Senate Report on the Act expressly observed:
"Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis regarding the
magnitude of the problem. For example, despite repe!J,ted warnings over
the years from other countries that their cotton workers suffered from
lung disease, it ib only within the past decade that we have recognized
byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease among workers in American
cotton mills." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis.
Hist. 143.
14 "Total dust" includes both respirable and nonrespirable cotton dust.
a The Secretary of Labor adopted the threshold limit values contained
in a list that had been prepared by the ACGIH.
tu Section 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), provides in pertinent
part :
" [T]he Secretary shall , as soon as practicable during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two year~ after
such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health ~tand
ard . . . any l'stabli~hed Fedl'ral st!mdard, unless he determinl's that the
promulgation of such a ~;tandard would not result in improved ::;afety ot'
health for specifically designated employees."
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respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous exposure limit recommendation to 200 ug/m3, measured by a
vertical elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust particles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351,
col. 1, 27355, col. 2. 11 That same year, the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)/ 8 pursuant to the Act, 29 U.S. C. §§ 669 (a)(3),
671 (d)(2), submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recommendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible exposure limit (PEL) that "should be set at the lowest level
feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as
high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu. m.," or 200 ug/m3
of lint-free respirable dust. 1u Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41
Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39
Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from inter17 In many cotton preparation and manufacturing operations, including
opening, picking, and carding, 1000 ugj m3 of total dust is roughly equivalent to 500 ug/m3 of re:spirable dust. Joint App. 464; 43 Fed. Reg.
27361, col. 2; Sft> ·infra, n . 22.
18 The Act establi:shed the National ln:;titute for Occupational Safety and
Health as part of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
NIOSH is authorized, inter alia, to "develop and establish recommended
occupational safety and health standards." 29 U. S. C. § 671 (c) (1) . At
the requPst of the Secretaries of Labor or HEW, or on his own initiative,
the Director of NIOSH may
"conduct such research and experimPntal programs as he determines are·
nere::;sa ry for the development of criteria for new and improved occupational »afety and health standards, and . . . after comsideratiou of the
tesults of :;uch research and experimental programs make recommendation~ concerning new or improved occupational safety and health standa rd~" ld .. § 671 (d) .
111 NIOSH presented itt. recommendation in a lengthy and detailed document entitled "Criteria for a Recommended Standard: Occupational Expo:;ure of Cotton Dust." Ex 1, Ct. of Avp. J . A. 1-169. The report
examined the effect:s of cotton du:;t exposure and suggested implementation·
of work practi ce:s, enginl:'ering controls, medical surveillance, and monitoc-ing to decrease expo.,;ure to the recommended leveL

.
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ested parties on the NIOSI! recommendation and other related matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker's Union
of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest
Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more
stringent PEL of 100 ug/m3.
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to replace the existing Federal standard on cotton dust with a
new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b)(5) of the Act,
29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) . 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. · The proposed standard contained a PEL of 200 ug/m3 of vertical
elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for all segments of
the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implementation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respirators for the short-term and engineering' controls for the longterm. !d., at 56506, col. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested
parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period." 0
Following the comment period; OSHA conducted .three
hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lubbock, Tex. that lasted over 14 days. Public participation
was widespread, involving representatives from industry and
the workforce, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists,
and many others. By the time the informal rule-making
procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments
and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed.
Reg. 27351 , col. 2. The volu:rpinous record, composed of a
transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and posthearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages.
U. S. App. D. C. - , 617 F. 2d, .at 647. OSHA issued
its final Cotton Dust Standard-the one challenged in the instant case- on June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying
statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69
pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418; see
29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980).
20 The Act specifies an informal rulemaking procedure to accompany the
promulgation of occupational safety and health :rtandards. See 29 U.S .. C.
§ 655 (b)(2) , (3) , (4).

'
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The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA estab ..
lishes mandatory PELs over an 8-hour period of 200 ug/m3
for yarn manufacturing, 21 750 ug/m3 for slashing and weav~
ing operations, and 500 ug/m3 for all other processes in the
cotton industry. 22 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c).· These levels
represent a rela.xation of the proposed PEL of 200 ug/m3 for
all segments of the cotton industry.
OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard
that depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls,
such as installation of ventilation systems, 23 and work practice controls, such as special floor sweeping procedures. Full
compliance with the PELs is required within 4 years, except
to the extent that employers can establish that the engineerThe Standard provide~:- that exposure to lint-free respirable cotton
dust may be measured by a vertical elutriator, with its 15-micron particle
size cutoff, or "a method of equivalrnt accuracy and precitlion." 29
CFR § 1910.1043 (c).
22 The manufacturing of cotton textilr products is divided into several
different stages. (1) In the operations of opening. picking, carding, drawing, and roving, raw cotton is cleaned and prrparrd for spinning into
yarn. Brief for Petitioners ATlVII et a!., at 7, n. 12. (2) In the operationtl of spinning, twisting. winding, spooling, and warping, the prepared
cotton i::. made into yam and reudied for weaving and other proce~sing.
ld , at 7, n 13 . (3) In slashing and weaving, the yarn is manufactured
into a woven fabric. Id. , at 7, n . 14. The Cotton Dust Standard defines
"yarn manufacturing" to mean " all textile mill operations from opening
to, but not including , slutihing and weaving." 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (b).
See generally 43 Fed . Heg. 27:365, col. 1 und 2.
The nontextile industries covered by the Standard's 500 ugjm3 PEL
include, but arr not limited to, "warehousing, compressing of cotton lint,
clal:l~ing and marketing, using cot ton yarn (i. e. knitting), reclaiming and
marketing of textile manufacturing wuste, delinting of cottonl:leed, marketing a11d converting of linters, reclaiming and marketing of gin motes and
batting, yarn felt manufacturing using wal:lte cotton fiberi:l and by prod·
uct~ ." !d., at 27360, col. 3.
~ 3 Venhlation syt<tems include general controls, such as central .air·
conditioning, and !oral exhamt controls, which capture emissions of cotton
dul:lt as clol:le to the point of generation as po:;sible. See 43 Fed. Reg.
27363- 27364.
21
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ing and work practice controls are infeasible. /d., § 1910.1043
(e) ( 1) . During this compliance period, and at certain other
times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators
to employees. /d. , § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements include monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveillance of all employees, annual medical examinations, employee education and training programs, and the posting of
warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in
the instant case requires employers to transfer employees
unable to wear respirators to another position, if available,
having a dust level at or below the Standard's PELs, with
"no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits
as a result of the transfer." !d., § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v) .
On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the
Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents
a "significant health hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350,
col. 1, and that "the prevalence of byssinosis should be significantly reduced" by the adoption of the Standard's PELs, id.,
at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust
and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA
relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relationship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the coucentration of lint-free respirable cotton dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 2735527359; Exhibit t>-51, Joint App. 29-55. See also Ex. t>-17,
Ct. of App . J . A. 235-245; id., at 1492-1839. Even at the
200 ug/m3 PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least
Grade 1/ 2 byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the
yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Re~. 27359, col. 2 and 3.
In enacting the Cotton Dust StandarJ, OSHA interpreted
the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard
to protect against material health impairment, bounded only
by technological and economic feasibility . /d., at 27361, col.
3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative proposal for a PEL of 500 ug/m3 in yarn manufacturing,
a proposal which would produce a 25 %· prevalence of at
least Grade 1/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the

•
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Standard to be both technologically and economica.lly feasible based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Although recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless
rejected the union proposal for a 100 ug/m3 PEL because
it was not within, the "technologic~i1 capabilities of the industry." 43 Fed. Reg. 27359-27360. Similarly, OSHA set
PELs for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 ug/m3
in part because of limitations of technological feasibility.
ld., at 27361, col. 3. Finally, the Secretary found that "engineering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even
with massive expenditures by the industry," id., at 27360, col.
2. and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL
cf 750 ug/ m3 for weaving apd slashing.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major
respects. 24 The court rejected the industry's claim that
OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give sufficient reasons for failing to adopt it. 617 F. 2d, at 652-654.
The court also held that the Standard was "reasonably necessary and appropriate" within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material
health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 617
F. 2d, at 654-655, 654, n. 83. Rejecting the industry position that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the
Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead
agreed with OSHA's interpretation that the Standard must
protect. employees against material health impairment sub. jePt only to the limits of technological and economic feasibility. ld., at 662-666. The court held that l'Congress
itself struck the balance between costs and benefits in the
mandate to ·the agency" under § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act, 29
24 The court remanded to the agency that portion of the Standard dealing with the cottonseed oil industry, after concluding that the record
failed to establish adequately the Standard's economic feasibility. -. - 1!. S. App. D. C. - , 617 F . 2d 636, 009, 677 (1979) ..
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U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), and that OSHA is powerless to cir..
cumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most pro~
tective feasible standard. 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the
court held that the agency's determination of technological
and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. ld., at 655-662.
We affirm in part, and vacate in part.25

.,.

..

1l At oral argument, and in a letter addressed to the Court after oral
argument, petitioners contended that the Secretary's recent amendment of
OSHA's so-called "Cancer Policy" in light of this Court's decision in
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, U. S.
(1980), was relevant to the issues in the present case. We di~agree.
OSHA amended its Cancer Policy to "carry out the Court's interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that consideration
must, be given to the significance of the risk in the issuance of a carcinogen
standard nne! that OSHA must COJJsider all relevant evidence in making
tlwse determinations." 46 fed. Reg. 4889, col. 3 (1981). Previously,
although laeking such evidence as dose response data, the Secretary presumed that. no safe exposure level existed for carcinogenic substances. In(lustrial Un:ion Department v. American Petmleum Institute, supra, slip
op., nt 10, 13-14, 25, n. 39-40. Following this Court's decision, OSHA
deleted those Jlrovisi9ns of the Cancer Policy which required the "automHtic setting of the lowest feasible level" without regard to determinations
of risk significance. /d., at 4890, col. 1.
In distinct contrast with its Cancer Policy, OSHA expressly found that
"exposure to cotton dust presents a significant heHlth hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1, and that "cotton dust produced
significant health effects at low levels of exposure," id., at 27358, col. 2.
In addition, the agency noted that "grade 1;2 byssinosis and associated
pulmonary function decreme11ts are significant health effects in themselves
and should be prevented in so far as possible." !d., nt 27354, col. 2. In
mHking its assessment of significant risk, OSHA relied on dose response
curve dat'a (the Merchant Study) showing that 25% of employees suffered
at least Grade 1f2 byssinosis at a 500 ug/m3 PEL, and that 12.7% of aU
employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 ugjm3 PEL standard. /d.,
at 27358, col. 2 Hnd 3. Examining the Merchant Study in light, of other
studies in the record, the agency found that "the Merchant, study provides
a reliable asRessment of health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton
dust." Id ., at 27357, col. 3.· OSHA eoncluded that the "prevalence of
2
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II
The principal question presented in this case is whether
the· Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secre ..
tary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of
the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) ( 5), to determine that the costs
of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits.
Relying on §§ 6 (b)(5) and 3 ,(8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 655 (b)(5), 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA
must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of
material health impairment, see Industrial Union Department
v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 29, but
also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk
of material health impairment is significant in light of the
costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners
ATMI et al., at 38-41.2 6 Respondents on the other hand
byssinosis should be significantly reduced" by the 200 ugjm3 PEL. Jd.,
at 27359, col. 3; see id., at 27359, col. 1 ("200 ugjm3 represents a significant reduction in the number of affected worker~ " ). It is difficult to
imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court's decision
in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute .
26 PetitiOners ATMI et a!. express their position in several ways . They
maintain that OSHA "is required to show that a reasonable relationship
exists between the risk reduction benefits and the costs of its shmdards."
Brief fo1 Petitioners ATMI et a!., at 36. Petitioners also suggest that
OSHA must :show that "the :standard is expected to achieve a significant
reduction in [the significant risk of material health impairment] " ba!:ied on
"an assesbment of the cost:; of achieving it." · /d., at 38, 40. Allowing
that "[t] hi::; does not mean that OSHA must engage in a rigidly formal
cost-bPnefit calculation that place:; a dollar value on employee lives or
health," ~d. , at 39, petitioners describe the required exerci:se as follows :
' First, OSHA must make a respon:sible determination of the costs nnd r;sk
reduction benefits of its standard. Pur:mant to the requirement of Section 6 (f) of the Act, this determination must be factunlly supported by
substantial evidence in the record . The subsequent determination whether
the reduction in health n sk is ':;;gnificant ' (based upon the factual a~se:ss
nwut of co::;ts and benefit~) is a judgment to be made by the agency in
the first instance." 1d., at 40.
Hespondent disputes petitioners' description of' the exerciHe, claiming

'
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eontend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate stand..,
ards that eliminate or reduce such risks "to the extent such
protection is technologically and economically feasible."
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 38; Brief for
Respondent Unions, at 26-27. 27 To resolve this debate, we
must turn to the language, structure, and legislative history
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

A
The starting point of our analysis ls the language of the
(1981);
statute itself. Steadman v. SEC,- U.S.-, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section
6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) (emphasis
added), provides:
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
that any meaningful balancing must involve ''plucing a [dollar] value on
human life and freedom from suffering," Brief for Respondent Secretary of
Labor, at 59, and that there iH no other way but through formal co:>tbenefit analysis to accomplish petitioners' desired balancing, id, at 59-60.
Cost-benefit analysis contemplates "systematic enumeration of all benefits
and all costs, tang1ble and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or difficult to measure, that will accrue to all memuers of :;ociety if a particular
project i:s adopted ." E . Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy
Anulysis 104 (1978); see National Academy of Sciences, Decillion Making
for Regulation Chemical in the Environment 38 ( 1975). See generally
E . Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analy::;is (1976); Prest and Turvey, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, in 300 Economic Journal 680 (1965). Whether petitioner::;' or
te;;pondent'~ charactPrization is correct, we will sometime rt:>fer to petitiont:>r'~ proposed ext:>rcise al' " cost-benefit analysi~ ."
21 As described h:r the union respondentR , the test for determining
whether a standard promulgatt:>d to regulate n ''toxic material or harmful
physical agt:>nt" satisfif's the Act has three parts :
"First, whether the ' place of employmt:>nt i~ unsafe-in the sense that
significant ri~Jk:; are present and can bt:> t:>liminatt:>d or lel:ll:lt'lled by a change
m practicel:l.' [International Union Department, ,;lip op., at 32 (plurality
opinion)] . Second, whether of the ]J08Slble available corrt:>ctives the· Secre...
tary had selected 'the ,;tandard .. . that i;; mo::;t protective'. Ibid. Tlmd ,
whether that :'ltandard ib 'fea~uble .' " Bnef for Re::;pondent Unions, at

40-41 •
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with toxic materit:\1S or harmful physical agents under
this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence,. that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
.dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life." 2.s
Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that
the phrase "to the extent feasible" contains the critical language in § 6 (b) ( 5) for purposes of this case.
The plain meaning of the word "feasible" supports respondentsr m terp~tation of the 7tatute-:-- According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, "feasible" means "capable of being done, executed,
or effected." !d., at 831 (1Q76). Accord, · The Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933) ("Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out"); Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard)Y
Dictionary of the English Language 903 (1957) ("That may
be done, performed or effected"). Thus, § 6 (b)( 5) directs
the Secretary to issue the standard that "most adequately
assures ... that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health," limited only by the extent to which this is "capable of being done." In effect then, as the Court of Appeals
held, Congress itself defined the relationship between costs
and benefits, by placing the "bene:ijt" of worker health above
SE:ction 6 (b)( 5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5}, aliso provides:
ccnevelopment of standards under this subsection ~hall be based npon
res1•arch, demonstration;;, experiments, and :such other information as may
be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of
health and safety protection for the employee, other con~iderations shall
be the latest available ~:<cientific data, · iu the field, thr fea8ibility of the
standards, and experience gained under thif' and othrr hPalth and tiafety
law:;. Whenewr practicable, the standard promulgated :;hall be expre:;~ed
m term:; of objective criteria, and of the performance desired;"
f&
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all other considerations save those making attainment of thig
"benefit" unachievable. Further balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6 (b)(S), because it might lead to a different balance than that struck by Congress. Thus, not only
is cost-benefit analysis by OSHA not required by the statute,
but it is precluded. 29 See Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 32 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
When Congre~ has i!lt,ended.. that_ an sgency engage in
cost-benefit analysiS, it has clearl ind'
u intent on
tne lace of tile statute. One early example is the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 710a.
"""'=
"[T]he Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the est'imated costs, and if the lives
and social security of people are otherwise adversely
affected.' 1
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
29 In this case we are faced only with the issue whether the Act requires
or permits OSHA to balance costs and benefits in promulgating a single
toxic material and lut rmful physical agent standard under § 6 {b) {5).
Petitioners arg11e that without cost-benefit balancing, · the issuance of a
single standard mighL result in a "serious misallocation of the finite resources that an• available for the proteetion of worker safety and health,"
given the other health hazards in the workplace. Reply Brief for Petitioners ATMI eta!., at 10; see Brief for Petitioners ATMI eta!., at 38-39.
This argument is more properly addressed to other provisions of the Act
which may authorize OSHA to explore costs and benefit~; for deciding between issuance of several standards regulating different varieties of health
and safety hazards, e. g., § 6 {g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (g); see
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip
op., at 33, or for promulgating other types of standard:s not issued under
§ 6 (b) (5). We express no view on tlwse que~tiomo.

·'
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Act Amendments of 19'78, 43 U. S. C. § 1347 (b), providing·
that offshore drilling operations shall use
"the best av~ilable and safest technologies which the
Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a signific4nt effect
on safety, health, or the environment, except where the
Secretary d~termines that the incrernental benefits are
clearly insufficient to j-ust·ify the incremental costs of
using such technologies."
These and other statutes 30 demonstrate that Congress uses
30 See, e. g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C.
§ 6295 (c) , (d) ; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972,33 U. S. C. §1312(b){l), (2); §1314(b)(l)(B) ; Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (b) (4) (B); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, 42 U . S. C.§ 7545 (c) (2){B) . In the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress directed the J\.dministr~
tor to consider "the total co~t of application of technology in relation to
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application. " 3a
U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (1) (" BPT" limitations) . With regard to 19~7 effluent
limitations, the Adminio;trator it~ directed to con::;ider total cost, but not in
comparison with effluent reduction benefits. Jd., § 1314 (b) (2) (B)
(" BAT" limitations) . See EPA v. National Cr·ushed .Stone Assn., No. 79770, ::;lip op., at 5-6, 6, n. 10, 11- 12.
In other statutes, Congress has used the phra8e "unreason~ble risk,"
accompanied by explanation in legislative hi~tory, to o;ignify a generaliZf•d
balancing of costs and benefit s. See, e. g., the Consumer Safety Act ol'
1972, 15 U. S. C. § 2056 (a) ( "unrea~onable risk of injury"); B. R. Rep.
No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Seso;., 33 (1972) (where the House ~tated:
"It should be noted that the Commi~sion's authority to promulgate
standard~ under this bill i::, limitl:'d to in::stances where the hazard as::;ociated with a consumer product pre~ent::, an upreasonable risk of death,
injury, or serious or frequent illne~& . . . . Protection against unreasonable
risks is central to many Federal and State s~ fety statutes and the court~
have had broad experience in interpreting the term's meaning and application. It, is generally expected th~t the determination of unreasonable
l1azard will involve the Commission in balancing the probability that rio;k
will result in harm and the gravity of such harm againo;t the effect on the
product's utility, co~Sts, and availability to the co11sumer.") ;
S. R ep. No. 92-749, !J:2d Cong., 2d Ses;,., 14-15. See also Aqua Slidl' 'N'"
Dive ·Cmp. v Consumer Product Safety Co rnrnissiuu, 569 F . 2d H31, 83!:1

!
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specific language when intending that an agency engage in
cost-benefit aualysis. See Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 23, n. 27
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary
meaning, the word "feasible" cannot be construed to articulate such congressional intent. We therefore reject the argument that Congress required or authorized cost-benefit anal~
ysis in § 6 (b)(5).

B

"The term 'occupational safety and health standard~
means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropr·i.ate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment."
Taken alone, the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropri~
ate" might be construed to contemplate some balancing of
the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that,
sp construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis require(CA5 1978) ; Forester v. Consumer· P1·od'Uct Safety Commission, - U. S.
App. D. C. - , 559 F . 2d 774, 789 (1977).
At least one Senator thought that the Occupational Safpty and HPalth
Act did not contemplate cost-bPnPfit analysis. In 1973, Senator Chile:;
introduced an amendment to the Act, that, int'er alia,
" directs the Secretary to recognize the cost-benefit ratio in promulgating a
new standard and to publish information relative to the projected financial
impact. This provision will promote the development of standards jui:itifiable in terms of the benefits to be derived and afford those to be
affected an opportunity to make a reasoned evaluation of the propo:sal."'
llQ Cong . Rec. 421.51.

·..
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ment on the issuance of § 6 (b) ( 5) standards, even if § 6 (b)
( 5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not
decide whether § 3 (8), standing alone, would contemplate
some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Congress specifically chose in § 6 (b) ( 5) to impose separate and
additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic
materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those
standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health
to the extent feasible. Congress could reasonably have concluded that health standards should be subject to different
criteria than safety standards because of the special problems
presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Departrnent v. American Petrole·u m Institute, supra, slip op., at :3839, n. 54 (plurality opiniou) .
Agreement with petitioners' argument that § 3 (8) imposes
an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit analysis on the issuance of § 6 (b)( 5) standards would eviscerate
the "to the extent feasible" requirement. Standards would
inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b) ( 5). For example, if cost-benefit a.nalysis indicated a protective standard
of 1000 ug/ m3 PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a
500 ug/m3 PEL, the agency would be forced by the costbenefit requirement to choose the less stringent point. 31 We
cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of
§ 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement
of § 6 (b) ( 5). Adoption of petitioners' interpretation would
effeetively write § 6 (b)(5) out of the Act. We decline to
render Congress' decision to include a feasibility requirement
1

In addition , as the legislative hbtory make:> plain, see infra, at 23-24,
any standard that was not, economically or technologically feasible would
a fortiori not be "reasonably necessary or appropriate'' under the Act.
U. S. App. D . C. - ,
See Indnstrial Union D epartment v. Hodgson, 499 F 2d 467 , 478 {1974) (''Congre:;:; does not appear to have intended
to protect employee~ by putting their employer<> out of bu~ine~~ '') .
,
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nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rule that all
parts of a statute, if poss;_ble, are to be given effect. E. g.,
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S,
609, 633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S.
303, 307-308 (1961). Congress eschewed any further balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful physical
agents standards, and we should not "impute to Congress a
purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote
with the other.'' Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunrdng, Inc., s·upra, at 631 , quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz~
Korportion_. 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947). 32

c
The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not
crystal clear, provides general support for respondents' interpretation of the Act. The congressional reports and debates
certainly confirm that Congress meant "feasible" and nothing
else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the
Act. might be thought to requ'ire achievement of absolute
eafety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that
Thi~ il:l not to say that § 3 (8) might not require the balancing of
tests and benefits for standards promulgated under provisions other than
6 (b) (5) of the Act. As a plurality of this Court noted in Industrial
nion Department, if § 3 (8) had no substantive content, "there
would be no statutory criteria at all to guide the Secretary in promulgating
either national consensus standards or permanent standards other than
those dealing with toxic materials and harmful physi~al agents." Slip op.,
at 29- 30, n . 45. Furthermore, the mere faet that a § 6 (b) (5) standard is
" feasible'' doe:; not mean that § 3 (8) 's "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language might not impose additional restraints on OSHA . For
example, all § 6 (b) ( 5) standards must be addressed to "significant risks"
of material health impairment. ld., at 32. In addition , if the use of
one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk a;,; the use
of five, the use of fivt' respirators was "technologically and economically
feasible," and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate'' limitation might come into play as an additional restriction on OSHA to choose the one-respirator standarrl. In this
rase we need not decide all the applirations that §. 3 (8) might have, either·
alone or togetnet with § 6 (b) (5) .
12

t
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health and safety goals be capable of economic and technological accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence
.,{ any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA
to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating
a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. · The
legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress
was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such
eosts were part of the cost of doing business. We thus turn
to the relevant portions of the legislative history.
Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, introduced by
~enator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785,
introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific provisions controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic
materials and harmful physical agents, Legis. Hist. 1, 6-7
(Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both
.ontained the definitional section now codified as § 3 (8) .83
The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the
Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that
included the following section:
"The Secreta.ry, in promulgating standards under this
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, on the basis of the best available professional
evidence, that no e~ployee will suffer any impairment
of health or functional capacity, or diminished life expectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785) ~
Legis. Hist. 834.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, reporting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtuaJly
sa Although both versions of the Act contained provisions identical to
§ 3 (8), 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), there is no discussion in the legislative histQry nf ·the meauing t)f the phrase " reasonably nece::>5:Hy or appropriate.'"

.... ·~\>.
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identical to the House version, except for the additional requirement that the Secretary set the standard ".which most
adequately and feas·ibly assures ... that no employee will
suffer any impairment of health." Legis. Hist. 242 (the Senate provision was numbered § 6 (b)( 5)) (emphasis added).
This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator
Javits, who explained his amendment:
"As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting
standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of
proposed standards. This is an improvement over the
Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee],
which might be interpreted to require absol·ute health
and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the
Administration bill, which contains no criteria for standards at all. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess.,
58; Legis. Hist. 197 (emphasis added). 34
14 Petitioners' primary legislative history argument is that Senator Javit:s
"took the position that OSHA standard~ should be 'feasible' in the sen.,e
of being 'reasonable' and 'practical' as well as technologically achievable."
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., aL 32. A review of the record belies
this contention. Senator Javits himself had introduced the Administration's bill, S. 2788, which he observed contained no criteria for issuance of
l:ltandards. Legi::;. Hist. 31, 39-42. That proposed legislation, which established a National Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate
standards, required the Board to submit proposed standards to an appropriate national standards-producing organization "to prepare a report on
the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of snch standard.''
Jd., at 39. Furthermore, either thP Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of
Health, Education, and WelfarE' coulu object to a propoBed standard on
the basis, inter alia, that it "ir, not fea~;;ible," id., at 40, at which point the
Board could reaffirm the standard by a majority vote, ibid. President
Nixon's message accompanying S. 2788, which Senator Javits inserted in
the Congressional Record, described the "report oil the technical feasi·
bility, reasonablen!:'~s and practicality of such standard" under the Act a~ a
" report on the feasibility of the proposer! ~t:mdards. " 115 Cong. Hec.
22517.
From this slim reed petitioners fashion their legislative hi~;;tory argument. l3u.t even if Senator Javit~;; fully suoocribed to statements by Presi-
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'l"hus the Senator's ce,ncern was that a standard might require
"absolute health and safety" without any consideration as to
whether such a condition was achievable. · The full Senate
Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this
provision "shall represent feasible requirements," id., at· 7;
Legis. Hist. 147, and commented that "[s]uch standards
should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no employee will suffer impaired health . • . ," ibid. (emphasis
added).
The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting
in § 6 (b )(5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the
Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Senator Dominick, who played a prominent role in this amendment process, see Legis. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits);
527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned
that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He
therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b)(5)
be struck, explaining:
"This requirement is inherently confusing and unrealistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to
ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of
injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case
of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all
risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria
. could, if literally applied, close every business in this
nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which
might most 'adequately' and 'feasibly' assure the elimin~tion of the daJlger would be the prohibition of the
occupation itself." Legis. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen.
dent Nixon on the proposed legislation, of which there is some doubt, see
115 Cong. Rec. 22512, this hardly supports the view that the Senator's
addition of the fensibility requirement to the Williams bill included any
such baggage. After all, the Senator described hiR amendment only with
the word "fea~ible," and specifically distinguished the amended Williams
bill from the Administration's, on the basis of the latter'~ lack of criteria.
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Dominick on his Pllopesed ttmendment No, 1054) (em,
phasis in original).
In the ensuing floor d~ba.te on this issue, Senator Dominick
reiterated hjs concern that "[i] t is unrealistic to attempt, as
[the Committee's Section 6 (b)( 5)] apparently does, to establish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is
an impossibility .•.." Legis. Hist. 480. 85 The Sentttor concluded tha,t 11 [a]ny administrator responsible for enforcing
the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either
he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is
any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could
not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of
Congress. ~ .." Id., at 481-482.
Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sentence of §13 (b){ 5) deleted. However, after working with
Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended version of the first sentence which he though "agreeable to all"
and which became § 6 (b)(5) as it now appears in the Act.
!d., at 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6
(b)( 5) to "toxic materials and harmful physical agents,';
changed 11health impairment" to "materiftl health impairment," and deleted t~1e reference to "diminished life expectancy." ~ignificantly, the feasibility requirement was left
intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase "which most
adequately and feasibly assures," the amendment merely substituted 11which most adequately assures, to the extent feasi-

·:

';

8 5 Senator Dominick gave :severn! examples. }'or instance:
'' [L]et Ub take a fellow who is a streetcar conductor or a bus conductor·
at the present time. How in the world, in the process of the pollution we
have in the streets or in the process of t.he automobile accidents that we
have all during a working day of anyone driving a bus or trolley car, ot
whatever it may be, can we se1 standards that will make sure he will not;
have any risk to his life for the rest of his life? It is totally impossible fot
this to be pu1 in a bill ; and yet it is in the committee bill." Legis. Hi~t ..
4~3, See ~:~lso id , at 481; ~45.
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ble,H to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated
as a limit on the promulgation of standard under§ 6 (b)(5).
Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made
clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working environment could not be achieved through "prohibition of the
occupation itself," id., at 367, and that toxic material and
harmful physical agent standards should not address frivolous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility
requirement, along with the need for a "material health im.,
pairment," were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns,
He explained the effect of the amendment:
"What we were trying to do in the bill-unfortunately,
we did not have the proper wording or the proper drafting-was to say that when we are dealing with toxic
agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps
as are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere
within which a person's health or safety would not be
affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing
that anyone would be assured that no one would have a
hazard .... " !d. , at 502.
Senator Williams added that the amendment "will provide a
continued direction to the Secretary that he shall be required
to set the standard which most adequately and to the greatest extent feasible assures" that no employee will suffer any
material health impairment. !d., at 503. The Senate thereafter passed S. 2193. One week latrr. the House passPd a
substitnte bill for its original bill, which failPd to contain
any substantive criteria for the issnanre of health standards.
Legis. Hist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Conferenrf'. howevrr . the House confere0R acceded to the Senate's
v0rsion of § 6 (b)( :1) 3 "
$h [n acr·eding, the Reuse obtained Senate agreement to another amendment , now § 6 (b) (6) (A) of the Act , that allowed employen; t o petition
t'or a temporary vari:m ~ e from an occupational safety and health standard
in ceftaln ruse~ , except that "[e]ronomic hardship is not to be a con-

'"='- .• ,.
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Not only qoes the legislative history confirm that Congress
meant "feasible" rather than "cost-benefit" when it used the
former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that
the Af't would create substantial costs for employers, yet intendE'd to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe
and healthful working environment. 37 Congress viewed the
costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Senator Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated:
"We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but
that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in
America." Legis. Hist. 444. He asked:
"One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too
sideration for the qualifiration for a temporary extension nrder." H. R
Conferepce Rep. No. 91-1765, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 35; Legis. Hist . 1188.
The Conference Report limited the variance procedure to the followi n ~
rases:
"unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of ne"PSSArv
materials or equipment or because necessary construction or alteration nf
facilities cannot be rompleted on time. . . . Surh an order may be i~~urd
for a maximum period of one year and may not be renewed more than
twir·e." Ibid.
87 Berause the rnsts of cornplianre wnuld weigh partirularly hPwi!v 01,
t;mall bu~inesses, Congress Jll'o··ided in &213 of the Art 11n am~l'cim~nt to
the f?mall Busine~8 Act, 15 U. S. C. &6:36 making sm1ll busi11esses e!igib!r
for economic assistance throul!,'h the Sm1ll Business Admi"istration to romJJly with standard~ promulgated by the Secretary. Legis. Hi~t . 1257.
Senator Dominick explained :
" There is a provision in the bill whirh recognizes the · impact that thi~
particular legislation may have on small businesses. . . . It perm'ts the
Secretary to make loans to small busiwsse;; wherever the stancln rds that
are set by the National Government are so ~evere as to have raused }t
real and substantial economic in.iury. Under thrse circumstances, the
Secretary is entitled, through the Small Business Administration , to mnke
loans to those businesses to get them over the hump, b2cause of the need
for new equipment, or because of new conditions within the shop, whirh
would permit them to continue in operation.
"I think that is a very significant and important provision for miniP1izing economic injury which could occur if the bill resulted in situationS'
which would have very serious effects on businessE:'S." Legis . Hist. 525.

•'·,

'•

..'

·'

79-1429 & 79- 1583-0PINION
~~

AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety
equipment loses the services of its skilled employees?
Is it too expensjve for the employee who loses his hand
. or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow
trying to raise her children on meager allowance under
workmen's compensation and social security? And what
about the man-a good hardworking man-tied to a
wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That
is what we ~e dealing with when we talk about indus~
trial safety. . . . We are talking about people's lives,
not the indifference of some cost accountants." Legis.
IIist. 510.
~enator Eagleton commented that "[t]he costs that wi11 be
incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and
~;afety to be established under this bill are, in my view, realonable and necessary costs of doing business." Legis. Hist.
1150-1151 (emphasis added). 38
Other Members of Congress voiced similar views. 30 Nowhere is there any indication that Congress intended a fur58 .Congress was concerned that some employers not obtain a competitive advantage over others by declining to inve~t in worker health and
llafety:
"Although many employers in all induslries have demonstrated Hn exemplary degree of concern for health and safety in the workplacP, their
efforts are to often undercut by those who 11re not so concerned. Moreover, the fact is that many employers-particularly smallPr onesa;imply cannot make the necp~sary invPBtment in health and safety, and
~urvivP competitively, unle~s all are compelled to do ~o. " S . Rep. 91-1282,
!ilst Cong., 2d Sess., 4, Legis . Hist.. 144.
8 0 See, e. g., Legis. Hist. 1030-1031 (remarks of Congre:ssman Dent) :
" Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs Lo the·
operation of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad,
I would ;;ay there is a greater concern and that must bt> for the production
men who do the producing-the men who work in the service industries
and the men and women in thiH country who daily go out and keep the
economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work and
to b e able t o vrospe1 in it ."'
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-ther balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health and
safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Congress
thought that the financ-ial costs of health and safety problems
in the workplace were as large or larger than the financial
costs of eliminating these problems. In its statement of
findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act
itself, Congress announced that "personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial
burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and
disability compensation payment." 29 U. S. C. § 651 (a)
'The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs:
"[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost
wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product
is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that
could be available for productive use are siphoned oft' to
pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses," S. Rep., supra, at 2; Legis. Hist. 142.
Senator Eagleton summarized, "Whether we, as individuals,
are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we
can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe
or unhealthy worksite." Legis. Hist. 1150-1151.

III
Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."
29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secretary's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is "economically feasible" is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they
elaim ( 1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs necessary to meet the Standard's requirements; and (2) that
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OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not
threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry.
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of
the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable miud might accept as adequate
to support a conclusiou." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U. S. 474. 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take
into account coutradictory evidence in the record, Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 487-488, but "the possibility of drawing two iuconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v.
Federal Mariti·me Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966).
Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial
evidence questious in the Courts of Appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655
{f), we apply the familiar rule that "[t]his Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
rsubstantial evidence] standard appears to have been misappreheuded or grossly misapplied" by the court below. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil
Corp v. FPC, 417 U. S. 2S3, 292, 310 (1974); F1'C v. Standttrd Oil Co ., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our
inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance,
would fiud OSHA's findiugs supported by substantial evidence. Instead we turu to OSHA's findings aud the record
upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of
Appeals "misappreheuded or grossly misapplied" the subst~:tn
~ial evidence test.
A
OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance
with the Cotton Dust Standard after reviewing two financial
aualyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute
(RTI) , an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry
representatives (Hocutt-Thomas). 40 The agency carefully
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explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the
conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the
agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which
it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost
estimate. A brief summary of OSHA's treatment of the two
studies follows.
OSHA rejected RTI's cost estimate of $1.1 billion for textile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons. 41
First, OSHA believed that RTI's estimate should be discounted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3, because that estimate was based on the assumption that engineering controls
would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those
processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust · is
·not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that
"[e]xclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only
~ould reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent." Ex. 676, Ct. of App. J. A. 585.42 Since the Standard did not refinal Inflationary Impact Statement (1976), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A.
457, 57:3:_748; RTI, Technological Feasibility and Economic Impact of
Regulations for Cotton Dust: Testimony to be Presented by the Research
Triangle Institute at Public Hearing (1977), Ex. 16, Ct. of App. J. A. 1320,
1351- 1357. The industry estimates were presented by Hovan Hocutt and
Arthur Thomas, employees of dust control equipment manufacturers .
Statement of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Pneumafil
Corp., Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2228-2247; Statement of Arthur Thomas,
Senior Vice-President, The Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, Ct. of App. J . A. 22482257. OSHA referred collectively to these two statements as the HocuttThornas estimate.
41 RTI estimated compliance costs of $984.4 million for yarn productinn
(opening through spinning), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 473, and $127.7
million for yarn processing (winding through weaving/slashing), id., at
600. ln another part of its study, RTI estimated yarn production costs
of $885.6 million . Jd., at 589. The explanation for this discrepancy is
not readily apparent from the record, although it may be attributable to
cost estimates for different years.
42 RTI made what it called a "conservative estimate" that "control5
would be applied to all the production equipment in mills processing cotton
and cotton-synthetic blends, even if part of their product is pure synthetlc.'1 Ex. 6-7tl, Ct. of App, J. A, 585.
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ttuire controls on synthetics-only equipmeut, OSHA rejected
RTI's assumption about application of controls to syntheticsonly machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3. Second, OSHA
concluded that RTI "may have over-estimated compliauce
costs since some operations are already in compliance with
the permissible exposure limit of the new standard." ld., at
27370, col. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some mills
had attained PELs of 200 ug/m3 or less, while others were
below the 100 ug/m3 total dust level.H Therefore, OSHA
disagreed with RTI's assumption that the industry had not
reduced cotton dust exposure below the existing standard's
1000 ug/m3 total dust PEL. ld., at 27370, col. 3. Third,
OSHA fouud that the RT'I study suffered from lack of recent
accurate industry data. ld., at 27373, col. 1; see Ex. 6-76,
Ct. of App. J. A. 858; Ex. 16, id., at 1357, 1359.
In light of these deficiencies in the RT'I study, OSHA
adopted the Hocutt-Thomas estimate for textile industry engineering controls of $543 million, 44 emphasizing that, be48

RTI's David LeSourd explained that RTI did not have data on the
degree of compliance for the industry as a whole, but only for some
specific mills. Ct. of App . .T. A. 3637-3638. Therefore RTI merely
assumed that industry-wide PELs were at a 1000 ug/m3 total dust PEL.
Ex. 6-76, id., at 579-580. The record contains conflicting evidence on the
actual lew! of control in the industry. Some evidence suggests compliance
by mills substantially better than the 1000 ugjm3 total dust level. See,
e. g., Ex. 47, id., at 2037 (66% of Burlington Industries work areas at
or below 500 ugjm3, 28% below 200 ug/m3); Ex. 78, id., at 2387. One
expert , commenting on another study, observed that "substantial proportions of the indm;try are, in fact , within compliance of [200 ugjm3] ."
Ct. of App. J . A. 3637. Other evidence in the record suggests that s~me
segments of the industry are not in compliance with the 1000 ugjm3
total dust PEL. See e. g , id, at 3939 (criticizing RTI assumption of
compliance) . In any event, OSHA found that the "actual level of controls
in the cotton industry could not be determined" on the basis of data
available to RTI at the time of its study. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 3.
41 OSHA'o cost estimate included $543 million for engineering controls
(the Hocutt-Thoma::; e~Stimate), $7 million for monitoring, medical survelllance, at1d other proviswnl:l (the RTI estimate), $31.5 million for waste
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cause it was based on the most recent industry data, it was
more realistic than RTI's estimate. 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col.
V " Nevertheless OSHA concluded that the Hocutt-Thomas
estimate was overstated for four principal reasons. First,
Hocutt-Thomas included costs of achieving the existing PEL
of 1000 ug/m3, while OSHA thought it likely that compli~
ance was more widespread and that some mills had in fact
achieved the final standard's PEL. Ibid., see supra, at 30,
n. 43. 16 Second, Hocutt-Thomas declined to make any allowance for the trend toward replacement of existing production
machines with newer more productive equipment. 47 Relying
proces~ing,

and $75 million for ~eed proce~ing, for a total of $656.5 million.
43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 1.
45 The Hocutt-Thomas ,;tudy based its estimates on data obtained from
R recent ATMI survey of cotton mills . Completed quel:ltionnaires from
353 mills, which processed 80% of the cotton balel:l in the United States,
were returned. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2231.
40 The Hocutt-Thomas study included an allowance for existing compliance efforts, by subtracting from its total estimate the cost of all eugineering controls purchased by the industry prior to February 11, 1977.
Ex. 60, C1. of App. J . A. 2232, 2247. Whether this is a sufficient proxy
for current industry compliance is not apparent from the record. Hocutt
himself admitted that he did not have figures on what portion of the
indul:ltry was meeting the 1000 ug/ m3 total dust PEL. Ct. of App. J . A.
3941.
17 John Figh, a vite-president at Chase Manhattan Bank specializing in
the textile industry , commented on the trend toward modernizing equipment in the milh:. :
" [1:3]y continuing to upgrade plants with the most modern and efficient
equipment, the textile manufacturing industry will likely not be required
due to demand to add much in the way of new bricks and mortar. There
may be l:lOme indiVldual cal:les of out-of-date facilities being replaced by
new buildingl:l ; but for the most part, I believe we will o;ee more in the
wa:v of modernization of exil:lting plants .... "· Ex. 63 , Ct. of App. J. A.
2260 (emphasi:s addt>d).
One study explained why the col:lts of controls should be lower if a mill
converts to new e4uipment as opposed to retrofitting old machines :
1 l) The operating col:lt of llf'W PQlllJlliWIIt with conlrob on that equipmpnt
ir: le~;: thnn thP operatmg co;;t of tlw old Pquipmcnt with control~

'
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f>O. this "[n]atural production trend[]," 43 Fed. Reg. 27359,

col. 1, OSHA concluded that fewer machines than estimated
by Hocutt-Thomas would require retrofitting or other controls, id., at 27372, col. 3. Third, OSHA thought that HocuttThomas failed to take into account development of new
technologies likely to occur during the four-year compliance
period. lbid. 48 Fourth, OSHA believed that Hocutt-Thomas
might have improperly included control costs for syntheticsonly machines, ibid., an inclusion which could result in a
30% cost overestimate.49
Petitioners criticize OSHA's adoption of the HocuttThomas estimate, since that estimate was based on achievement of somewhat less stringent PELs than those ultimately
promulgated in the final Sta.ndard.~ 0 Thus, even if the
Hocutt-Thomas estimate was exaggerated, they assert that
"only by the most remarkable coincidence would the amouut
neeet>sary for the older, slower equipment to meet. proscribed [sic] dust
levels; and 2) by going to newer equipment with controls there is a likelihood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some or·
all of the capital cost of control." Ex. 79A, id., at 2532; see Ex. 79C,
id., at 2550-2551; Ex. 63, id., at 2261; Ex. 78, i.d., at 2:37ti-2:377.
4 8 Chase Manhattan Bank vice-pres)dent Figh noted that "[t]here does·
not appear to be any vast new technology on the horizon," but that
" [a]s for new machinery, evolutionary changes are continuing at what
appears to me to be about the :;;ame rate as in the last few yean;." Ex. ti3,
Ct. of App. J . A. 2660-2661. One study is particularly critical of the
assumption of a "static state of technology," Ex. 7/:i, id ., at 2:380, and docu·
ments technological advances that can be expected, id., at 2380-2386.
Some experts were Jess optimistic of the role of technology. See, e. g., id.,.
a t 3643- 3644 (lrrr .,;tudy) .
40 Hocutt-Thomas had some information on the "ratio of synthetics to
cotton in blends" in the mills, but it is not clear from the record if and'
how they used thi~; information. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2230.
5 0 The final Cotton Dust Standard calls for PELs of 200 ug/m3 in
opening through roving and spinning through warping, and 750 ug/m3·
for slashing and wc:-aving. The Hocutt-Thomas study similarly assumed·
a 200 ug/ m3 PEL for opening through roving, but assumed less stringent
PELs of 500 ug/ m3 for spinning through warping, and 1000 ug/m3 for·
slashing and weaving.
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of that overestimate be equal to the additional costs required
to attain the far more stringent limits of the Standard OSHA
actually adopted ." Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 27;
see Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America,
at 14-15. The agency itself recognized the problem cited
by petitioners, but found itself limited in the precision of its
estimates by the industry's refusal to ma.ke more of its own
data available.51 OSHA explained that, "in the absence of
the [industry] survey data [of textile mills], OSHA cannot
develop more accurate estimates of compliance costs." 43
Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1. Since § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act requires
that the Secretary promulgate toxic material and harmful
physical agent standards "on the basis of the best available
evidence," 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) ( 5), and since OSHA could
not obtain the more detailed confidential industry data it
thought essential to further precision, we conclude that the
agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas estimate.5~ While a cost estimate based on the standard actually
For example, in questioning before an administrative law judge,
Hocutt answered:
"Well, I'm beginning to whsh I hadn't said anything about this, which I
did, and I have to be helpful. Practically all of this information that I
have is confidential and I couldn't reveal any of the sources. You can only
take my word for the figures . I can't substantiate it in any manner."
Ct. of App. J. A. 3929.
Petitioners note, however, that the industry subsequently provided its
survey data to OSHA, and that the only information deleted was confidential information withheld by agreement with the agency in order
to prevent identification of specific mills. Reply Brief for Petitioners
ATMI et al., at 23, n. 32 ; see J. A. 388-390. OSHA responds that ,
"[blecause the number of machines was deleted and corrrlated dust data
was not supplied, the data could not be u~rd to ~Support a speeific cost
adjustment." Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 64, n. 70. In
any event, no contention is made that OSHA had access to Hocutt's own
data used to calculate his cost estimate.
62 Both petitioners and respondents attempt their own calculations from
evidence in the record to show the unreasonableness or rrasonablene:;s of
OSHA'~ ro\~h equ~tton ~tween the Hocu.tt-Thoma8 overstatement in
11
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promulgated surely would be preferable, ss we decline to hold
as a matter of law th~t its absence under the circumstances
required the Court of Appeals to find that OSHA's determinatjon was unsupported by substantial evidence. 54
tosts and the expense of achieving a Standard somewhat more stringent
for some operations. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner National Cotton
Council of America, at 9-10; Brief for Respondent Unions, at 14-18.
Such manipulation of the data suggests a wide margin of error for any
estimate, whether it be OSHA's, the industry's, or the unions'. Viewed
in that light, the agency's .candor in confessing its own inability to achieve
a more precise estimate should not precipitate a judicial review that nonetheless demands what the congressionally-delegated "expert" says it cannot provide.
18 The Secretary originally asked RTI to prepare cost estimates for
several PEL levels, including 500, 200, and 100 ug/m3. Ex. &--76, Ct. of
App. J. A. 509. Clearly the Secretary intended to have cost infonnation
on the different PELs that he might promulgate. Although RTI provided
estimates for these levels in its final report, OSHA found them to be too
unreliable to adopt 11s final estimates. See supra, at - - - .
Even if the Secretary had wanted to obtain a cost estimate, based on
confidential industry data, for the actual PELs in the adopted Standard,
it would have been unable to do so. Hocutt had concluded that it was
technologically impractical to achieve PELs below 500 ug/m3 for the
operations of spinning through warping, Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 22392241, and PELs below 1000 ug/m3 for weaving and slashing, id ., at 22412243. Therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates of a 200 ug/m3
PEL for those operations. The Secretary obviously disagreed with his
judgment of technological feasibility. We also note that, although petitioners challenged the technological feasibility of the final Cotton Dust
Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such challenge
here. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 8, n. 16.
~·The Court of Appeals observed that "the agency's underlying cost
estimates are not free from imprecision," 617 F. 2d, at 662, but that
"[t]he very nature of economic analysis frequently imposes pra.cticallimits
on the precision which reasonably can be required of t,he agency," id., at
661. We suspect that this results not only from the difficulty of obtaining
accurate data, but also from the inherent crudeness of estimation tools.
Of necessity both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on
assumptions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the
·validity of their final numerical cost estimates. As the official charged'
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Therefore, whether or not in the first instance we would
find the Secretary's conclusions supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals in this case
"misapprehended or groi'SlY misapplied" the substantial evidence test when it found that "OSHA reasonably evaluated
the cost estimates befo~e it, considered criticisms of each, and
selected suitable estimates of compliance costs." 617 F. 2d,
at 661 (footnote ornitted).
B
After estimating the cost of compliance with the Cotton
Dust Standard, OSHA analyzed whether it was "economically
feasible" for the cotton industry to bear this cost.M OSHA
by Congress with the promulgation of occupational safety and health
standards that protect workers "to the extent feasible," the Secretary was
obligated to subject such assumptions to careful scrutiny, and to decide
how they might affect the correctness of the preferred estimates.
6 " In one of their questions presented, petitioners ATMI et al., ask
whether "the statutory requirement that compliance with an OSHA standard must be 'economically feasible' can be satisfied merely by the agency's
eonclusion that the standard will not put the affected industry out of
business." Pet. for Writ of Certiorari of ATMI et al., at 2. However,
in argument in their brief, petitioners apprar to treat this issue primarily
as a substantial evidence question. See Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al.,
at 24-31. They finally summarize their position as follows:
" . . . OSitA must present a responsible prediction, supported by substantial evidence, of what its standard will cost and what impact it will
have on such factors as production, employmrnt, competition, and prices.
And the agency must explain in a cogent. manner-on the basis of intelligible criteria-why it concludes that a standard having such an economic
impact is 'feasiblr."' !d., ,at 35 (footnote omitted).
As our review of OSHA's economic feasibility determination demonr:Jtrates, OSHA presented a "responsible prediction" of what its Standard
would cost and its impact on "production, employment, competition, and
prices." The agency concluded that its Standard is feasible brcause "compliance with [if! is well within the financial capability of the covered
industries." 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 3. OSHA also found that thr industry "will be able to meet the demands for production of cotton products."
' !d., at 27378, col. 2. We take these findings to mean, as the Secretary

:
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concluded that it wa.s. finding that "although some marginal
employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry
as a whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements
of the regulation." 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2; see id., at
27379, col. 3 ("compliance with the standard is well within
the financial capability of the covered industries"). In
reaching this conclusion on the Standard's economic impact,
OSHA made specific findings with respect to employment,
energy consumption, capital financing availability, a.nd profitability. Id., at 27377-27378. To support its findings, the
agency relied primarily on RTI's comprehensive investigation
of the Standard's economic impact.~ 0
RTI evaluated the likely economic impact on the cotton
industry and the United States economy of OSHA's original
proposed standard, an across-the-board 200 ug/m3 PEL.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 626.~ RTI had estimated a total
7

lluggests, that "[a]t bottom, the Secretary must [and did] determine that
the industry will maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness."
l3rief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 49. See als:> United Steelworkers of America, v. Marshall, No . 79-1048, illip op., at 144, U. S.
App . D . C . - , (1980) ("the practical question is whether the iltandard
threaleHil the competitive stability of an industry"); Industri'll Uuion
D epartment, v. Hodgson, supra,- U. S. App. D . C., at 499 F. 2d, at 478.
This interprE>tation by the Secretary is certainly consistent with the plain
meaning of the word "feasible." See Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, supra, illip op., at 31, n . 30 (MARsHALL, J.,
di::;sPnting). Therefore, thiil case doeil not present, and we do not denide,
the que::;tion whether a Standard that threatenil the long-term profitability
and competitiveness of an industry is "feasib!e" within the meaning of
§ 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5) .
~ 6 ln contrast to the cost estimates prepared by RTI, OSHA did not
find any major fl aws with RTI's ~tudy of the economic impact of compliance c o~ts.
57 RTI specifically analyzed the impact of the Standard on the follo')Ving
areas in the cotton indu~try :
"1) Additional employment requirement~.
"2) Energy commmption.
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~ompliance

cost of $2.7 billion fo:r a 200 ug/m3 PEL, 58 anq
used this estimate in assessing the economic impact of such
a standard. !d., at 736-737. As described supra, at 31, n.
44, OSHA estimated total compliance costs of $656.5 million
for the final Cotton Dust Standard, 59 a Standard less strin~
cent than the across-the-board 200 ug/m3 PEL of the proposed standard. Therefore, the agency found that the economic impact of its Standard would be "much less severe))
than that suggested by RTI for a 200 ug/m3 PEL estimate
of $2.7 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2. Nevertheless, it
is instructive to review RTI's conclusions with respect to the
economic impact of a $2.7 billion cost estimate. RTI found:
"Implementation of the proposed [200 ug/m3] standard will require adjustments within the cotton textile
industry that will take time to work themselves out and
that may be difficult for many firms. In time, however,
prices may be expected to rise and markets to adjust so
that revenues will cover costs. Although the impact on
any one firm cannot be specified in advance, nothing in
the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry
as a whole will be seriously threatened by the impact of
"3) Increases in production costs and consequent price increases by
affected industries.
"4) Capital requirements and capital financing problems.
"5) Competition effects on profit and market structure.
''6) Inflationary impact on consumers 1:1nd U. S. economy.
'' 7) Employment impact due to the contraction of output demand. "
E!x. 6-76, Ct. of App . J . A. 626.
RTI also examined the economic impact of two other across-the-board
PELs of 500 ug/m3 and 100 ug/m3 . Ibid .
68 This cost estimate included $984.4 million for yarn production (opening through spinning), $1.3879 billion for winding through weaving/slashiug, $292.2 million for cotton ginning, and $32 million for waste processing.
E)x. 6-76 , Ct. of App . J . A. 737.
Gu Cotton ginning was the subject of a separate regulation not at issue
in this case, 43· Fed. Reg. 27350, col, 1; see 29 CFR § 1910.1046 ( 1980),
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the proposed standard for control of cotton dust exposure." Ex. 60, Ct. of App. 'J . A. 1380; id., at 3620.
In reaching this conclusion, RTI analyzed the total and annual economic impact 60 on each of the different sectors of
the cotton industry.
For example, in yarn production (opening through spinning), RTI found that the total additional capital requirement per dollar of industry shipment was 7.8 cents, and the
the corresponding annual requirement was 1.9 cents. Ex. 676, Ct. of App. J. A. 729. Average price increases necessary
to maintain pre-standard rates of return on investment were
estimated to range from 0.22 cents to 6.25 cents per dollar
of industry sales. 61 Ib·1:d. Even assuming no price increases,
RTI's annual cost of compliance figure contained thrPe components:
nn annualized capital charge, direct ·operating cost, and energy cost.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . J. A. 643. The annualized capital charge consisted
vf depreciation, interest, administrative overhE:'ad, property tax, and insurance. Ibid. Depreciation and interest were computed "by use of a
ca]>ital recovery factor based upon the concept of capital rent, the value
of which depends on the operating life of the equipment and the market
interest rate." Ibid.
61 Petitioners' primary critici:;m of OSHA's reliance on the RTI study
derives from their disagreement with RTI's a,;sumption that compliance
cost:; would be passed on to the consumers. Brief for Petitioners ATMI
t:t al., at 28-29. This characterization misstates RTI's position. In calculating price increases necessary to maintain pre-standard rates of return,
RTI "decided to adopt an extreme assumption of zero price demand
ela:;ticity in computing post-control price increases" because of difficulties
in obtaining data necessary to compute rla::~ticities for cotton yarns.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 657. However, RTI carefully te~ted this
assumption to determine "how much bias" it would introduce into the
analysis. Id , at 657-659. RTI concluded that, "unles:; the true demand
elasticity for the output of the given sector i~:~ substantially greater than
unity, our impact analysis ba:;Pd on the as:;umption of zero price elasticity
of demand would not be invalidatE-d." !d., at 659. Therefore, unless a
1% increase in price was met with substantially more than a 1% decrease
in demand , RTI's e:;timates of the price increases necessary to maintain
60
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only one of the six yarn producing operations would experience a negative rate of return on investment, while the five
other rates of return would range from 1.4% to 3.95"o. !d.,
at 652. 62 RTI estimated the average pre-standard rate of
return for the yarn producing sector as 4.1%. Ibid.
Through an output demand elasticity analysis, RTI determinPd that price increases necessitated by the 200 ug/m3
standard would result in a 1.687o contraction of cotton yarn
consumption. 63 !d., at 685; see id., at 680-687. RTI also discussed the effects of such price increases on interfiber and
domestic/ foreign competition. RTI ob~:;erved that "non-price
factors have probably dominated" the competition between
cotton and man-made fibers. !d., at 623; 948-953. 64 Noting
pre-standard rates of return were valid. Since there was no evidence
suggesting such an effect, RTI !)roceeded with its assumption.
In any event, RTI subsequently inve:stigated :short-term price elasticities
of demand for 25 cotton consumer products, finding that 19 of them had
elastirities less than or equal to unity. !d., at 681.
u~ RTI found higher price increases and lower rates of return when
framing its analysis in pounds of cotton yarn produced. See Ex. 6-76, Ct.
of App. J . A. 654, 729-730.
0 3 Petitioner National Cotton Council of American criticizes RTI's use
of short-term price elasticity coefficients, claiming that this underestimates
long-term demand responses to price increases. Brief for Petitioner
National Cotton Council of America, at 16-17. However, RTI's Dr. Lee,
who conducted the elasticity analy~is, observed that he used two independent procedures to compute demand contraction, and only one relied
on short-term price elasticities. Ct. of App . J. A. 36.26-3627. Hi~>
" main procedure [was] input output table procedure:;," which produced
an even smaller demand contraction estimate than those calculations relying on the short-term roefficirnts. Ibid.
64 RTI cited such nonprice factors as "research expenditures, promotion and advertising, fiber and fabric development, fiber properties, and
tare characteristins of fabric." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 623. John
Figh, Chase Manhattan bank vice-presid!:'nt, observed that "polvester has
grown at the expense of cotton over th!:' last 10 year:; and I think it has
penetrated tnu;:;t of the market~ it can penetmte; . . . [Tjh!:' majority of

79-14~~

41

&

7~-lM~-C>PUUON

AMEIUCAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

that international trade agreements restricting foreign imports

f)f textile products "have tended to smother the effects of a
&mall change in the relative prices of domestic versus foreign
textile products," id., at 622. RTI concluded that such small
ehanges have had "very little impact" on domestic industries
and markets, id., at 961; see id., at 954-961. In order to
measure the ability of different sized textile companies to
finance compliance costs, RTI constructed a ratio of capital
requirements to profit after taxes. RTI found that two of
the six yarn production operations would have financing diffi.~ulties, but that such difficulties decreased as company size
increased. !d., at 730. 65 Finally, impacts on energy costs,
employment, inflation, and market structure were evaluated,
See id., at 728-731. 68
it, the growth of polyester at the expense of cotton, has been completed."
Joint App. 474-475. He noted that some cotton products, such a~; towels
and 100% cotton men's <ihirts, enjoy the support of cou~umer preferences.
Ibid. Although RTI cited the energy cri~:>is without detailing it" po~sible
impact on man-made fiber products, Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . .T. A. 948,
OSHA observed that changes in petroleum prices, a key ingredient in
flynthetic products, may have important impacts on the competitive
balance, see 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 2.
0
~ Two of the six yarn production operations had ratios less than 1, two
had ratios less than 2, and the remaining two were le;;s than 6. Ex. 6-76,
Ct. of App. J. A. 665. Chase Manhattan Bank's .John Figh agreed with
RTI's assessment that financing the $2.7 billion compliance cost for a
200 ug/ m3 PEL standard would be most difficult for smaller textile companies. Ex. 63, Ct. of App . J. A. 2264-2265.
10 RTI conducted similar economic impact analyses, although in less
dt•pth, for the twi8ting through wenviug and waste proces;;ing sector~:~
pf the cotton industry covered by the proposed 200 ug/m:3 PEL standard.
Ex. 6-76, Ct . of App. J. A. 462. RTI found, for example, that price
increases per dollar of industry sale<-~ ranged from .5 cents to 18 cents
for twisting through weaving operations, and that some of these operations
would experience "severe" financing difficulties . Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App.
J. A. 733-734. To recount in further detail these conclusions would be an
irrelevant exercise. RTI cnlculated thnt a 200 ug 1m3 stand:ud for weaving/slashing would cost $1.259 billion, id., at 600, and computed the
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Relying on its comprehensive economic evaluation of the
cotton industry's ability to absorb the $2.7 billion compliance
cost of a 200 ug/m3 PEL standard, RTI concluded that
''nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile
industry as a whole will 'be seriously threatened." Ex. 60,
Ct. of App. J. A. 1380.67 Therefore, it follows a fortiori that
OSHA's estimated compliance cost of $656.6 million is "economically feasible." 68 Even if OSHA's estimate were under ..
fltated, we are fortified in observing that RTI found that a
11tandard more than four times as costly wM nevertheless economically feasible.
The Court of Appeals found that the agency "explained
the economic impact it projected for the textile industry,"
and that OSHA has "substantial support ~n the record for
its ... findings of economic feasibility for the textile industry." 617 F. 2d, at 662. On the basis of the whole record,
tronomic impact based on that figure. But RTI had also estimated that
tompliance costs for a 500 ug/m3 PEL would be zero. Ibid. Since the
Ina! eotton Dust Standard sets a 750 ug/m3 PEL for weaving/sla:shing,
further review of RTI's conclusion with respect to its $1259 billion cost
ib particularly unnecessary.
" Petitioners note that, although RTI estimated that compliance with
the Cotton Dust Standard would take 8 or more years, OSHA required
t•umpliance within four yearb. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29.
RTI chose an 8-year period primarily because of "problems the control
indul:ltr) may have in supplying the required equipment." Joint App.
415; see id, a L 415-416. If this proves to be the case, then presumably
individual mills will be able to obtain variances from the Standard's
requirements because of technologiCal infeasibility. See 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (e) (1); 29 U . S. C. § 655 (6).
18 Perhaps in light of this fact, neither petitioners ATMI et al. nor
petitioner National Cotton Council of America frame their "economic impact" ~Substantial evidence arguments based on OSHA's estimate of compliance costs. Instead, they adopt as a minimum RTI 's $2.7 billion
Pstimatp for eomplia11ce tusts with the proposed standard's 200 ug 1m3
PEL. BriPf for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, at 15-16;
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et nl., at 29.
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we cannot conclude that the Court of Appeal's "misapprehemled or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test.

III
The final Cotton Dust Standa.rd places heavy reliance on
the use of respira.tors to protect employees from exposure to
~otton dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period
necessary to install and implement feasible engineering controls.69 One part of the respirator provision requires the
employer to give employees unable to wear a respirator 70
the opportunity to transfer to another position, if available,
where the dust level meets the standard's PEL. 29 CFR
§ 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v). When such a transfer occurs, the employer must guarantee that the employee suft'ers no loss of
earnings or other employment rights or benefits. 71 PetiThe final Standard, 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (1) , provides:
"Where the use of repirators is required under this section, the employer
~;hall provide, at no cost to the employee, and a~~ure the u~e of respirator(')
which comply with the requirement~ of this paragraph (f). Respirator,
f;ha ll be used in the following circumshmces:
"(i) During the time periods necessary to im;tall or implemrnt feasible
engineering controls and work practice controls;
"(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which engineering
and work practice controls are not feasible;
"(iii) In work situations where feasible engineering and work practice
controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to or below the permissible exposure limit; and
"(iv) In operations specified under paragrnph (g) (1 ).
"(v ) Whenever an employee requests a respirator."
' 0 An employee may be unable to wear a respirator because of facial
Irritation, ~evere discomfort, or impaired brt>athing. 43 Feel. Reg. 2731l7,
col. 1 and 2.
n The regulation, 29 CFR § 1019.1043 (f) (2) (v) (emphasi;; added),
provides:
"Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear
any form of re~pirator, including a power air purifying respirator, the
employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another position
which is available or later becomes available having a dust level at or·
19

~.

'7'9-1429 & i9-1583'""""0PINION

AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

45

tioners do not object to the transfer provision, but challenge
OSHA's authority under the Act to require employers to
guarantee employees' wage 11nd employment benefits following the transfer. The Court of Appe~s held that OSHA
has such authority. 617 F. 2d, at 675~ We conclude that,
whether or not OSHA has this underlying authority, the
agency has failed to make the necessary determination or
statement of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is
related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work
environment.
Respondents urge several statutory bases for the authority
exercised here. The cite § 2 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 651 ,
which declares that the purpose of the Act is "to assure so
far as possible every working map and woman in the Nation
safe .and healthful working conditions"; § 2 (b) ( 5), id., a:t
§ 651 (b)(5), which suggests achievement of the purpose "by
developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems";
§ 6 (b) ( 5), id., at § 655 (b) ( 5), which requires the agency to
"set the standard which most adequately assures ... that no
employee will suffer material hnpairment of health or functional capacity . . ."; and § 3(8), id., at § 652 (8), which
provides that a standard must require "conditions, or the
adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment." Brief for Re$pondent Secretary of Labor, at 68. Whatever methods these
provisions authorize OSHA to apply, it is clear that such
approaches must be justified on the basis of their relation to
safety or health .
Section 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), requires
that "determinations of the Secretary" must be supported

.

,.

below the PEL. 1'he employer shall assure that an employee who is
transferred due to an inability t·o wear a respimtor suffets no loss of earnings m· other employment rights or benefits as a result of the tmnsfer."

'

'

.
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by sttbstantial evidence. Section 6 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 655 (e),
requires the Secretary to include "a statement of the reasons
for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register." In his "Summary and Explanation of the Standard,"
the Secretary stated: "Each section includes an analysis of
the record evidence and the policy considerations underlying
the decisions adopted pertaining to specific provisions of the
standard.'' 43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 2. But OSHA never
explained the wage guarantee provision as au approach designed to contribute to increased health protection. Instead
the agency stated that the "goal of this provision is to minimize apy adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue
of the inability to wear a respirator." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387.
col. 3. 72 Perhaps in recoguition of this fact, respondents in
their briefs a:rgue that
" [ e] xperience under the Act has shown that employees
are reluctant to disclose symptoms of disease and tend
to minimize work-related health problems for fear of
being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job ....
72

In its l:lpecific

discus~Siou

of the lranl:lfer/guarantee provision, occupy-

ing more than two-thirds of a column in the Federal Regil:lter, OSHA
argned that ''[i]t i~> manife:;tly unfair that employees who are unable to
wear re:;pirators l:lulfer . . . economie detriment because their employer:;
have not yet achirved compliance with the engineering control requiremrnt!:i of tht> :;taudard, but are relying instead on the interim and lesl:l
effective devire of re::;pirators ." 43 Fed. RPg. 27:387, col. 2 and 3. The
agenry tht>n ::;tatcd its judgment that thr "protection Lthe tranl:lfer and
guarantee regulation] afford!:! should grea1ly increa8e the success of the
stundard':s respiratory protPction proviswns." ld ., at 27387, col. 3. Since
lhe Secretary had ulready stated an impemussible reason for the guarantee
provl81on, we declme to accept th1s "boilerplate" statemrnt as a suffich1t
dett>rmination und l:ltatement of reason~ within the meaniug of the Act.
29 lT. S. C. §§ 655 (e), (f) . See Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturer8 Association v. Brenuan, 503 F. 2d 1155 (CA3 1974); lnd,ustrial
Vuion Department v. Hodgson, 8Uprf),, - ·u. S. App . D. C. - , 499
F . 2d, ut 4'75-476. See all:lo Berger & Ri;;km, Economic and TPchuo!ogicuf
Feasibility in Rcgulllting Toxic Substance!:! Under the Orrupatioual Sn fety
anu Health Act, 7 Erology L. Q 2H.'i, 29R-299 (1978)
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It may reasonably be expected, therefore, that many employees incapable of using respirators would continue to
breathe unhealthy air rather than n~quest a transfer, thus
destroying the utility of the respirator program." Brief
for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 67; see Brief for
Respondent Unions, at 51. 73

Whether these arguments have merit, and they very well
may ,74 the post-hoc rationalizations of the agency or the parties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate
for age11cy action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Parle v.
Vol77e. 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines
v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). For Congress gave
OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and safety,
and to explain its reasons for its actions. Became the Act in
no way authorizes OSHA to repair general unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety
goals, we hold that OSHA acted beyond statutory authority
when it issued the wage guarantee regulation.

v
When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health
Act in 1970, it chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring
8
'
Although it cited no i:ipecific determination or statement of reasons
proferred by the Secretary, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by this
argument. 617 F . 2d., at 675.
14 There ii:i evidence in the record that might support such a determination . Dr. Merchant teHtified that a medical surveillance program alone·
would not be ,;ufficient for identifying and relocating employees suffering
from by;;sinosis. Joint App. 440-441. He observed :
"There i,; reluctance very often among the employee himself to leave hio;
job. I think clearly ,;orne guarantees as to wages and opportunities must
be an integral part of any recommendation to relocate somebody and it
ha;; been the experience in coal mining where miners are allowed, under
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, to be transferred, a very
low proportion Qf th_el:ie m~n Hctu11lly eoxerci~e the:r transfer rights . ld., at
44t.
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employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited
only by the feasibility of such an environment's achievement.
We must measure the validity of the Secretary's actions
against the requirements of t)lttt Act. For " [ t] he .i udicial
function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory
policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and
Executive oversight or amendatory legislation." Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra,
slip op., at 2 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring); see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185, 194 (1978).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in all respects except to the extent of its approval of
the Secretary's application of the wage guarantee provision
of the Cotton Dust Standard at 29 Cli'R § 1910.1043 (f) (2)
(v). To that extent, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated and the case remanded with directions ' to remand
to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this
·bpiriion:
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEVENS

May 18, 1981

Re:

79-1429 and 79-1583 - American Textile
v. Marshall

Dear Bill:
Over the weekend I reviewed the various papers
that have been filed in connection with the
Government's suggestion that the Court vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the
merits, as well as your fine circulation.
I have come
to these tentative conclusions:
1. Since the Secretary proposes to leave the
present standard in effect during the proposed
rulemaking proceeding, the case is certainly not
moot and petitioners are entitled to have us
decide the merits of the questions they have
presented and argued.
I do not believe, however,
that there is any merit to their suggestion that
we should hold the cases in abeyance on our docket
while the proposed rulemaking proceeding goes
forward.
2. For the reasons set forth in your opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed except to the extent that it upholds the
wage guarantee provisions.
3. There is nothing in the statute to prohibit
the Secretary from doing a cost benefit study for
the purposes set forth in the notice of rulemaking
of March 27, 1981. Indeed, at page 33 of the slip
opinion of the plurality in the Benzene case,
after quoting§ 6(g} of the Act, we noted:
"The Government has expressly acknowledged
that this section requires the Secretary to
undertake some cost-benefit analysis before
he promulgates any standard, requiring the

elimination of the most serious hazards
first."
In footnote 49 we quoted from the Secretary's
Reply Brief at page 13:
"First, 29 u.s.c . § 655(g) requires the
Secretary to establish priorities in setting
occupational health and safety standards so
that the more serious hazards are addressed
first.
In setting such priorities the
Secretary must, of course, consider the
relative costs, benefits and risks."
4. After the reconsideration and re-evaluation of
the cotton dust standard is concluded, if the
Secretary should adopt a less protective standard ,
the unions will have an opportunity to raise the
question whether the cost benefit analysis has
been misused. Now, however, I do not believe we
should issue an opinion that would prevent further
proceedings that may or may not lead to a change
in the standard .
5. In summary, I am prepared to join your opinion
if you can modify the language in a few places to
conclude merely that the Act does not require OSHA
to compare costs and benefits without holding that
the Act prohibits such comparisons. In my
judgment, the more extreme holding is foreclosed
by§ 6(g) and, in any event, is not necessary to
answer the questions presented by the parties.
It
may well be true that no cost benefit analysis
that the Secretary can make can justify a change
in the standard, but I am not persuaded that we
have the power to order him not to take a second

L

look at a standard or not to receive any evidence
comparing costs and benefits during a proceeding
taking such a second look.
Respectfully,

JPL

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the
merits, as well as your fine circulation.
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1. Since the Secretary proposes to leave the
present standard in effect during the proposed
rulemaking proceeding, the case is certainly not
moot and petitioners are entitled to have us
decide the merits of the questions they have
presented and argued.
I do not believe, however,
that there is any merit to their suggestion that
we should hold the cases in abeyance on our docket
while the proposed rulemaking proceeding goes
forward.
2. For the reasons set forth in your opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed except to the extent that it upholds the
wage guarantee provisions.
3. There is nothing in the statute to prohibit
the Secretary from doing a cost benefit study for
the purposes set forth in the notice of rulemaking
of March 27, 1981. Indeed, at page 33 of the slip
opinion of the plurality in the Benzene case,
after quoting§ 6(g) of the Act, we noted:
"The Government has expressly acknowledged
that this section requires the Secretary to
undertake some cost-benefit analysis before
he promulgates any standard, requiring the

elimination of the most serious hazards
first."
In footnote 49 we quoted from the Secretary's
Reply Brief at page 13:
"First, 29 u.s.c. § 655(g) requires the
Secretary to establish priorities in setting
occupational health and safety standards so
that the more serious hazards are addressed
first.
In setting such priorities the
Secretary must, of course, consider the
relative costs, benefits and risks."
4. After the reconsideration and re-evaluation of
the cotton dust standard is concluded, if the
Secretary should adopt a less protective standard,
the unions will have an opportunity to raise the
question whether the cost benefit analysis has
been misused. Now, however, I do not believe we
should issue an opinion that would prevent further
proceedings that may or may not lead to a change
in the standard.
5.
In summary, I am prepared to join your opinion
if you can modify the language in a few places to
conclude merely that the Act does not require OSHA
to compare costs and benefits without holding that
the Act prohibits such comparisons.
In my
judgment, the more extreme holding is foreclosed
by§ 6(g) and, in any event, is not necessary to
answer the questions presented by the parties.
It
may well be true that no cost benefit analysis
that the Secretary can make can justify a change
in the standard, but I am not persuaded that we
have the power to order him not to take a second

look at a standard or not to receive any evidence
comparing costs and benefits during a proceeding
taking such a second look.
Respectfully,
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.To: The Chiet· Justice
Yr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White

May 19, 1981

RE: Nos. 79-1429

&

79-1583, American Textile

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Justice
Ju s t ic e
Just ice
Just ice
Justi ce

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
R ~ h n quist

Stevens

Ma~~.rttaStice

Brennan

MY 19

Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

Re clrculat~
Dear John,

I very much appreciate your thoughtful comments on my
circulated opinion in the above.

I think my only difference with

you centers on whether Section 6(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§655(g), has relevance for the purposes of our decision in this
case.

I agree, without deciding, as I said in footnote 29, page

17 of the opinion, that Section 6(g)

"may authorize OSHA to

explore costs and benefits for deciding between issuance of
several standards regulating different varieties of health and
safety hazards"

(citing your Benzene opinion, slip op. 33), in

setting priorities for the issuance of more than one standard,
thereby ensuring that the most serious health hazards are
addressed first.

As Section 6(g) states:

"In determining _the priority for establishing standards
under [Section 6 of the Act, 29 u.s.c. §655], the
Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the
need for mandatory safety and health standards for
particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations,
businesses, workplaces or work environments."
And it is true that the Secretary acknowledged not only in
Benzene but also in this case, Brief for Respondent Secretary of
Labor, at 56, that Section 6(g) appears to contemplate such an
e xercise.

1981

Circulated: _ _ _ _ __
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But that is not this case.

Here, OSHA was not considering

and "deciding between issuance of several standards regulating
different varieties of health and safety hazards."

The Secretary

never discussed other health hazards in the cotton industry that
the agency would address.

Rather OSHA considered and promulgated

only one health standard for the industry; therefore Section 6(g)
is not implicated by its determinations.

Your thought that

Section 6(g) is involved here is not shared by the industry
petitioners-- they fail to cite Section 6(g) even once in their
briefs.

I think this indicates industry recognition that we are

not faced here with OSHA's setting of priorities for the issuance
of several health and safety standards.

The industry argument

instead is that OSHA must undertake a cost-benefit analysis under
Section 6(b) (5)

to determine whether and how stringent a single

standard should be promulgated, regardless of the existence of
any other health hazards in the workplace.
approach, if preventing

·-

3~,000

a~nual

Under the industry

cases of byssinosis would

cost $500 million, and preventing 35,000 annual byssinosis cases
would cost $650 million, OSHA might have to choose the $500
million standard even if cotton dust exposure were the only
health hazard in the workplace and the $650 million cost were
economically feasible.

In effect, then, the industry position

requires the agency to undertake an analysis of the absolute
relation between costs and benefits of a single standard, placing
some sort of absolute value on the benefit of reducing byssinosis
compared only with the cost of achieving such reduction, without
reference to other hazards.

1
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I think the considerations contemplated by Section 6(g) are
quite different from the absolute considerations suggested above,
emphasizing instead the range of health hazards in the workplace,
which ones are most serious, and which should be addressed first.
Such considerations might include a comparison of the relative
costs and benefits of various ' standards addressing different
health problems in the same industry.

Let us assume, for

example, that OSHA found two serious health hazards in textile
mills -- cotton dust and noise.

In addition, let us assume --

although untrue for the real Cotton Dust Standard

that the

agency determined that an expenditure of $650 million would be
the maximum economically feasible expenditure by the cotton
industry for all health and safety standards, and that
expenditures in excess '- of $650 million would result in
substantial reduction of material health impairment from cotton
dust exposure.

OSHA would then have to decide whether to

promulgate a single standard regulating only one of the hazards,
J

or whether to issue two standards that would address both
hazards.
In choosing what course of action to follow, the agency
pursuant to Section

~(g)

might compare the reduction in

byssinosis resulting from an expenditure of $650 million for
cotton dust engineering controls versus the reduction in worker
deafness resulting from an expenditure of $650 million
expenditure for noise controls.

In choosing between the two

standards, or determining a proper mix of the two, the Secretary
could compare the relative costs and benefits of the two

standards in order to maximize total health benefits for the
worker. And the Secretary might finally decide that spending the
full $650 million on cotton dust control would be less worthwhile
than spending $500 million on cotton dust control, and $150
million on noise control.

But since a total industry-wide

expenditure of $650 million was economically feasible, the cost
of compliance for the two standards combined would have to be
$650 million, given Section 6(b) (5) 's requirement of promulgation
of the most protective standard limited only by feasibility.
Undoubtedly the industry would be no happier with this outcome
using a Section 6(g) balancing of costs and benefits, because the
industry's overall expenditure on health hazards would remain the
same even as the mix of standards changes.

That is why the

distinction between absolute ~ost~benefit balancing, in a vacuum
without reference to other health hazards, as opposed to relative
cost-benefit balancing, comparing the costs and benefits of

-

different health standards, is n6t just a technical distinction
but one of real substance.

The industry's failure to rely on

Section 6(g) to buttress its argument, and the Secretary's
willingness to accept Section 6(g) balancing while nevertheless
arguing against absolute cost-benefit analysis, are telling
evidence of this fact.
My opinion deals at length with the industry argument that
OSHA must balance, without reference to other health hazards, the
absolute costs and benefits for considering and promulgating a
single health standard.

The basis for my rejection of their

argument is that the statute and legislative history show that

.

,.-.

Congress itself struck the balance between costs and benefits
when it said ''to the extent feasible," thereby precluding further
balancing by OSHA for the issuance of a single standard, and that
Section 6(b) (5)

requires promulgation of the most protective

standard limited only by feasibility.
While it would be possible, as you suggest, to decide this
case by holding merely that Section 6(b) (5) does not require OSHA
to compare costs and benefits in promulgating a single standard,
I think there is an additional reason that we should not leave
open the question whether OSHA is precluded from doing so.

It

seems to me that OSHA, the industry, and the unions should have
the answer now, and not leave the issue in limbo while they go
forward with another extensive and costly rule-making (this one
took several years and ~ produced at enormous cost a 105,000-page
record) .

The unions would be back here tomorrow arguing that

cost-benefit analysis is precluded.

If the correct forum to

-

engraft cost-benefit analysis onto Section 6(b) (5) for
considering and promulgating a single standard is the Congress,
the sooner we tell the parties, the better for all concerned.
The Secretary gives no indication in his post-argument March
27, 1981 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, pursuant to
Section 6(g), he wants to compare the costs and benefits of the
Cotton Dust Standard relative to those of other possible
standards addressing different health and safety problems in the
cotton industry.

On the contrary, the Notice implies that he

will engage in cost-benefit analysis in reviewing the Cotton Dust
Standard in the abstract, without reference to other hazards.

-6-

For instance, he notes that "it is appropriate to evaluate the
practicality of cost-benefit balancing by investigating the
concept in the context of an actual standard such as cotton
dust," Memorandum, at 4a, that the "agency will produce a
comprehensive and thorough cost-benefit analysis", id., at Sa,
and that as a result "the standard itself may be subject to
adjustment," ibid.
that.

I think we ought tell him whether he can do

And even if the Secretary does plan to make comparisons

with other health standards, under my proposed opinion, he is not
precluded from undertaking, pursuant to Section 6(g), a relative
balancing of the costs and benefits of the cotton dust standard
with those of other health standards he plans to promulgate.
Perhaps I should make this point more explicit in the opinion,
for example by bringing parts of footnote 29 into the text and
emphasizing that cost-benefit analysis is precluded only for the
consideration and issuance of a single health standard without

·-

reference to other health· hazard§.

In addition, I can add "for
..
the issuance of a single standard" after the word "Secretary" on
page 17, line 3, after the word "analysis" on page 17, line 6,
and in other appropriate places thoughout the opinion.

Of

course, I would welcome any other suggestions that may occur to
you.
In short, I do feel that it is important to indicate to the
Secretary what he can and cannot do in considering and
promulgating a single standard, without reference to other health
hazards, under Section 6(b) (5).

His Advance Notice may be read,

I think, as proposing the sort of absolute cost-benefit urged by

.'

petitioners, without reference to other health hazards in the
cotton industry.

My opinion concludes that he is , precluded from

doing so .

Sincerely,

/ c

/ 1.

f;'

!~CL-

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference

C HAM BE R S O F

..JUS TI CE ..J O H N P AU L STEVE NS

May 19, 1981

Re:

79-1429 and 79-1583 - American Textile
v. Donovan

Dear Bill:
My point about § 6(g) is not that it is in any way
involved in this case as it was argued to us, but
rather, as the Solicitor General represented in his
memorandum, that one of the purposes of the proposed
rulemaking is to determine the effectiveness of cost
benefit studies in the context of a particular industry
in order to facilitate their implementation of § 6(g)
in future cases.
You may very well be correct that an advisory
opinion indicating that OSHA is precluded from using
any cost benefit analysis in connection with the
promulgation of a single standard would shorten future
~proceedings in this case.
As is often true of advisory
opinions, however, we really cannot foresee all
possible situations in which a cost benefit analysis
might be relevant.
Your hypothetical concerning noise and cotton dust
in the textile industry suggests that comparable
variables might be involved in a single standard.
Suppose, for example, that there are two species of
cotton dust, one more harmful than the other. Just as
a cost benefit study might help the Secretary to decide
on priorities between noise and dust, might not it also
be helpful in deciding whether to eliminate dust A
entirely before curtailing dust B? In some situations,
a choice between spending a great deal of money to
reduce the exposure level and incurring a different
kind of cost by requiring protective masks or
shortening working hours might be made more
intelligently with the benefit of a cost benefit

•<
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analysis.
I do not suggest that the study will
necessarily be valuable here, but we must remember that
your opinion will apply to other industries which may
well present variables of the noise-dust alternative
type problem.
In Benzene the standard allowed exposures of 1 ppm
averaged over an 8-hour work day with a ceiling of 5
ppm for any 15-minute period. Conceivably a standard
of .5 ppm over an 8-hour work day, with a ceiling of 10
ppm for any 15-minute period, might have been an
alternative available to the Secretary.
In trading off
between a lower exposure level for the average 8-hour
work day and the higher exposure level for brief
periods, should not the Secretary be permitted to
compare costs and benefits?
In sum, I do not believe we should try to tell the
Secretary what he can or cannot do in future
proceedings but should confine our ruling to the
validity of the standard that he has already
promulgated.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~ttpumt

C!fcrurl: crf tlrt ~tb ~tatt.tr

~ltinghm. ~.

cq.

211,?'~~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 20, 1981

I
Re: 79-1429 and 79-1583 American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan;
National Cotton Council of America v. Donovan

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
cpm

l;ourr;

v ore a on . ................. ,

............•.•...•.

1 tJ • ••

Argued ................... , 19 .. .
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No. 79-1583

NATL. COTTON COUNCIL, ETC.
vs.

DONOVAN, SEC. LABOR

Relisted for Mr. Justice Brennan.
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Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, J ........................... .
White, J ........................... .
Marshall, J .......................... .
Blackmun, J ........... .
Powell, J .............. .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J ............. .
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May 21, 1981

NoC 79-14.29" American Textile Mfg. v. Donovan
No ~83 National Cotton Council v. Donovan
Dear Bill:
At our May 14 Conference, Nos. 80-1134 Lead
Industries v. Donovan and 80-1155 South Central serrTelephone v. Donovan, were held for the Cotton Dust cases.
This presents a problem for me because my former
firm is one of a number of firms representing the lead
industry. I, therefore, took no part in the decision to
hold these cases.
Although a superficial examination suggests that
most of the questions in the present cases differ from those
presented in the Lead cases, I think there also may be
common questions.--xccordingly, I will remain out of the
Cotton Dust cases - at least for the present.
As I am not entirely sure that the two cases are
close enough for me to disqualify, I suggest that you not
mark me out on your circulated drafts. Before the cases are
decided, I will make a definite decision on my status.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
LFP/lab
Copies to the conference
cc:

Mr. Alexander L. Stevas

·'

..

'.

~ltptttttt

<!Jcttrl cf tlre ~niftb ~taf.tg

~htslfingtcn, ~. <!J. 20gi>t~
CHAMB E R S OF"
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American Textile Mfg. v. Donovan
National Cotton Council v. Donovan

Dear Bill:
At our May 14 Conference, Nos. 80-1134 Lead
Industries v. Donovan and 80-1155 South Central BerrTelephone v. Donovan, were held for the Cotton Dust Cases.
This presents a problem for me because my former

f~is one of a number of firms representing the leaa-~try.
I, therefore, took no part in the decision to
hold these cases.

Although a superficial examination suggests that
most of the questions in the present cases differ from those
presented in the Lead cases, I think there also may be
common questions.--xccordingly, I will remain out of the
Cotton Dust cases - at least for the present.
As I am not entirely sure that the two cases are
close enough for me to disqualify, I suggest that you not
mark me out on your circulated drafts. Before the cases are
decided, I will make a definite decision on my status.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
LFP/lab
Copies to the Conference
cc:

Mr. Alexander L. Stevas
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Re:
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Dear Bill :
;~;'lease

join me .
Sincerely ,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J. BRENNAN, JR.

May 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan
Nos. 79-1429 & 1583

. ·~'

You will notice on page 13, note 25, that I have dealt with the postargument motions of the various parties. This assumes, of course, that
there are five or more who agree with this view.

Sincerely,

~
The Conference

.,
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
May 26, 1981

Re:

79-1429 and 79-1583 - American Textile
v. Donovan

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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AmeFiean Textile Manufacturers
~nstitute, Inc., et al.,
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AND

AAJL ·
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..

r~.

9Pejit~:ners,
7 1129
Raymond J~ Donovan, Secretary
· of Labor1 United States De.:- On Writs of Certiorari tJ - - ~ · · ... '
the United States Co~---
-~ partrrient of Labor, eta~.
of Appeals for. the Di&- ~
of
trict of Columbia Circ~
-~
·
Am~pica, Petitioner,
t9- 1583
v.
Raymond J, Donovan, Secretary
· of Labor, United States Department of Labor, et al.

N~tion~l ~o-tto~ Co~ncil

LCJ~ ·

•

[May -, 1981]

th~rt.~

delivered the opinion of
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act //of 1970 (the Act) "to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working ~
conditions...." 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportu- ,. __
f)
nity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing ~
health and safety in the workplace. 29 U. S. C. §§ 655 (a),
(b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/ promulgated
JusTICE BRENNAN

fJ/ 1A(

'Ol'),

1 This opinion will use the terms OSHA and the Secretary interchangeably when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, or the Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health. The Secretary of Labor

''',.

..
.

~

.

,
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a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an
airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manu~
facture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "constellation of respiratory effects" known as ''byssinosis." 43
Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 ( 1978). This disease was one of the
expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. S. Rep. No.
91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legislative History of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 143 (1971)
(Legis. Hist.).
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry, 2 challenged the validity of the
"Cotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29
U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did
below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its
Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs
and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the
Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations, 8 counter that
Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself,
and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require
OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating
has delegated the authority to promulgate occupational safety and health
standards to the Assistant Secretary. See 29 CFR § 1910.4 (1980).
2 Petitioners in No. 79-1429 include 12 individual cotton textile manufacturers, and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI),
a trade association representing approximately 175 companies. Brief for
Petitioners American Textile Manufacturers Institute et a!., at i, 2. In
No. 79-1583, petitioner is the National Cotton Council of America, a nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of increasing the consumption
of cotton and cotton products. Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, at 3-4.
8 The two labor organizations are the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Industrial Union Department, AFLCIO, and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
In the Court of Appeals, the labor organizations challenged the Cotton
Dust Standard as not sufficiently stringent.

I
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that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to
eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment,
subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. 617 F. 2d 636
U. S. (1980), to re(1979). We granted certiorari, solve this important question, which was presented but not
decided in last Term's Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,- U.S.- (1980)/ and to decide
other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard. 5

I
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as
"brown lung" disease, is a serious and potentially disabling
respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust. 6 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit
JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and in the judgment, was the only
member of the Court to decide the cost-benefit issue expressly. JusTICE
PowELL concluded that the statute "requires the agency to determine that
the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the
expected benefits." Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute, slip op., at 4 (PowELL, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment). ,JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting, joined by JUS1'ICE BRENNAN,
.JusTICE WHrrE, and JusTICE BLACKMUN, indicated that the statute did
not contemplate cost-benefit analysis. See id., slip op., at 31 n. 30, 32.
5 In addition to the cost-benefit issue, the other questions presented and
addreEsed are (1) whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole
supports OSHA's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is economically feasible; and (2) whether OSHA has the authority under the Act
to require that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees
who are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear
respirators.
6 Cotton dust is defined as
"du~t present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which
may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant
matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and
other contaminants which may have accumulated with the cotton during
the growing, harvesting and subsequent processing or storage periods,.
4

.

•.

;

'

.
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6-16, Joint App. 15-22. 7 Byssinosis is a "continuum ..•
disease," 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2, tha.t has been categorized
into four grades.8 In its least serious form, byssinosis pro~
duces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness,
shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective
indications o~ loss of pulmonary functions. ld., at 27352,
col. 2. In its most seri6us form, byssinosis is a chronic and
irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar
to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely disabling. Ibid.· At -worst, as is true of other respiratory diseases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssinosis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions
and contributes to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 673) Joint App. 72 .("there is an association between mortality
and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has de-·
scribed the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows:
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust],
symptoms o~cur on Monday, or other-days after absence
from the work environment;· later, symptoms occur on
Any dust present during the handling and processing of cotton through the
weavi!lg or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations or
manufacturing processes using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton · fiber
by-products from textile mills are considered cotton dust." 29 CFR
§ 1910.1043 (b) (1980) (Cotton Dust Standard).
7 References are made throughout this opinion to the Joint Appendix
filed in this Court (Joint App.), and to the Joint Appendix lodged -in
the Court of Appeals below (Ct. of App. J . A.).
8 Known genera!ly as the Schilling classification grades, they include:
"[Grade] 72 : slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; ,no
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment.
"[Grade] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; . n~>
evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment.
"[Grade] 2: evidence of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of
ventilatory capacity.
"[Grade] 3 : evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of
ventilatory capacity." Exhibit 6-27; Joint App. 25 ; see 41 Fed. Reg.

56500-56501 (1976).
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other days of the week; and eventually, symptoms are
continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure." A.
Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-16,
Joint App. 15.9
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which
the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling
grades, it is likely that prolonged exposure contributes to the
9 Descriptions of the disease by individual mill workers, presented in
hearings on the Cotton Dust Standard before an administrative law judge,
are more vivid:
"When they started speeding the looms up the dust got finer and more
3nd more people started leaving the mill with breathing problems. My
mother had to leave the mill in the early fifties. Before she left, her
breathing got so short she just couldn't hold out to work. My stepfather left the mill on account of breaching [sic] problems. He had
coughing spells til he couldn't breath, like a child's whooping cough. Both
my ~isters who work in the mill have breathing problems. My husband
had to give up his job when he was only fifty-four years old because of
the breathing problem." Ct. of App. J. A. 3791.

"I suppose I had a breathing problem since 1973. I just kept on getting
sick and began losing time at the mill. Every time that I go into the
mill I get deathly sick, choking and vomiting losing my breath. It would
blow down all that lint and cotton and I have clothes right here where
I have wore and they have been washed several times and I would like for
you all to see them. That will not come out in washing.
I am only fifty-seven years old and I am retired and I can't even get togo to church because of my breathing. I get short of breath just walking
around the house or dressing [or] sometimes just watching T. V. I cough
all the time." /d., at 3793.
" ••. I had to quit because I couldn't lay down and rest without oxygen in
the night and my doctor told me I would have to get out of there. . . . I
couln't [sic] even breathe, I had to get out of the door so I could breathe
and he told me not to go back in [the mill] under any circumstances."·
I d., at 3804.
Byssinosis is not a newly discovered disease, having been described as early
as in the 1820s in England, Joint App. 404-405, and observed in Belgium
in a study of 2,000 cotton workers in 1845, Exhibit 6-16, Joint App. 15..

,,

.
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progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 1 and 2; Exhibit 6-27,
Joint App. 25; Exhibit 11, Joint App. 152. It also appearg
that a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without
experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, Joint
App. 192.10
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such wdrkers, suffers
from the most disabling form of byssinosis. 11 43 Fed. Reg.
27353, col. 3; Exhibit 124, Joint App. 347. The Senate Report accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 active and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease.
S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong.,· 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis.
Hist. 143. One study found that over 25% of a sample of
active cotton preparation and yarn manufacturing workers
suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure
level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43
Fed. Reg: 27355, col. 3; Exhibit 6-51, Joint App. 44.12 Other
studies confirm these general findings on the prevalence of
byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6-56, id. at
376- 385.
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the
United States as a distinct occupational hazard associated
10

As an expert representing the industry noted:
"[T]he assumption is often made that the disorder progresses from :1f2 to
1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all grades reflect the progress of the individual's disability. In many instances, however, there is no progression at all. Sometimes Grade 3 seems to appear de novo, or there is a jump from 1 to 3.
Ari10ng those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2 very often never
occurs." Exhibit 41, Joint App. 192.
11 The criterion of disability used for the 35,000 worker estimate was a
Forced Expiratory Volume (FEV1 ) measurement of pulmonary function
of 1.2 liters or le~s . 43 Fed. Reg. 27353, col. 3. An FEV1 of 12 liters
"is a small fraction of the pulmonary performance of a normal lung."
Ibid.; Ct. of App. J. A. 1231.
12 There are between 126,000 and 200,000 active workers in the yarn
preparation and manufacturing segments of the cotton industry. 43 Fed.
-Reg. 27379, col. 2.

'

.
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with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Legis.
Hist. 143.13 In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust 14 be
limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per
cubic meter of air (1000 p.g/m 3 ) averaged over an 8-hour
workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1. The United States
Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968,
when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey
Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant
threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that
included the 1000 p.g/m 8 limit for total cotton dust. 34
Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969). 15 Following passage of the Act in
1970, the 1000 p.g/m 3 standard was adopted as an "established Federal standard" under § 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate protection of workers for the period between enactment of the
statute and promulgation of permanent standards. 16
In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of
Indeed the Senate Report on the Act expressly observed:
"Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis regarding the
magnitude of the problem. For example, despite repeated warnings over
the years from other countries that their cotton workers suffered from
lung disease, it is only within the past decade that we have recognized
byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease among workers in American
cotton mills." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970), Legis.
Hist. 143.
14 "Total dust" includes both respirable and nonrespirable cotton dust.
15 The Secretary of Labor adopted the threshold limit values contained
in a list that had been prepared by the ACGIH.
16 Section 6 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), provides in pertinent
part:
"[T]he Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two yearr; after
such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard ... any established Federal standard, unless he determines that the
promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or·
health for specifically designated employees."
18

·'·

,.
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respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous exposure limit recommendation to 200 ~g/m 3 measured by a
vertica.I elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust particles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351,
col. 1, 27355, col. 2. 17 That same year, the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)/ 8 pursuant to the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 669 (a)(3),
671 (d) (2) , submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recommendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible exposure limit (PEL) that ushould be set a.t the lowest level
feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as
high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu. m.," or 200 ~g/m 3
of lint-free respirable dust. 19 Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41
Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39
Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from inter17 In many cotton preparation and manufacturing operations, including
opening, picking, and carding, 1000 l"g/m 3 of total dust is roughly equivalent to 500 J"gj m3 of respirable dust. Joint App. 464 ; 43 Fed. Reg.
27361, col. 2; see infra, n. 22.
18 The Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health as part of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
NIOSH is authorized, inter alia, to "develop and establish recommended
occupational safety and health standards." 29 U.S. C. ·§671 (c)(1). At
the request of the Secretaries of Labor or HEW, or on his own initiative,
the Director of NIOSH may
"conduct such research and experimental programs as he determines are
neressary for the development of criteria for new and improved occupat ional safety and health standards, and . . . after consideration of the
results of such research and experimental programs make recommendations concerning new or improved occupational safety and health standards." ld. , § 671 (d) .
19 NIOSH presented its recommendation in a lengthy and detailed document entitled "Criteria for a Recommended Standard : Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust." Ex. 1, Ct. of App . J. A. 1- 169. The report
examined the effects of cotton dust exposure and suggested implementation
of work practices, engineering controls, medical surveillance, ·and monitoring to decrease exposure to the recommended level.
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ested parties on the NIOSH recommendation and other related matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker's Union
of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest
Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more
stringent PEL of 100 p.g/m3 ,
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to replace the existing Federal standard on cotton dust with a
new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act,
29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5). 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. The proposed standard contained a PEL of 200 p.g/m3 of vertical
elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for aU segments of
the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implementation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respirators for the short-term and engineering controls for the longterm. !d., at 56506, col. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested
parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period. 2
Following the comment period, OSHA conducted three
hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lubbock, Tex. that lasted over 14 days. Public participation
was widespread, involving representatives from industry and
the workforce, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists,
and many others. By the time the informal rule-making
procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments
and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed.
Reg. 27351, col. 2. The voluminous record, composed of a
transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and posthearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages.
U. S. App. D. C. --, 617 F. 2d, at 647. OSHA issued
its final Cotton Dust Standard-the one challenged in the instant case-on June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying
statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69
pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418; see
29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980).
l)

The Act specifies an informal rulemaking procedure to accompany the
promulgation of occupational safety and health standards. See 29 U. S. C.
§655 (h)(2), (3), (4).
20

I

'•

>
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The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA estab~
Iishes mandatory PELs over an 8-hour period of 200 ~A-g/m 8 •
for yarn manufacturing, 21 750 /kg/m 3 for slashing and weav- ·
ing operations, and 500 ~A-g/m 3 for all other processes in the
cotton industry. 22 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c). These levels
represent a relaxation of the proposed PEL of 200 /kg/m 3 for
all segments of the cotton industry.
OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard ·
that depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls,
such as installation of ventilation systems/ 8 and work practice controls, such as special floor sweeping procedures. Full
compliance with the PELs is required within 4 years, except
to the extent that employers can establish that the engineer~
21

The Standard provides that exposure to lint-free respirable cotton
dust may be measured ·b y a: vertical elutriator, with its 15-micron particle
size cutoff, or "a method of equivalent accuracy and precision." 29
C;FR '§ 1910.1043 (c).
22
The manufacturing of cotton textile products is divided into severa!
different stages. (1) In the operations of opening, picking, carding, drawing, and roving, raw cotton is cleaned and prepared for spinning into
yarn. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 7, n. 12. (2) In the operations of spinning, twisting, windmg, spooling, and warping, the prepared
cotton is made into yarn and readied for weaving and other processing.
ld ., at 7, n. 13. (3) In slashing and weaving, the yarn is manufactured
into a woven fabric. ld., at 7, n. 14. The Cotton Dust Standard define~
"yarn manufacturing" to mean "all textile mill operations from opening
to, but not including, slashing and weaving." 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (b).
See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 27365, col. 1 and 2.
The nontextile industries covered by the Standard's 500 .u.g/m 3 PEL
include, but are not limited to, "warehousing, compressing of cotton lint,
cla::;sing and marketing, using cotton yarn (i. e. knitting), reclaiming and
marketing of textile manufacturing waste, delinting of cottonseed, marketing and converting of linters, reclaiming and marketing of gin motes and
batting, yarn felt manufacturing using waste cotton fibers and by products." /d. , at 27360, col. 3.
23
Ventilation systems include general controls, such as central airconditioning, and local exhaust controls, which capture emissions of cotton
dust as close to the point of generation as possible. See 43 Fed. Reg.
27363-27364.

I''
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ing and work practice controls are infeasible. !d., § 1910.1043
(e) ( 1). During this compliance period, and at certain other
times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators
to employees. !d., § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements in~
elude monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveillance of all employees, annual medical examinations, employee education and training programs, and the posting of
warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in
the instant case requires employers to transfer employees
unable to wear respirators to another position, if available,
having a dust level at or below the Standard's PELs, with
-"no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits
a.s a result of the transfer." !d., § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v).
On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the
Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents
a "significant health hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350,
col. 1, and that "the prevalence of byssinosis should be significantly reduced" by the adoption of the Standard's PELs, id.,
at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust
and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA
relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relationship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the concentration of lint-free respirable cotton dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 2735527359; Exhibit 6-51, Joint App. 29-55. See also Ex. 6-17,
Ct. of App. J . A. 235-245; id., at 1492-1839. Even at the
200 J..tg/ m3 PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least
Grade 1/ 2 byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the
yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, col. 2 and 3.
In enacting the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA interpreted
the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard
to protect against material health impairment, bounded only
by technological and economic feasibility. !d., at 27361,
col. 3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative
proposal for a PEL of 500 J..tg/m8 in ya.rn manufacturing,
. a proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at
least Grade 1/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the·
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Standard to be both technologically and economically feasi~
ble based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Although recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless
rejected the union proposal for a 100 p.g/m 8 PEL because
it was not within the "technological capabilities of the industry." 43 Fed. Reg. 27359-27360. Similarly, ·OSHA set
PELS for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 p.g/m3
in part because of limitations of technological feasibility.
/d. , at 273ql, col. 3. Finally, the Secreta.r y found that "engineering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even
with massive expenditures by the industry," id., at 27360, col.
2, and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL
of 750 p.g/m3 for weaving and slashing.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major
respects. 24 The court rejected the industry's claim that
OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give sufficient reasons for failing to adopt it. 617 F. 2d, at 652-654.
The court also held that the Standard was "reasonably necessary and appropriate" within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material
health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 617
F . 2d, at 654-655, 654, n. 83. Rejecting the industry position that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the
Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead
agreed with OSHA's interpretation that the Standard must
protect. employees against material health impairment subject only to the limits of technological and economic feasibility. I d., at 662- 666. The court held that "Congress
itself struck the balance between costs and benefits in the
mandate to the agency" under § 6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29
24 The court remanded to the agency that portion of the Standard dealing with the cottonseed oil industry, after concluding that the record
failed to establish adequately the Standard's economic feasibility.
U. S. App. D. C. - , 617 F. 2d 636, 669, 677 (1979).
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U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), and that OSHA is powerless to cir..
cumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most pro..
tective feasible standard. 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the
court held that the agency's determination of technological
and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Id., at 655-662.
We affirm in part, and vacate in part.25

·'

25 The post-argument motions of the several parties for leave t9 file supplemental memoranda are granted. We decline to adopt the sugge;tion
of the Secretary of Labor that we should "vacate the judgmrnt of the
court of appeals and remand the case so that the record may be returned
to the Secretary for further consideration and development." Supplemental Memorandum for Federal Respondent, at 4. We also decline to
adopt the suggestion of petitioners that we should "hold these cases in
abeyance a11d . . . remand the record to the court of appeals with an
instruction that the record be remanded to the agency for further proceedings." Response of Petitioners to the Supplemental Memorandum for
Federal Respondent, at 4.
At oral argument, and in a letter addressed to the Court after oral
argument, petitioners contended that the Secretary's recent amendment of
OSHA's so-called "Cancer Policy" in light of this Court's decision in
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, U. S.
(1980), was relevant to the issues in the present case. We disagree.
OSHA amended its Cancer Policy to "carry out the Court's interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that consideration
must be given to the significance of the risk in the issuance of a carcinogen
standard and that OSHA must consider all relevant evidence in making
these determinations." 46 Fed. Reg. 4889, col. 3 (1981). Previously,
although lacking such evidence as dose response data, the Secretary presumed that no safe exposure level existed for carcinogenic substances. Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, sliP'
op., at 10, 13-14, 25, n. 39-40. Following this Court's decision, OSHA
deleted those provisions of the Cancer Policy which required the "automatic setting of the lowest feasible level" without regard to determinations·
of risk significance. 46 Fed. Reg. 4890, col. 1.
In distinct contrast with its Cancer Policy, OSHA expressly found that
"exposure to cotton dust presents a significant health hazHrd to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1, and that "cotton dust produced
significant health effects at low levels of exposure," id., at 27358, col. 2.
In addition, the agency noted that "grade 1/2 byssinosis and associated'
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II
The principal question presented in this case is whether
the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of
the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)( 5), to determine that the costs
of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits.
Relying on §§ 6 (b)(5) and 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 655 (b)(5), 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA
must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of
material health impairment, see Industrial Union Department
v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 29, but
also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk
of material health impairment is significant in light of the
costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners
ATMI et al., at 38-41. 26 Respondents on the other hand
pulmonary function decrements are significant health effects in themselves
and should be prevented in so far as possible." !d., at 27354, col. 2. In
making its assessment of significant risk, OSHA relied on dose response
curve data (the Merchant Study) showing that 25% of employees suffered
at least Grade 1j2 byssinosis at a 500 ~tgjm 3 PEL, and that 12.7% of all
employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 ~tgjm 3 PEL standard. !d.,
~t 27358, col. 2 and 3. Examining the Merchant Study in light of other
studies in the record, the agency found that "the Merchant study provides
a reliable assessment of health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton
dust ." Id., at 27357, rol. 3. OSHA concluded that the "prevalence of
byssinosis ~hould be significantly reduced" by the 200 ~tg/m 3 PEL. !d.,
at 27359, col. 3 ; see id., at 27359, col. 1 ("200 ~tgjm 3 represents a significant reduction in the number of affected workers"). It is difficult to
imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court's decision
in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute.
20 Petitioners ATMI et al. express their position in several ways.
They
maintain that OSHA "is required to show that a reasonable relationship
exists between the risk reduction benefits and the costs of its standards."
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 36. Petitioners also suggest that
OSHA must show that "the standard is expected to achieve a significant
reduction in [the significant risk of material health impairment]" based on
"an assessment of the costs of achieving it." !d., at 38, 40. Allowing
that "[t]his does not mean that OSHA must engage in a rigidly formal

79-1429 & 79-1583-0PINION
AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

15

contend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate standards that eliminate or reduce such risks "to the extent such
protection is technologically and economically feasible."
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 38; Brief for
Respondent Unions, at 26-27. 27 To resolve this debate, we
cost-benefit calculation that places a dollar value on employee Jives or
health," id., at 39, petitioners describe the required exercise as follows:
"First, OSHA must make a responsible determination of the costs and risk
reduction benefits of its standard. Pursuant to the requirement of Section 6 (f) of the Act, this determination must be factually supported by
substantial evidence in the record. The subsequent determination whether
the reduction in health risk is 's:gnificant' (based upon the factual assessment of costs and benefits) is a judgment to be made by the agency in
the first instance." Id., at 40.
Respondent disputes petitioners' description of the exercise, claiming
that any meaningful balancing must involve "placing a [dollar] value ori
human life and freedom from suffering," Brief for Respondent Secretary of
Labor, at 59, and that there is no other way but through formal costbem•fit analysis to accomplish petitioners' desired balancing, id, at 59-60.
Cost-benPfit analysis contemplates "systematic enumeration of all benefits
and all costs, tangible and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or difficult to measure, that will accrue to all members of society if a particular
project is adopted." E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy
Analysis 134 (1978); see National Academy of Sciences, Decision Making
for ltegulating Chemicals in the Environment 38 ( 1975). See generally
E . Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis (1976); Prest and Turvey, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, in 300 Economic Journal 683 (1965). Whether petitioners' or
respondent's characterization · is correct, we will sometime refer to petitioner's proposed exercise as "cost-benefit analysis."
27 As described by the union respondents, the test for determining
whether a standard promulgated to regulate a "toxic material or harmful
physical agent" satisfies the Act has three parts:
"First, whether the 'place of employment is unsafe--in the sense that
significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change
in practices.' [International Union Department, slip op., at 32 (plurality
opinion)] . Second, whether of the possible available correctives the Secretary had selected 'the standard ... that is most protective'. Ibid. Third,
whether that standard is 'feasible.'" Brief for Respondent Unions, at
40-41.
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must turn to the language, structure, and legislative history
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

A
The starting point of our analysis is the language of the
statute itself. Steadman v. SEC,- U. S. - , - (1981);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section
() (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5) (emphasis
added). provides:
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under
this subsection, shall set the standard which most ade.,
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life.'' 28
Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that
the phrase "to the extent feasible" contains the critical language in § 6 (b) ( 5) for purposes of this case.
The plain meaning of the word "feasible" supports respondents' interpretation of the statute. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
I;anguage, "feasible" means "capable of being done, executed,.
or effected." ld., at 831 (1976). Accord, The Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933) ("Capable of being done, accom2 g Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), also provides:
"Drvelopment. of standards under this subsection shall be based upon
rr~rarch , demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may
br appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of
health and safety protrction for the employee, other considerations shall
he the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
!-ifandard:;, and t>xperience gained under this and other health and safety
law~ . Wht>never practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed
iu terms of objective criteria, and of the performance desired."

,,
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plished or carried out"); Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard"
Dictionary of the Englisli bapguage 903 (1957) '("That ,nay
be done, performed or effected:'). Thu~~ § 6 (b) (5) directs
the Secretary to issue the ·standard t~at ..''zP~St' adequately
assures ... that no employee will suffer, material ~mpair:tnent
of health," limited only by the, ~xtfnt 1i? JVhicq 1 th{~ is "~apa
b~e of being done." In effect then, as the ·c ourt, o( Ap~eals
. 'held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between
' costs and benefits, by placing the "benefit" of worker health
above all other considerations save those making attainrpent
of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a
balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes
a different balance than that struck by Congress would be
inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6 (b) ( 5). Thus,
cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute
because feasibility analysis is. 29 See Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op.,
at 32 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
When Congress has intended that an agency engage in
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on
20 In this casf' we are faced with the issue whether the Act require<>
OSHA to balance costs and benefits in promulgating a single.· toxic
material and harmful physical agent standard under § 6 (b) (5) .\ Petitioners argue that without rost-benrfit balancing, the ·llisl,ance . of a
single standard might result in a "serious misallocation of th'e finitr resources that are available for the protection of worker ::;afety'tl.'nd health ,"
given the other health hazards in the workplace. Reply BriM for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 10 ; see Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 38-39;
Brief of Chamber of Commerce of United States at> amicu~ curiae, at 12;
Brief of American Industrial Hralth Council as amicus cu1iae, at 19.
This argument is more properly addressed to other provisions of the Act
which may authorizr OSHA to explore costs and benefits for deciding between issuance of several standards regulating different varieties of health
and safety hazards, e. g, § 6 (g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (g) ; see
Indust1ial Union Depa1'trnent v. American Petrol~um Institute, supra, slip
op., at 33; !lee also Case Comment , 60 B. U. L. R. 115, 122, n. 52, or for
promulgating other type:; of standards not issued under § 6 (b) (5). We
'expre~s no view on these qi1estion~:>.
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the face of the statute. One early example is the Flood Con..,
trol Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 710a.
"[T]he Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives
and social security of people are otherwise adversely
affected."
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act Amendments of 1978, 43 .U. S. C. § 1347 (b), providing
that offshore drilling operations. shall use
"the best available and safest technologies which the
Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant effect
on safety, health, or the environment, except where the
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are
clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of
using such technologies."
These and other statutes so demonstrate that Congress uses
1

so See, e. g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C.
§ 6295 (c), (d); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U. S. C. §1312(b)(l), (2); §1314(b)(1)(B); Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (4) (B); Clean Air Act
Amendments of Hl70, 42 U. S. C. §7545 (c)(2)(B). In the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress directed the Administrator to consider "the total cost of application of technology in relation to
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application." 33
U.S. C.§ 1314 (b) (1) ("BPT" limitations) . With regard to 1987 effluent
limitations, the Administrator is directed to consider total cost, but not in
comparison with effluent reduction benefits. /d., § 1314 (b){2) (B)
("BAT" limitations). See EPA v. National C1·ushed Stone Assn., No. 79770, slip op, at 5-6, 6, n. 10, 11-12.
In other statutes, Congress has used the phrase "unreasonable risk,"
accompanied by explanation in legislative history, to signify a generalized
balancing of eosts and benefits. See, e. g., the Consumer Product Safety

79-1429 & '19-1583...-0PINION
AMERICAN TEXTILE MF:rtS. INST, v. PONOVAN

19

specific language when intending that an agency engage in
cost-benefit analysis. See Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 23, n. 27
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary
meaning, the word "feasible" cannot be construed to articulate such congressional intent. We therefore reject the
Art of 1972, 15 U. S. C. § 2056 (a) ("unreasonable risk of injury"); H. R.
Rep. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1972) (where the House
stated:
"It should be noted that the Commission's authority to promulgate
standards under this bill is limited to instances where the hazard associated with a consumer product presents an unreasonable risk of death,
injury, or serious or frequent illness. . . . Protection against unreasonable
risks is central to many Federal and State safety statutes and the courts
have had broad experience in interpreting the term's meaning and application. It is generally experted that the determination of unreasonable
hazard will involve the Commission in balancing the probability that risk
will result in harm and the gravity of such harm against the effect on the
product's utility, costs, and availability to the consumer.");
S. Hep. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 14-15. See also Aqua Slide 'N'
Dive Corp . v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 569 F. 2d 831, 839
(CA5 1978); Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,- U . S.
App. D . C.-, 559 F. 2d 774, 789 (1977) . The error of ·several cases
finding a cost-benefit analysis mandate in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act is their reliance on the different language and clear legi~lative
hi8tory of the Consumer Product Safety Act to reach their conrlusions.
See 'l'exas Independent Ginners Assoc. v. Marshall, F. 2d - , (CA5 1980); American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F. 2d 493, 502M3 (CA5 1978), aff'd on other grounds, Industrial Union Department v.
American Pet1'oleum lrn;titute, U. S. (1980).
Senator Chiles was sufficiently certain that the Act did not contemplate
cost-benefit analysis that he introduced an amendment in 1973 that, inter
alia,
"direct:; the Secretary to recognize the cost-benefit. ratio in promulgating a
new standard and to publish information relative to the projected financial
impact. Tins provision will promote the development of standards justifiable in terms of the benefits to be derived and afford those to be
affected an opportunity to make a reasoned evaluation of the proposal.'..
119 Cong. Hec. 42151 (1973),

"t,...•

'

..
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11rgument that Congress required cost-benefit analysis in
§ (j (b) (5).

B
Even though the plain language of § 6 (b) ( 5) supports
this construction, we must still decide whether § 3 (8), the
general definition of an occupational saJety and health standard, either alone or in tandem with § 6 (b)( 5)' incorporates a
cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic
materials or harmful physical agents. Section 3 (8) of the
·
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8) (emphasis added), provides:
"The term 'occupational safety and health standard;
means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment."
Taken alone, the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" might be construed to contemplate some balancing of
the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that,
so construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis requirement on the issuance of § 6 (b)( 5) standards, even if § 6 (b)
(5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not
decide whether § 3 (8), standing alone, would contemplate
some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Congress specifically chose in § 6 (b) (5) to impose separate and
additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic
materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those·
standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health
to the extent feasible. Congress cobld reasonably have concluded that health standards should be subject to different
criteria than safety standards because of the special problems
presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Depart-·
ment v. American Petroleum Institute , supra, slip op., at 3839, n. 54 (plurality opinion)~
·

.
'

,.

,.
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Agreement with petitioners' argument that § 3 (8) imposes
an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit analysis on the issuance of § 6 (b) ( 5) standards would eviscerate
the 11 to the extent feasible" requirement. Standards would
inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b) ( 5). For example, if cost-benefit analysis indicated a protective standard
of 1000 p.g/m~ PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a
500 p.g/ m8 PEL, the ag::mcy would be forced by the costbenefit requirement to choose the less stringent point. 31 We
cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of
§ 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement
of § 6 (b)( 5). Adoption of petitioners' interpretation would
effectively write § 6 (b)(5) out of the Act. We decline to
render Congress' decision to include a feasibility requirrment
nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rnle that all
parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect. E. g.,
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., supra, 442 U. S., at 339; Wein~ 1
t
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609,
633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S.
303, 307- 308 (1961). Congress did not contemplate any
further balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful
physical agents standards, and we should not "impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to
promote with the other." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
I>1t.nnh1(l. Tw. , .~upra. at 631. quoting Clark v. Uebersee
Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947). 32
81 In addition, as the legislative history makes plain, see infra, at 23-24,
any standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would
a fortiori not be "reasonably necessary or appropriate" under the Act.
Sre Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, U. S. App. D. C. - ,
499 F. 2d 467, 478 (1974) ("Congress docs not appear to have intended
to protect employees by putting their employers out of bu;;iness").
3 2 This is not to say that § 3 (8) might not require the balancing of
costs and benefits for ~tandards promulgated under provisions other than
§ 6 (b) (5) of the Act . As a plurality of this Court noted in Industrial
Union Department, if §:; (8) had no sub~tantive content, "there

79-1429 & 79-1583-0PINION
22

AMERICAN TEXTILE MFRS. INST. v. DONOVAN

c
The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not
crystal clear, provides general support for respondents' interpretation of the Act. The congressional reports and debates
certainly confirm that Congress meant "feasible" and nothing
else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the
Act might be thought to rl'lquire achievement of absolute
safety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that
health and safety goals be capable of economic and technological accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence
of any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA
to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating
a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. The
legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress
was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such
costs were part of the cost of doing business. · We thus turn
to the relevant portions of the legislative history.
Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, introduced by
Senator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785,
introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific provisions controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic
would be no statutory criteria at all to guide the Secretary in promulgating
either national consensus standards or permanent standards other than
those dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agent::..'' Slip op .,
at 29-30, n . 45. Furthermore, the mere fact that a §()(b) (5) standard is
"feasible" does not mean that § 3 (8) 's "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language might not impose additional restraints on OSHA. For
example, all § 6 (b) (5) standards must be addressed to "~ignificant risks"
of material health impairment. /d., at 32. In addition, if the use of
one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk as the use
of five, the use of five respirators was "technologically and economically
feasible," and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" limitation might come into play as an additional restriction on OSHA to choo::le the one-respirator standard. In this
case we need not decide all the applications that § 3 (8) might have, either
alone or together with § B (b) (5).
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materials and harmful physical agents, L€gis. Hist. 1, 6-7
(Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both
contained the definitional section now codified as § 3 (8). 33
The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the
Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that
included the following section:
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards under this
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, on the basis of the best available professional
evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment
of health or functional capacity, or diminished life expectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785);
Legis. Hist. 834.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, reporting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtually
identieal to the House version, except for the additional requirement that the Secretary set the standard "which most
adequately and feasibly assures ... that no employee will
suffer any impairment of health." Legis. Hist. 242 (the Senate provision was numbered § 6 (b) ( 5)) (emphasis added).
This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator
Javits, who explained his amendment:
"As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting
standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of
proposed standards. This is an improvement over the
Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee],
which might be interpreted to require absolute health
and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the
Administration bill, which contains no criteria for standAlthough both versions of the Act contained provisions identical to
§ 3 (8), 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), there is no discussion in the legislative history (,f the meaning of the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate/1
83
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ards at all. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess.,
58; Legis. Hist. 197 (emphasis added). 34
Thus the Senator's concern was that a standard might require
"absolute health and safety" without any consideration as to
whether such a condition was achievable. The full Senate
Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this
provision "shall represent feasible requirements," id., at 7;
Legis. Hist. 147, and commented that "[s]tich standards
should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no employee will suffer impaired health . . . ,'; ibid. (emphasi&
added).
84 Petitioners' primary legislative history argument is that Senator Javits
"took the position that OSHA standards should be 'feasible' in the sense
of being 'reasonable' and 'practical' as well as technologically achievable."
Brief for Petitioners ATMI et a!., at 32. A review of the record belies
this contention. Senator Javits himself had introduced the Administration's bill, S. 2788, which he observed contained no criteria for issuance of
standards. Legis. Hist. 31, 39-42. That proposed legislation, which established a National Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate
standards, required the Board to submit proposed standards to an appropriate national standards-producing organization "to prepare a report on
the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard."
/d., at 39. Furthermore, either the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare could object to a proposed standard on
the basis, inter alia, that it "is not feasible," id., at 40, at which point the
Board could reaffirm the standard by a majority vote, ibid. President
Nixon's message accompanying S. 2788, which Senator Javits inserted in
the Congressional Record, described the "report on the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard" under the Act as a
"report on the feasibility of the proposed standards." 115 Cong. Rec,
22517.
From this slim reed petitioners fashion their legislative history argument. But even if Senator Javits fully subscribed to statements by President Nixon on the proposed legislation, of which there is some doubt, see
115 Cong. Rec. 22512, this hardly supports the view that the Senator's
addition of the feasibility requirement to the Williams bill included any
such baggage. After all, the Senator described his amendment only with
the word "feasible, " and specifically distinguished the amended Williams
bill from the Administration's, on the basis of the latter's lack of criteria.

.'
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The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting
in § 6 (b) ( 5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the
Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Senator Dominick, who pla.yed a prominent role in this amendment process, see Legis. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits);
527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned
that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He
therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b) (5)
be struck, explaining:
"This requirement is inherently confusing and unrealistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to
ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of
injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case
of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all
risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria
could, if literally applied, close every business in this
nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which
might most 'adequately' and 'feasibly' assure the elimination of the danger would be the prohibition of the
occupation itself." Legis. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen.
Dominick on his proposed amendment No. 1054) (emphasis in original).
In the ensuing floor debate on this issue, Senator Dominick
'reiterated his concern that "[i]t is unrealistic to attempt, as
[the Committee's Section 6 (b)(5)] apparently does, toestablish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is
an impossibility.. . ." Legis. Hist. 480.35 The Senator conSenator Dominick gave several examples. For instance:
" [L] et us t ake a fellow who is a streetcar conductor or a bus conductor
at the present time. How in the world, in the process of the pollution we
have in the streets or in the process of the automobile accidents that we
have all during a working day of anyone driving a bus or trolley car, or
whatever it may b£>, can we set standards that will make sure he will not
have any risk to his life for the rest of his life? It is totally impo~s ible for
this to be put in a bill ; and yet it is in the committee bill." Legis. Hist.
423, See also id., at 481; 345.
86
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eluded that "[a]ny administrator responsible for enforcing
the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either.
he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is
any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could
not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of
Congress .... " Id., at 481-482.
Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sentence of § 6 (b)(5) deleted. However, after working with
Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended version of the first sentence which he though "agreeable to all"
and which became § 6 (b) ( 5) as it now appears in the Act.
!d., at 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6
(b)( 5) to "toxic materials and harmful physical agents,"
changed "health impairment" to "material health impairment," and deleted the reference to "diminished life expectancy." Significantly, the feasibility requirement was left
intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase "which most
adequately and feasibly assures," the amendment merely substituted "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible," to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated
as a limit on the promulgation of standard under § 6 (b )(5).
Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made
clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working environment could not be achieved through "prohibition of the
occupation itself," id., at 367, and that toxic material and
harmful physical agent standards should not address frivolous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility
requirement, along with the need for a "material health impairment," were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns.
He explained the effect of the amendment:
"What we were trying to do in the bill-unfortunately,
we did not have the proper wording or the proper drafting-was to say that when we are dealing with toxic
agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps
~fl are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere·
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within which a person's health or safety would not be
affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing
that anyone would be assured that no one would have a
hazard . ... " !d., at 502.
S enator Williams added that the amendment "will provide a
continued d;rection to the Secretary that he shall be required
to set the standard which most adequately and to the greatest extent feasible assures" that no employee will suffer any
material health impairment. ld., at 503. The Senate thereafter passed S. 2193. One week later, the House passed a
substitnte bill for its original bill, which failed to contain
any substantive criteria for the issuance of health standards.
Legis. IIist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Conference, however. the House conferees acceded to the Senate's
version of § 6 (b)( 5) .86
Not only does the legislative history confirm that Con~rress
meant "feasible" rather than "cost-benefit" when it used the
former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that
the A0t would create substantial costs for employers. yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe
and healthful working environment. 37 Congress viewed the
In acceding, the House obtained Senate agre ~ ment to another amendment, now § 6 (b) (6) (A) of the Act, that allowed employers to petition
for a temporary variance from an occupational safety and health stand:ud
in certain cases, except that " [e]conomic hardship is not to be a consideration for the qualification for a temporary extens:on order." H . R.
Conference Rep . No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 35; Legis. Hist. 1188.
The Conference Report limited the variance procedure to the followi~g
cases:
"unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of ne"essary
materials or equipment or because necessary construction or alteration of
facilities cannot be completed on time. . . . Such an order may be issued
for a maximum period of one year and may not be renewed more than
twice." Ibid.
37
Because the costs of compliance would weigh particularly heavily on
~mall busine~ses , Congre~s provided in § 28 of the Act an amendment to
86
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costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Sena~
tor Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated:
1'We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but
that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in
America." Legis. Hist. 444. He asked:
"One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too
expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety
equipment loses the services of its skilled employees?
Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand
or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow
trying to raise her children on meager allowance under
workmen's compensation and social security? And what
about the man-a good hardworking man-tied to a
wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That
is what we are dealing with when we talk about industrial safety. . . . We are talking about people's lives,
not the indifference of some cost accountants." Legis.
Hist. 510.
Senator Eagleton commented that "[t]he costs that will be
incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and
safety to be established under this bill are, in my view, reathe Small Business Act, 15 U. S. C. § 636, making small businesses eligible
for economic assistance through the Small Business Administration to comply with standards promulgated by the Secretary. Legis. Hist. 1257.
Senator Dominick explained:
"There is a provision in the bill which recognizes the impact that this
particular legislation may have on small businesses. . . . It permits the
Secretary to make loans to small businesses wherever the standards that
are set by the National Government are so severe as to have caused a,
real and substantial economic injury. Under those circumstances the
Secretary is entitled, through the Small Business Administration, to makeloans to those bul:linesses to get them over the hump, because of the need
for new equipment, or because of new conditions within the shop, which
would permit them to continue in operation.
"I think that is a very significant and important provision for minimizing economic injury which could occur if the bill resulted in situations·
which would have very serious effects on businesses." Legis. Hist. 525 ..
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,ponable and necessary costs of doing business." Legis. Hist,
1150-1151 (emphasis added). 38
Other Members of Congress voiced similar views. 39 Nowhere is there any indication that Congress contemplated a (
different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health
and safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Congress thought that the financial costs of health and safety
problems in the workplace were as large or larger than the
financial costs of eliminating these problems. In its sta.t ement
of findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act
itself, Congress announced that "personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial
burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and
disability compensation payment." 29 U. S. C. ~ 651 (a).
The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs:
"[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost
wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product
38

Congress was concerned that some employers not obtain a competitive advantage over others by declining to invest in worker health and
safety :
"Although many employers in all industries have demonstrated an exemplary degree of concern for health and safety in the workplace, their
efforts are to often undercut by those who are not so concerned. Moreover, the fact is that many employers-particularly smaller onessimply cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety, and
survive competitively, unless all are compelled to do so." S. Rep. 91-1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 4, Legis. Hist. 144.
89 See, e. g., Legis. Hist. 1030-1031 (remarks of Congressman Dent):
"Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs to the
operation of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad,
I would say there is a greater concern and that must be for the production
men who do the producing-the men who work in the service industries
and the men and women in this country who daily go out and keep the
economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work and
to be able to prosper in it."
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is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that
could be available for productive use are siphoned off tQ
pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses," S. Rep., supra, at 2; Legis. Hist. 142.
Senator Eagleton summarized, "Whether we, as individuals,
are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we
can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe
or unhealthy worksite." Legis. Hist. 1150-1151.

.' '
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III
Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."
29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secretary's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is "economically feasible" is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they
claim (1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs necessary to meet the Standard's requirements; and (2) that
OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not
threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry.
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of
the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U. S. 474, 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take
into account contradictory evidence in the record, Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 487-488, but "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v.
'Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966).
Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial
evidence questions in the Courts of Appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655
(f), we apply the familiar rule that "[t]his Court will inter-
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·vene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
[substantial evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied" by the court below. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 292, 310 (1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our
inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance,
would find OSHA's findings supported by substantial evidence. Instead we turn to OSHA's findings and the record
upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of
A-ppeals "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test.
A
OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance
with the Cotton Dust Staudard after reviewing two financial
analyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute
(RTI), an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry
representatives (Hocutt-Thomas) .40 The agency carefully
explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the
conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the
agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which
it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost
estimate. A brief summary of OSHA's treatment of the two
studies follows.
40 See RTI, Cotton Dust : Technological Feasibility Assessment and
Final Inflationary Impact Statement (1976), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . J . A.
457, 573-748; RTI, Technological Feasibility and Economic Impact of
Regulations for Cotton Dust : Testimony to be Presented by the Research
Triangle Institute at Public Hearing (1977), Ex. 16, Ct. of App . J. A. 1320,
1351- 1357. The indust ry estimates were presented by Hovan Hocutt and
Arthur Thomas, employees of dust control equipment manufacturers.
Statrment of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Pneumafil
Corp., Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2228-2247; Statement of Arthur Thomas,
Senior Vice-President, The Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, Ct. of App. J . A. 2248'2257. OSHA referred collectively to these two statements as the HocuttTbomas estimate.
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OSHA rejected RTI's cost estimate of $1.1 billion for tex~
tile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons.H
First, OSHA believed that RTI's estimate should be discounted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3, because that estimate was based on the assumption that engineering controls
would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those
processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust is
not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that
" [ el xclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only
could reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent." Ex. 676. Ct. of App. J. A. 585. 42 Since the Standard did not require controls on synthetics-only equipment, OSHA rejected
RTI's assumption about application of controls to syntheticsonly machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3. Second, OSHA
concluded that RTI "may have over-estimated compliance
costs since some operations are already in compliance with
the permissible exposure limit of the new standard." !d., at
27370, col. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some mills
had attained PELS of 200 ,ug/m 3 or less, while others were
below the 100 ,ug/ m 3 total dust leveJ.4 3 Therefore, OSHA
41 RTI estimated compliance costs of $984.4 million for yarn producticn
(opening through spinning), Ex. 6- 76, Ct. of App . J . A. 473 , and $127.7
million for yarn processing (winding through weaving/slashing), id., at
600. In another part of its study, RTI estimated yarn production costs
of $885.6 million . Id., at 589. The explanation for this discrepancy isnot readily apparent from the record, although it may be attributable . to
cost estimates for different years.
42 RTI made what it called a "conservative estimate" that "controls
would be applied to all the production equipment in mills processing cotton
and cotton-synthetic blends, even if part of their product is pure synthetic." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 585.
48 RTI's David LeSourd explained that RTI did not have data on the
degree of compliance for the industry as a whole, but only for some
specific mills. Ct. of App. J . A. 3637-3638. Therefore RTI merely
assumed that industry-wide PELs were at a 1000 !Lg/m 3 total dust PEL.
Ex. 6-76, id., at 579- 580. The record contains conflicting evidence on the
actual level of control in the industry. Some evidence suggests compliance
by mills substantially better than the 1000 !Lgj m3 total dust level. See,
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disagreed with RTI's assumption that the ·industry had not
reduced cotton dust exposure below the existing standard's
1000 J.tg/ m" total dust PEL. I d., at 27370, col. 3. Third,.
OSHA found that the RTI study suffered from lack of recent
accurate industry data. I d., at 27373, col. 1; see Ex. 6-76,
Ct. of App. J. A. 858; Ex. 16, id., at 1357, 1359.
In light of these deficiencies in the RTI study, OSHA
adopted the Hoeutt-Thomas estima.te for textile industry engineering controls of $543 million/ 4 emphasizing that, because it was based on the most recent industry data, it was
more realistic than RTI's estimate. 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col.
1.4 5 Nevertheless OSHA concluded that the Hocutt-Thomas
estimate was overstated for four principal reasons. First,
Hocutt-Thomas included costs of achieving the existing PEL
of 1000 J.tg/ m 3 , while OSHA thought it likely that compliance was more widespread and that some mills had in fact
achieved the final standard's PEL. Ibid., see supra, at 30,
n. 43.4 6 Second, Hocutt-Thomas declined to make any allowe. g., Ex. 47, id., at 2037 (66% of Burlington Industries work areas at
or below 500 ~g/mS, 28% below 200 ~g/m 3 ); Ex. 78, id., at 2387. One
.expert, commenting on another study, observed that "substantial proportions of the industry are, in fact, within compliance of [200 ~g/m'l] ."·
Ct. of App. J . A. 3637. Other evidence in the record suggests that ssme
segments of the industry are not in compliance with the 1000 ~gjmll·
total dust PEL. See e. g, id , at 3939 (criticizing RTI assumption of
compliance). In any event, OSHA found that the "actual level of controls
in the cotton industry could not be determined" on the basis of data
available to RTI at the time of its study. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 3.
44 OSHA's cost estimate included $543 million for engineering controls
(the Hocutt-Thomas estimate), $7 million for monitoring, medical surveillance, and other provisions (the RTI estimate), $31.5 million for waste
processing, and $75 million for seed processing, for a total of $656.5 million~
43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 1.
45 The Hoeutt-Thomas study based its estimates on data obtained from
a recent ATMI survey of cotton mills. Completed questionnaires from
353 mills, which processed 80% of the cotton bales in the United States,
were returned. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2231.
46 The Hocutt-Thomas study included an allowance for existing com-
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ance foF the trend toward replacement of existing production
machines with newer more productive equipment. 47 Relying
on this "[n]'atural production trend[]," 43 Fed. Reg. 27359,
col. 1, OSHA concluded that fewer machines than estimated
by Hocutt-Thomas would require retrofitting or other controls, id., at 27372, col. 3. Third, OSHA thought that HocuttThomas failed to take into account development of new
technologies likely to occur during the four-year compliance
period. lbid.48 Fourth, OSHA believed that Hocutt- Thorn~
pliance efforts, by subtracting from its total estimate the cost of all engineering controls purchased by the industry prior to February 11, 1977.
Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2232, 2247. Whether this is a sufficient proxy
for current industry compliance is not apparent from the record . Hocutt
himself admitted that he did not have figures on what portion of the
industry was meeting the 1000 l'g/m3 total dust PEL. Ct; of App. J. A.
3941.
17 John Figh, a vice-president at Chase Manhattan Bank specializing in
the textile industry, commented on the trend toward modernizing equipment in the mills:
" [B]y continuing to upgrade plants with the most modern and efficient
equipment, the textile manufacturing industry will likely not be required
due to demand to add much in the way of new bricks and mortar. There
may be some individual cases of out-of-date facilities being replaced by
new buildings ; but for the most part, I believe we will see more in the
way of modernization of existing plants ...." Ex. 63, Ct. of App. J. A.
2260 (emphasis added).
One study explained why the costs of controls should be lower jf a mill
converts to new equipment as opposed to retrofitting old machines:
"1 ) The operating cost of new equipment with controls on that equipment
io less than the operating cost of the old equipment with controls
necessary for the older, slower equipment to meet proscribed [sic] dust
levels; and 2) by going to newer equipment with controls there is a likelihood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some orall of the capital cost of control." Ex. 79A, id., at 2532; see Ex. 79C,
id., at 2550-2551 ; Ex. 63, id., at 2261; Ex. 78, id., at 2376-2377.
48 Chase Manhattan Bank vice-president Figh noted that "[t]here does
not appear to be any vast new technology on the horizon," but that
1
'[a]s for new machinery, evolutionary changes are continuing at what
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might have improperly included control costs for syntheticsonly machines, ibid., an inclusion which could result in a
30% cost overestimate.49
Petitioners criticize OSHA's adoption of the HocuttThomas estimate, since that estimate was based on achievement of somewhat less stringent PELs than those ultimately
promulgated in the final Standard. 50 Thus, even if the
Hocutt-Thomas estimate was exaggerated, they assert that
"only by the most remarkable coincidence would the amount
of that overestimate be equal to the additional costs required
to attain the far more stringent limits of the Standard OSHA
actually adopted." Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al.. at 27;
see Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America,
at 14- 15. The agency itself recognized the problem cited
by petitioners, but found itself limited in the precision of its
estimates by the industry's refusal to make more of its own
data available. 51 OSHA explained that, "in the absence of
appears to me to be about the same rate as in the last few years." Ex. 63,
Ct. of App. J. A. 2660-2661. One study is particularly critical of the
assumption of a "static state of technology," Ex. 78, id., at 2380, and documents technological advances that can be expected, id., at 2380-2386.
Some experts were less optimistic of the role of technology. See, e. g., id.,
at 3643-3644 (RTI study).
49 Hocutt-Thomas had some information on the "ratio of synthetics tct
cotton in blends" in the mills, but it is not clear from the record if and
how they used this information. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J . A. 2230.
50 The final Cotton Dust Standard calls for PELs of 200 ,ug/ms in
opening through roving and spinning through warping, and 750 .ug/ma
for slashing and weaving. The Hocutt-Thomas study similarly assumed
a 200 .ugjm3 PEL for opening through roving, but assumed Jess stringent
PELs of 500 .ug/m 3 for spinning through warping, and 1000 ,ugj m3 for
slashing and weaving.
51
For example, in questioning before an administrative law judge,
Hocutt answered:
"Well, I'm beginning to wish I hadn 't said anything about this, which I
did, and I have to be helpful. Practically all of this information that I
have is confidential and I couldn't reveal any of the so'urces. You can Cll.nly
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the [industry] survey data [of textile mills], OSHA cannot
develop more accurate estimates of compliance costs." 43
Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1. Since § '6 (b) ( 5) of the Act requires
that the Secretary promulgate toxic material and harmful
physical agent standards "on the basis of the best available
evidence," 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)( 5), and since OSHA could
not obtain the more detailed confidential industry data it
thought essential to further precision, we conclude that the
agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas estimate.52 While a cost estimate based on the standard actually
promulgated surely would be preferable, 53 we decline to hold
take my word for the figures . I can't substantiate it in any manner."
Ct. of App. J. A. 3929.
Petitioners note, however, that the industry subsequently provided its
survey data to OSHA, and that the only information deleted was confidential information withheld by agreement with the agency in order
to prevent identification of specific mills. Reply Brief for Petitioners
ATMI et al., at 23, n. 32; see J. A. 388-390. OSHA responds that,
" [b.lecause the number of machines was deleted and correlated dust data
was not supplied, the data could not be used to support a specific cost
adjustment." Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 64, n. 70. In
any event, no contention is made that OSHA had access to Hocutt's own
data used to calculate his cost estimate.
02 Both petitioners and respondents attempt their own calculations from
evidence in the record to show the unreasonableness or reasonableness of
OSHA's rough equation between the Hocutt-Thomas overstatement in
costs and the expense of achieving a Standard somewhat more stringent
for some operations. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner National Cotton
Council of America, at 9-10; Brief for Respondent Unions, at 14-18.
Such manipulation of the data suggests a wide margin of error for any
estimate, whether it be OSHA's, the industry's, or the unions'. Viewed
in that light, the agency's candor in confessing its own inability to achieve
a more precise estimate should not precipitate a judicial review that nonetheless demands what the congressionally-delegated "expert" says it cannot provide.
53 The Secretary originally asked RTI to prepare cost estimates for
several PEL level~, including 500, 200, and 100 .ugj m3 • Ex. 6-76, Ct. of
App. J. A, 509. Clearly the Secretary intended to have cost informatio~
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as a matter of law that its absence under the circumstances
required the Court of Appeals to find that OSHA's determination was unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 '
Therefore, whether or not in the first instance we would
find the Secretary's conclusions supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals in this case
"misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test when it found that "OSHA reasonably evaluated.
the cost estimates before it, considered criticisms of each, and
selected suitable estimates of compliance costs." 617 F. 2d,
at 661 (footnote omitted).
on the different PELs that he might promulgate. Although RTI provided
estimates for these levels in its final report, OSHA found them to be too
unreliable to adopt as final estimates. See supm, at 31-32.
Even if the Secretary had wanted to obtain a cost estimate, based on
confidential industry data, for the actual PELs in the adopted Standard,
it would have been unable to do so. Hocutt had concluded that it was
tPchnologically impractical to achieve PELs below 500 1-1g/m 3 for the.
operations of spinning through warping, Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 22392241 , and PELs below 1000 1-1g/m3 for weaving and slashing, id., at 22412243. Therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates of a 200 1-1gjm3
PEL for those operations. The Secretary obviously disagreed with his
judgment of technological feasibility. We also note that, although petitioners challenged the technological feasibility of the final Cotton Dust
Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such challenge
here. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 8, n. 16.
5 ~ The Court of Appeals observed that "the agency's underlying cost
estimates are not free from imprecision," 617 F. 2d, at 662, but that
"[t]he very nature of economic analysis frequently imposes practical limits
on the precision which reasonably can be required of the agency," id., at
661. We suspect that this results not only from the difficulty of obtaining
accurate data, but also from the inherent crudeness of estimation tools.
Of necessity both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on
assumptions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the.
validity of their final numerical cost estimates. As the official charged
h? Congress with the promulgation of occupational safety and health
standards that protect workers "to the extent feasible," the Secretary was
()bligated to subject such assumptions to careful scrutiny, and to decide·
how they might affect the correctness of the preferred estimates.
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B
After estimating the cost of compliance with the Cotton
Dust Standa.rd, OSHA analyzed whether it was "economically
feasible" for the cotton industry to bear this cost. 55 OSHA
55

In one of their questions presented, petitioners ATMI et al., ask
whether "the statutory requirement that compliance with an OSHA standard must be 'economically feasible' can be satisfied merely by the agency's
conclusion that the standard will not put the affected industry out of
business." Pet. for Writ of Certiorari of ATMI et al., at 2. However,
in argument in their brief, petitioners appear to treat this issue primarily
as a substantial evidence question. See Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al.,
at 24-31. They finally summarize their position as follows:
" . . . OSHA must present a responsible prediction, supported by substantial evidence, of what its standard will cost and what impact it will
have on such factors as production, employment, competition, and prices.
And the agPncy must explain in a cogent manner-on the basis of intelligible eriteria-why it concludes that a standard having such an economic
impact is 'feasible.'" Id, at 35 (footnote omitted).
As our review of OSHA's economic feasibility determination demonstrates, OSHA presented a "responsible prediction" of what its Standard
would cost and its impact on "production, employment, competition, and
prices.'' The agency concluded that its Standard is feasible because ' 1complianre with ritl is well within the finanrial capability of the covered
industries." 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 3. OSHA also found that the industry "will be able to meet the demands for production of cotton products.''
Id, at 27378, col. 2. We take these findings to mean, as the Secretary
suggests, that ''r a lt bottom, the Secretary must [and did] determine that
the industry will maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness.''
Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at. 49. See als'J United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall. No. 79-1048, slip op., at 144, U. S.
App. D. C. - , (1980) ("the practical question is whether the standard
threatens the competitivE' stability of an industry"); Indmtrial Union
Department v. Hodgson, supra,- U.S. App. D. C., at-, 499 F. 2d, at
478. This interpretation by the Secretary is certainly consistent with the
plain meaning of the word "feasible." See Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, supra, slip op., at 31, n. 30 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, this case does not present, and we do not deride,
the question whether a Standard that threatens the long-term profitability
and competitiveness of an industry is "feasible" within the meaning of
§6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. §655 (b)(5).
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.concluded that it was, finding that 11although some marginal
employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry
as a whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements
of the regulation." 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2; see id., at
27379, col. 3 ("compliance with the standard is well within
the financial capability of the covered industries"). In
reaching this conclusion on the Standard's economic impact,
OSHA made specific findings with respect to employment,
enerp:y consumption, capital financing availability, and profitability. Id., at 27377-27378. To support its findings, the
agency relied primarily on RTI's comprehensive investigation
of the Standard's economic impact. 56
RTI evaluated the likely economic impact on yhe cotton
industry and the United States economy of OSHA's original
proposed standard. an across-the-bof!rd 200 ,..g 1m 3 PEL. Ex.
6- 76. Ct. of App. J. A. 626. 5 7 RTI had estimated a total
compliance cost of $2.7 billion for a 200 ,..g;m~ PEL, 58 and
56

In rontrnst to the cost estimates prepared by RTI, OSHA did not
find any major flaws with RTI's study of the economic impact of compliance costs.
57 RTI specifically ·analyzed the impact of the Standard on the followingareas in the cotton industry:
"1) Additional employment requirements.
"2) Energy consumption.
"3) Increases in production costs and consequent price increases by
affected industries.
"4) Capital requirements and capital finanring problems.
"5) Compl;'tition ('ffects on profit and market structure.
"6) Inflationary impact on consumers and U. S. economy.
"7) Employment impact due to the contraction of output demand."
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. ,J. A. 626.
RTI a1so examined the economic impact of two other across-the-board
PELS of 500 ~tgjm 8 and 100 ~tg /m R . Ibid.
58 This cost estimate included $984.4 million for yarn production (open-.
ing through spinning), $1.3879 billion for winding through weaving / slashing, $292.2 million for cotton ginning, and $32 million for wast(' processing;.
Ex. Q--7~, Ct, of App . J. A. 737.
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used this estimate in assessing the economic impact of such
a standard. /d., at 736-737. As described supra, at 31, n.
44, OSHA estimated total compliance costs of $656.5 million
for the final Cotton Dust Standard,09 a Standard less stringent than the across-the-board 200 l-'g/m 8 PEL of the proposed standard. Therefore, the agency found that the economic impact of its Standa.r d would be "much less severe"
than that suggested by RTI for a 200 l-'g/m3 PEL estimate
of $2.7 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2. Nevertheless, it
is instructive to review RTI's conclusions with respect to the
economic impact of a $2.7 billion cost estimate. RTI found:
"Implementation of the proposed [200 l-'g/ m 3 ] standard will require adjustments within the cotton textile
industry that will take time to work themselves out and
that may be difficult for many firms. In time, however,
prices may be expected to rise and markets to adjust so
that revenues will cover costs. Although the impact on
any one firm cannot be specified in advance, nothing in
the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry
as a whole will be seriously threatened by the impact of
the proposed standard for control of cotton clust exposure." Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 1380; id., at 3620.
In reaching this conclusion, RTI analyzed the total and annual economic impact 60 on each of the different sectors of
the cotton industry.
For example, in ya.rn production (opening through spin59

Cotton ginning was the subject of a separate regulntion not at issue
in this case. 43 Fed . Reg. 27350, col. 1; see 29 CFR § 1910.1046 (1980).
60 RTI's annual cost of compliance figure contained three components:
an annualized capital charge, direct operating cost, and energy cost.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . J. A. 643. The annualized capital charge consisted
of depreciation, interest, administrative overhead, property tax, and insurance. Ibid. Depreciation and interest were computed "by use of a
capital recovery factor based upon the conrept of capital rent , the value-·
of which depends on the operating life of the equipment and the market
interest rate." Ibid .

. ,..
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ning), RTI found that the total additional capital requirement per dollar of industry shipment was 7.8 cents, and that
the corresponding annual requirement was 1.9 cents. Ex. 676, Ct. of App. J. A. 729. Average price increases necessary
to maintain pre-standard rates of return on investment were
estimated to range from 0.22 cents to 6.25 cents per dollar
of industry sales. 61 Ibid. Even assuming no price increases,
only one of the six yarn producing operations would experience a negative rate of return on investment, while the five
other rates of return would range from 1.4% to 3.9%. · !d.,
at 652. 02 RTI estimated the average pre-standard rate of
return for the yarn producing sector as 4.1 %. Ibid.
Through an output demand elasticity analysis, RTI determined that price increases necessitated by the 200 ug/m3
61 Petitioners' primary criticism of OSHA's reliance on the RTI study
derives from their disagreement with RTI's assumption that compliance
ccsts would be passed on to the consumers. Brief for Petitioners ATMI
et al., at 28--29. This characterization misstates RTI's position. In calculating price increases neressary to maintain pre-standard rates of return,
RTI "decided to adopt an extreme assumption of zero price demand'
elasticity in computing post-control price increases" because of difficulties
in obtaining data necessary to compute elasticities for cotton yarns.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 657. However, RTI carefully tested this
assumption to determine "how much bias" it would introduce into the
analysis. Id, at 657-659. RTI concluded that, "unless the true demand
elasticity for the output of the given sector is substantially greater than
unity, our impact analysis based on the assumption of zero price elasticity
of demand would not be invalidated." /d., at 659. Therefore, unless a
1% increase in price was met with substantially more than a 1% decrease
in demand, RTI's estimates of the price increases necessary to maintain
pre-standard rates of return were valid. Since there was no evidence
suggesting such an effect, RTI proceeded with its assumption.
In any event, RTI subsequently investigated short-term price elasticities
of demand for 25 cotton consumer products, finding that 19 of them had
elasticities less than or equal to unity. !d., at 681.
62 RTI found higher price increases and lower rates of return when·
framing its analysis in pounds of cotton yarn produced. See Ex. 6-76, Ct,.
Qf Apj). J, A.. 654, 729-730,
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standard would result in a 1.68% contraction of cotton yarn
consumption.'18 ld., at 685; see id., at 680-687. RTI also discussed the effects of such price increases on interfiber and
domestic/foreign competition. RTI ob::;erved that "non-price
faetors have probably dominated" the competition between
cotton and man-made fibers. !d., at 623; 948-953. 114 Noting
that international trade agreements restricting foreign imports
of textile products "have tended to smother the effects of a
small change in the relative prices of domestic versus foreign
textile products," id., at 622, RTI concluded that such small
changes have had "very little impact" on domestic industries
and markets, id., at 961; see id., at 954-961. In order to
measure the ability of different sized textile companies to
finance compliance costs, RTI constructed a ratio of capital
requirements to profit after taxes. RTI found that two of
03

Petitioner National Cotton Council of American criticizes RTI's use
of short-term price elasticity coefficients, claiming that this undrrestimates
long-term demand responses to price increases. Brief for Petitioner
National Cotton Council of America, at 16-17. However, RTI'~ Dr. Lee,
who conducted the elasticity analy~i:s, observed that he used two independent procedures to compute dPmand contraction, and only one relied
on short-term price rlasticities. Ct. of App. J. A. 362G-a627. His
"main prorrdure [was] input output table prorrdures," which produced
an even >·mallrr drmand contraction estimate than those calculations relying on the short-term coefli.rients. Ibid.
64
RTI cited :mch nonprire factors as "re~earch expenditures, J)romotion and advertising, fiber and fabric development, fiber propertiel:l, and
rare charactrristirs of fabric." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 623. John
Figh, Cha8e l\.lanhattan hank vice-president, observed that "polyestrr has
grown at the expense of cotton over the la~t 10 years and I think it has
11enetrated moHt of the markets it ean penetrate; . . . [T]he majority of
it, the growth of polyester at the t;xpense of cotton, has been completed.".
Joint App. 474-475. He noted that some cotton products, such as towels
and 100% cotton men's shirts, enjoy the support of consumer preferences.
Ibid. Although RTI cited the energy crisis without detailing its possible
impact on man-made fibl.'r products, Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App . .T. A. 948,
OSHA observed that changes in petroleum prices, a key ingredient in
synthetic prodn<'ts, may have important impacts on the competitive·
balance, see 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 2.
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the six yarn production operations would have financing difficulties, but that such difficulties decreased as company size
increased. Id., at 730. 65 Finally, impacts on energy costs,
employment, inflation, and market structure were evaluated.
See id., at 728-731. 66
Relying on its comprehensive economic evaluation of the
cotton industry's ability to absorb the $2.7 billion compliance cost of a 200 p.g/m 3 PEL standard, RTI concluded that
"nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile
industry as a whole will be seriously threatened." Ex. 60,
Ct. of App. J. A. 1380. 67 Therefore, it follows a fortiori that
65

Two of the six yarn production operations had ratios less than 1, two
had ratios less than 2, and the remaining two were less than 6. Ex. 6-76,
Ct. of App. J. A. 665. Chase Manhattan Bank's John Figh agreed with
RTI's assessment that financing the $2.7 billion compliance cost for a
200 ,ugjm 3 PEL standard would be most. difficult for smaller textile companies. Ex. 63, Ct. of App. J. A. 2264-2265.
66 RTI conducted similar economic impact analyses, although in less
depth, for the twisting through weaving and waste processing sectors
of the cotton industry covered by the proposed 200 ,ugjm" PEL standard.
Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 462. RTI found, for example, that price
increases per dollar of industry sales ranged from .5 cents to 18 cents
for twisting through weaving operations, and that some of these operations
would experience "severe" financing difficulties. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App.
J. A. 733-734. To recount in further detail these conclusions would be an
irrelevant exercise. RTI calculated that a 200 ,ugjm8 standard for weaving/slashing would cost $1.259 billion, id., at 600, and computed the
economic impact based on that figure. But RTI had also estimated that
complia.nce co:;ts for a 500 ,ugjm 3 PEL would be zero.. Ibid. Since the
final Cotton Dust Standard sets a 750 ,ugjm" PEL for weaving/slashing,
further review of RTI's conclusion with respect to its $1.259 billion cost
is particularly unnecessary.
67 Petitioners note that, although RTI estimated that compliance with
the Cotton Dust, Standard would take 8 or more years, OSHA required
compliance within four years. Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29.
RTI chose an 8-year period primarily because of "problems the control
industry may have in supplying the required equipment." Joint App.
415; see id., at 415-416. If this proves to be the case, then presumably
individual mills will be able to obtain variances from the Standard's
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OSHA's estimated compliance cost of $656.6 million is "eco..,
nomically feasible." 68 Even if OSHA's estimate were under.,
stated, we are fortified in observing that RTI found that E\.
standard more than four times as costly was nevertheless economically feasible.
The Court of Appeals found that the agency "explained
the economic impact it projected for the textile industryt
and that OSHA has "substantial support in the record for
its ... findings of economic feasibility for the textile industry." 617 F. 2d, at 662. On the basis of the whole record,
we cannot conclude that the Court of Appeal's "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test.

III
The final Cotton Dust Standard places heavy reliance on
the use of respirators to protect employees from exposure to
cotton dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period
necessary to install and implement feasible engineering controls.69 One part of the respirator provision requires the
requirements because of technological infeasibility. See 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (e) (1); 29 U.S. C.§ 655 (6).
68 Perhaps in light of this fact, neither petitioners ATMI et al. nor
petitioner National Cotton Council of America frame their "economic impact" substantial evidence arguments based on OSHA's estimate of compliance costs. Instead, they adopt as a minimum RTI's $2.7 billion
'f'stimate for compliance co;;ts with the proposed standard's 200 ~tgjm 3
PEL. Brief for Petitioner National Cotton Council of America, at 15-16;
·Brief for Petitioners ATMI et al., at 29.
69 The final Standard, 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (1), provides:
"Where the use of repirators is required under this section, the employer
'shall provide, at no cost to the employee, and assure the use of respirators
which comply with the requirements of this paragraph (f). Respirators
shall be used in the following circumstances:
"(i) During the time periods necessary to install or implement feasible
•engineering controls and work practice controls;
"(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which engineering
;nnd work practice con trois are not feasible;
"(iii) In work situations where feasible engineering and work practice
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employer to give employees unable to wear a respirator 70
the opportunity to transfer to another position, if available,
where the dust level meets the standard's PEL. 29 CFR
§ 1910.1043 (f) (2)(v). When such a transfer occurs, the employer must guarantee that the employee suffers no loss of
earnings or other employment rights or benefits. 71 Petitioners do not object to the transfer provision, but challenge
OSHA's authority under the Act to require employers to
guarantee employees' wage and employment benefits following the transfer. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA
has such authority. 617 F. 2d, at 675. We conclude that,
whether or not OSHA has this underlying authority, the
agency has failed to ma.ke the necessary determination or
statement of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is
related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work
environment.
Respondents urge several statutory bases for the authority
exercised here. The cite § 2 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 651,
which declares that the purpose of the Act is "to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions"; § 2 (b)(5), id., at
controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to or below the permissible exposure limit; and
"(iv) In operations specified under paragraph (g)(1).
" ( v) Whenever an employee requests a respirator."
70 An employee may be unable to wear a respirator because of facial
irritation, severe discomfort, or impaired breathing. 43 Fed. Reg. 27387,
col. 1 and 2.
71
The regulation, 29 CFR § 1019.1043 (f) (2) (v) (emphasis added),
provides:
"Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear
any form of respirator, including a power air purifying respirator, the
employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another position
which is available or later becomes available having a dust level at or
below the PEL. The employer shall assure that an employee who is

transferred due to an inability t"o wear a respirator suffers no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer.'"'
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§ 651 (b) ( 5), which suggests achievement of the purpose "by
developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems" 1
§ 6 (b)(5), id., at § 655 (b)(5), which requires the agency t~
"set the standard which most adequately assures ... that n~
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity . . . "; and § 3 (8), id., at § 652 (8), which
provides that a standard must require "conditions, or the
adoption or use of one or more practiCes, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment." Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 68. Whatever methods these
provisions authorize OSHA to apply, it is clear that such
methods must be justified on the basis of their relation tu
safety or health.
Section 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), requires
that "determinations of the Secretary" must be supported
by substantial evidence. Section 6 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 655 (e),
requires the Secretary to include "a statement of the reasons
for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register." In his "Summary and Explanation of the Standard,"
the Secretary stated: "Each section includes an analysis of
the record evidence and the policy considerations underlying
the decisions adopted pertaining to specific provisions of the
standard." 43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 2. But OSHA never
explained the wage guarantee provision as an approach designed to contribute to increased health protection. Instead
the agency stated that the "goal of this provision is to minimize any adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue
of the inability to wear a respirator." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387,
col. 3. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, respondents in
their briefs argue that
"[e]xperience under the Act has shown that employees
are reluctant to disclose symptoms of disease and tencf
to minimize work-related health problems for fear ~f
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being discharged or transferred to a lowel' paying job... ,
It may reasonably be expected, therefore, that many employees incapable of using respirators would continue to
breathe unhealthy air rather than request a transfer, thus
destroying the utility of the respirator program." Brief
for Respondent Secretary of Labor, at 67; see Brief for
Respondent Unions, at 51. 72
Whether these arguments have merit, and they very well
may, 78 thP post-hoc rationalizations of the agency or the parties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate
for agency action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines
v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). For Congress gave
OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and safety,
and to explain its reasons for its actions. Because the Act in
no way authorizes OSHA to repair general unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety
• 72 Although it citPd no !>pccific detprmination or statement of rea~ons
proferred by the SPcretary, the Court of Appeal::; was persuaded by this
:ugumPnt. 617 F. 2d., at 675.
73 TherP ib evidPnce in the rrcord that might :support uch a detpmination. Dr. Merchant testified that a medical surveillance prcgram alone
\Vould not be sufficiPnt for identifying and relocating employPes suffPring
from byssinosis. Joint App. 440--441. He observed:
"TherP is reluctance very often among thP employee himself to lea,·p his
job. I think rlParly some guarantees as to wag2s and opp:>rtunities must
be an integral purt of any recommendution to relocate somebody and it
has bPen the experience in roal mining where miners are allowed, u"der
thr Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, to be tram::fPrrrd, a very
low proportion of thrse men actually exerci::;e the;r tran:sfer rights. ld., at
441.
Howcwr, the rourts will not be expPrted to scrutinize the record to
uncover and formulatE' a rationale explaining an artion , whf'n the agrncy
in the first in::;tanrf' ha:; failf'd to articulate ::;uch rationale. See AutoU. S. App. D. C. - , 407
motive Parts & Accessories Assn. Y. Boyd, F. 2d 330, 338 (1968).
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goals, we conclude that OSHA acted beyond statutory author... J
ity when it issued the wage guarantee regulation/

v
When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health
Act in 1970, it chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring
employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited
only by the feasibility of achieving such an environment.
We must measure the validity of the Secretary's actions
against the requirements of that Act. For "[t]he· judicial
function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory
policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and
Executive oversight or amendatory legislation." Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra,
slip op., at 2 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring); see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185, 187-188, 194-195
(1978).
74 In its specific discussion of the transfer/guarantee proviHion, occupying more than two-thirds of a column in the Federal Register, OSHA
argued that "[i]t is manifestly unfair that employees who are unable to
wear respirators suffer . . . economic detriment because their employers
have not yet achieved compliance with the engineering control requirements of the standard, but are relying instead on the interim and less
effective device of respirators." 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, col. 2 and 3. The
agency then stated its judgment that the "protection [the transfer and
guarantee regulation] affords should greatly increase the success of the
standard's respiratory protection provisions." ld., at 27387, col. 3. Since
the Secretary had already presented an unauthorized reason for the guarantee provision, we decline to accept this "boilerplate" statement as a
sufficient determination and statement of reasons within the meaning of the
Act. 29 U.S. C.§§ 655 (e), (f). See Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufact·urers Association v. Brennan, 503 F. 2d 1155, 1157, 1160 (CAB 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U. S. 973 (1975); Industrial Union Department v.
Hodgson , supra,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 499 F. 2d, at 475-476; Assoc. \
Industries of New York State, Inc.''· U.S . Dept. of L'lbor. 4!:17 F. :2d :342,
354 (CA2 1973); Dry Color Manufacturers' Assn. v. Dept. of Labor, 486
F. 2d 98, 105-106 (CA3 1973). See also Berger & Riskin, Ecmwmie and
Technological Frasibili1y in Regulating Toxic Substances Un<.ler the Octmpational Safety and Health Act, 7 Ecology L. Q. 285, 298-299 (1978).
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is af.,
firmed in all respects except to the extent of its approval of
the Secretary's application of the wage guarantee provision
of the Cotton Dust Standard at 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f) (2)
(v). To that extent, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated and the case remanded with directions to remand
to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion,
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Dear Gib:
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Lewis III called me this morning to say
that Mims was concerned by my failure to
participate in the decision of the cotton dust
cases, decided this week •
The cotton dust cases were filed here
last fall, and were argued January 21. At that
time, ! .did not know about the lead industry cases
(Lead Industries Association, et al v. Donovan and
two other cases) • Indeed these cases did not come
to the attention of the Justices until sometime in
May.
I then learned that Hunton & Williams was
counsel for one of the petitioners, the Ethyl
Corporation.
When it became apparent that there was
an overlap of issues, I concluded that I should
not participate further in the cotton dust cases •
Thus, although I sat for the argument and had
participated in the consideration of those cases
up to that time, I then withdrew and did not take
part in the final decision.
I can well understand how you and your
partners - as well as Mims - may have wondered
what happened.
I am glad to have the opportunity
to explain it.
I am the only Justice who came to the
Court directly from the private practice of law.
In addition, my firm had an extensive list of
clients - many of which were my personal clients.
Thus, I have recusal problems that most Justices
do not have. Even so, in argued cases, this
problem has arisen infrequently.

..

2.
As normally we do not give details as to
recusals, I write this letter for the confidential
information of you and your partners.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,

w. Gibson Harris, Esquire
McGuire, woods & Battle
Ross Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
lfp/ss
cc:

1'

Ms. Mims Powell

